【桥水观点】深度理解欧洲经济滞涨的本质
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Europe’s Stagflation Is Different in Kind and Much Harder to Remedy
欧洲的滞胀性质不同，政策补救难度将十分棘手
Europe’s energy supply shock is creating a painful stagflation, and policy makers face a difficult set of choices. Looking forward, structurally higher energy prices will be a long-term competitiveness challenge for Europe.
欧洲的能源供应链冲击正在造成痛苦的滞胀，决策者面临着一系列艰难的选择。在未来，结构性上涨的能源价格将对欧洲面临的长期竞争力形成巨大挑战。
What was once a possibility is now a virtual certainty…Europe will face a major contraction this winter because it will not have enough energy to run its economy. As Europe severs its links to Russian gas, the current energy shortfall is being reflected in sky-high natural gas prices (the equivalent of over $350-per-barrel oil), one-year electricity prices in Germany and France that are about 10x higher than normal, and in serious actions to curtail demand. This challenge calls for a different policy response. While interest rate hikes are the right tool for dealing with too-strong demand in the US, they are likely an insufficient tool for Europe, where a true supply shock is constraining production. Instead, encouraging rationing and shutting down energy-intensive industries will be needed. Policy makers may also want to reduce the second-order effects of these shutdowns, supporting incomes in order to avoid a self-reinforcing contraction. How much to stimulate fiscally and not tighten monetarily is far from obvious, as inflation will clearly be high even as the economy contracts.
在过去仅仅只被视为可能性之一现在已经成为现实。
欧洲将在今年冬天面临严重经济收缩，因为它没有足够的能量以运作。随着欧洲切断与俄罗斯天然气的联系，当前的能源短缺反映在天价天然气价格（相当于每桶超过 350 美元的石油），德国和法国的一年电价高出约 10 倍高于正常水平，并采取严肃行动抑制需求。这一挑战需要不同的政策回应。虽然加息是应对美国过于强劲需求的正确工具，但对欧洲来说可能不是足够的工具，因为真正的供应冲击正在生产规模的所见。相反，将需要鼓励配给和关闭能源密集型产业。政策制定者可能还希望减少这些关闭的次级效应，支持收入以避免自我强化的收缩。财政刺激而不是货币紧缩的程度远非显而易见，因为即使经济收缩，通胀显然也会很高。
Looking beyond this winter, the effects on the European economy of structurally higher energy prices may also be profound. The German economy, supported for years by its highly competitive, energy-intensive industrial sector, will be acutely strained. Like Brexit, this shock will create weaker secular growth, higher necessary levels of inflation, and a downward pressure on the currency over time.
冬天之后，结构性能源价格上涨对欧洲经济的影响也可能是深远的。德国经济多年来一直受到其高度竞争的能源密集型工业部门的支持，将陷入极度紧张的困境与英国脱欧一样，这种冲击将导致长期增长放缓、必要的通胀水平上升，并随着时间的推移对货币造成下行压力。
An Update on Europe’s Transition Away from Russian Gas
欧洲在摆脱俄罗斯天然气努力上的最新进展
Europe’s transition away from Russian gas is already well underway. Prior to the war in Ukraine, Europe typically imported 155 bcm of natural gas from Russia (roughly 40% of total gas imports). Since the invasion, Europe has moved to 1) find new sources of supply, such as LNG and expanded pipeline imports from European producers, and 2) build up gas storage levels to 80–90% of total capacity in order to have enough supply to meet expected demand during the two coldest months of winter. Altogether, even with Russia exporting gas to Europe at 40% of its total pipeline capacity, Europe had been on track to muddle through it and stretch to meet its storage targets in time for winter. But this was only possible because of Europe’s willingness to pay sky-high natural gas prices in the process. And starting two months ago, Russia curtailed imports to roughly 20% of capacity. The charts below show our read of current gas supply and demand in the subset of Western European countries where we have the timeliest data.
欧洲从俄罗斯天然气的过渡已经在顺利进行。在乌克兰战争之前，欧洲通常从俄罗斯进口 155 bcm 的天然气（约占天然气进口总量的 40%）。
自入侵以来，欧洲已采取行动 1) 寻找新的供应来源，例如液化天然气和扩大从欧洲生产商进口的管道，以及 2) 将天然气储存水平提高到总容量的 80–90%，以便有足够的供应满足冬季最寒冷的两个月的预期需求。总而言之，即使俄罗斯以其管道总容量的 40% 向欧洲出口天然气，欧洲仍有望蒙混过关，并在冬季及时实现其储存目标。但这之所以成为可能，是因为欧洲愿意在此过程中支付天价天然气。从两个月前开始，俄罗斯将进口量削减至产能的大约 20%。下图显示了我们对我们拥有最及时数据的部分西欧国家的当前天然气供需情况的解读。
The most recent reduction in Russian gas flow likely means Europe will not have enough gas to meet its storage targets for the winter unless it curtails consumption from here. Europe has come close to exhausting the levers it had for finding alternative sources of natural gas supply in the short term. While there is potentially some extra juice to squeeze from the LNG market once one or two LNG floating regasification units come online in Germany around December, the market is giving a clear signal to reduce natural gas demand in the form of skyrocketing prices. And while some demand destruction has already occurred and natural gas consumption is down ~20% at this point versus previous years, the majority of the pain will come later this year given the highly seasonal nature of demand. In addition, there are a number of other factors that could cause prices to rise from here and require more painful cuts in natural gas consumption. Europe is competing with the rest of the world for LNG imports, and a resurgence in Chinese demand could make it much more difficult to access supply. Low water levels in the Rhine have made it harder to ship coal to German power plants, and heat waves in France have made it harder to cool down nuclear reactors. A colder winter would lead to higher heating demand, putting increased pressure on prices.
最近俄罗斯天然气流量的减少可能意味着欧洲将没有足够的天然气来满足冬季的储存目标，除非它减少这里的消费。欧洲已接近耗尽其在短期内寻找替代天然气供应来源的手段。一旦 12 月左右在德国上线一两个液化天然气浮式再气化装置，液化天然气市场可能会挤出一些额外的能源，但市场正在以价格飞涨的形式发出明确的信号，以减少天然气需求。虽然一些需求破坏已经发生，天然气消耗量与往年相比下降了约 20%，但鉴于需求的高度季节性，大部分痛苦将在今年晚些时候到来。此外，还有许多其他因素可能导致价格从现在开始上涨，并需要更痛苦地削减天然气消费。欧洲正在与世界其他地区竞争液化天然气进口，而中国在经济需求的复苏可能会使获得供应变得更加困难。莱茵河的低水位使得将煤炭运往德国发电厂变得更加困难，而法国的热浪使得冷却核反应堆变得更加困难。寒冷的冬天将导致供暖需求增加，从而增加价格压力。
Triangulating across our analysis and external sources, we would pencil in the demand reduction required this winter relative to previous winters to be on the order of 10% if Russian imports stay at the current level, and 15% in the event they fall to zero. This would respectively require a comparable 10–15% reduction in industrial demand, with the rest of the reduction likely to occur via substitution in electricity production and heating demand, per external estimates.
对我们的分析和外部资源进行三角测量，如果俄罗斯进口保持在当前水平，我们认为今年冬天相对于往年冬天所需的需求减少大约 10%，如果俄罗斯进口量降至零，则需要减少 15%。 根据外部估计，这将分别要求工业需求减少 10–15%，其余减少可能通过替代电力生产和供暖需求来实现。
European governments have thus far remained steadfast in their resolve to continue supporting Ukraine, even if it requires enduring economic pain. To achieve the necessary demand reduction and prepare for the possibility of a complete shutoff of natural gas, the European Commission has laid out a high-level approach for member states to reduce gas usage by 15% through March 2023 compared to a long-term, five-year average (a 45 bcm reduction). From least painful to most painful, the tenets of the planned approach are 1) Continued gas substitution and diversification, 2) Voluntary demand reduction, including price-driven demand destruction and tactics such as public awareness campaigns, 3) Preparing for the possibility of EU-mandated rationing as a last resort when the above options are exhausted. Any rationing would prioritize households over industry, and within industry, those with critical products and where temporary shutdowns would risk permanent infrastructure damage would be prioritized. Finally, 4) The European Commission has clarified conditionality for potential invocation of energy solidarity clauses, establishing a governance framework to assess whether member states have made “best efforts” to reduce their gas consumption before they can compel other member states to share their natural gas supply.
迄今为止，欧洲各国政府一直坚定地继续支持乌克兰局势，即使这意味着欧盟需要遭受持久的经济下行的痛苦。为了实现必要的需求减少并为完全关闭天然气的可能性做准备，欧盟委员会为成员国制定了一项高级别方法，与长期相比，到 2023 年 3 月将天然气使用量减少 15%，五年平均值（减少 45 bcm）。从最不痛苦到最痛苦，计划方法的原则是 1) 持续的天然气替代和多样化，2) 自愿减少需求，包括价格驱动的需求破坏和策略，例如公众意识活动，3) 为欧盟的可能性做准备-当上述选项用尽时，强制配给是最后的手段。任何配给都会优先考虑家庭而不是工业，而在工业内部，那些拥有关键产品以及临时关闭可能会造成永久性基础设施损坏的产品将被优先考虑。最后，4) 欧盟委员会阐明了可能援引能源团结条款的条件，建立了一个治理框架来评估成员国是否已“尽最大努力”减少天然气消耗，然后才能迫使其他成员国分享其天然气供应。
This only outlines the general approach, and it falls on individual member states in the EU to formulate precise plans for achieving the voluntary demand-reduction targets. We are in the process of seeing those plans materialize. As an example, we show below the announced policies in Germany, where the dependency on Russian gas is the highest and the need to reduce demand is the most acute.
这只是概述了一般方法，由欧盟各成员国制定实现自愿减少需求目标的具体计划。我们正在见证这些计划的实现。例如，我们在下面显示了德国宣布的政策，其中对俄罗斯天然气的依赖度最高，减少需求的需求也最为迫切。
We’re also starting to get a clearer sense from industry on how companies are already working to reduce gas consumption in response to high prices and voluntary government incentive schemes. Multiple companies have started to announce efforts to substitute gas with oil in their production (e.g., car manufacturer Mercedes-Benz, glass manufacturer Wiegand-Glas, chemical company H&R), while others are moving production of their most energy-intensive products elsewhere (e.g., chemical conglomerate BASF is reducing ammonia production and sourcing ammonia from the US).
我们也开始从行业中更清楚地了解公司如何努力减少天然气消耗以应对高价格和政府将如何开展能源自愿激励计划。 多家公司已开始宣布努力在其生产中以石油替代天然气（例如，汽车制造商梅赛德斯-奔驰、玻璃制造商 Wiegand-Glas、化学公司 H&R），而其他公司则将其能源密集型产品的生产转移到其他地方（例如 ，化学集团巴斯夫正在减少氨产量并从美国采购氨）。
The pain Europe is set to face is likely Putin’s intention in curtailing the flow of Russian gas down to 20% — keeping Europe from meeting its storage targets without significant economic pain provides Russia with maximum leverage over Europe during the winter. The winter may be the last time Russia has such leverage before Europe can implement longer-term solutions that fully wean it off Russian gas (including nuclear energy and expanded renewables). That said, we see continued Russian gas flow at 20% as a more likely outcome than a full cutoff of Russian gas, given Russia is already exporting gas to Asia at the maximum capacity current pipelines allow, and cutting Europe off now would remove any leverage Russia would have to apply further economic pressure in the winter. But a full cutoff is still a risk, and either way, the long-term challenge is clear in terms of the loss of a significant amount of Russian supply and the cost of alternatives to replace it.
欧洲即将面临的痛苦很可能是普京打算将俄罗斯的天然气流量减少到 20% — — 阻止欧洲在没有重大经济痛苦的情况下实现其储存目标，这为俄罗斯在冬季对欧洲提供了最大的影响力。 2022年的冬天可能是俄罗斯最后一次拥有这种影响力，然后欧洲才能实施长期解决方案，使其完全摆脱俄罗斯天然气（包括核能和扩大的可再生能源）。也就是说，我们认为俄罗斯的天然气流量继续保持在 20% 比完全切断俄罗斯天然气更有可能，因为俄罗斯已经以当前管道允许的最大容量向亚洲出口天然气，现在切断欧洲将消除任何杠杆作用 俄罗斯将不得不在冬季施加进一步的经济压力。但全面停产仍然存在风险，无论哪种方式，就俄罗斯供应的大量损失以及替代品的成本而言，长期挑战是显而易见的。
Understanding the Growth Shock of the Shortfall in European Energy
了解欧洲能源短缺对增长的冲击
Over the next eight months, Europe will have to swallow the pain of higher prices and reduced energy supply. The most energy-intensive sectors are the most at risk, comprising roughly 3% of total gross value added (GVA) in Europe and 25% of the region’s industrial natural gas usage. This effect most likely translates to a roughly 1–2% direct hit to growth, in line with these industries reducing gas consumption by roughly one- to two-thirds to get the total 10–15% necessary reduction in industrial gas demand. Many of the impacted industries are also already very low-margin, making weathering the current high energy costs even more untenable. On top of the hit to industry, we’d expect a further drag from the hit to households facing significantly higher heating and electricity prices, especially in the winter, and cutting spending elsewhere. Finally, there is a further downside risk to growth from the ripple effects of how companies and households respond to the shortfall in gas and higher prices — for example, the most energy-intensive sectors are roughly 4% of total employment, suggesting a further hit to growth if cutbacks in production are not paired with fiscal support to furloughed workers, and reductions in industry production may also cause broader supply chain problems.
在接下来的八个月里，欧洲将不得不忍受价格上涨和能源供应减少的痛苦。能源最密集的行业面临的风险最大，约占欧洲总增加值 (GVA) 的 3% 和该地区工业天然气使用量的 25%。这种影响很可能转化为对增长造成大约 1–2% 的直接影响，这与这些行业将天然气消耗量减少大约三分之二，从而使工业气体需求总量减少 10–15% 一致。许多受影响的行业的利润率也已经很低，这使得承受当前高能源成本的风险更加难以为继。除了对工业的打击之外，我们预计家庭面临着更高的供暖和电力价格，尤其是在冬季，并削减其他地方的支出，这将进一步拖累家庭。最后，公司和家庭如何应对天然气短缺和价格上涨的连锁反应对经济增长造成进一步的下行风险 — — 例如，能源密集型行业约占总就业人数的 4%，这表明进一步打击如果减产不与对休假工人的财政支持相结合，则可能会影响增长，而工业减产也可能导致更广泛的供应链问题。
When we look at total energy expenditure, about 10% of industry, translating to about 2% of Europe’s GVA, uses almost half of all industrial energy.
当我们查看总能源支出时，大约 10% 的工业（相当于欧洲 GVA 的 2% 左右）使用了几乎所有工业能源的一半。
The chart below shows a rough, first-order indication of what share of European industries become unprofitable as energy prices rise — highlighting the blow to competitiveness from higher energy prices.
下图粗略地显示了随着能源价格上涨，有多少欧洲工业变得无利可图 — — 突出了能源价格上涨对竞争力的打击。
A Difficult Trade-Off for Policy Makers
The inflationary situation in Europe calls for a different policy response compared to the US. While the US is facing an overheating as a result of strong MP3 stimulus and waiting too long to tighten, the European economy is weaker, with inflation much more driven by the energy supply shock. As you can see, while the two economies face similar levels of headline inflation, core inflation in Europe is lower (4% versus 6% in the US), and other indicators of cyclical overheating are much stronger in the US, such as higher wage growth and lower unemployment.
政策制定者的艰难权衡
与美国相比，欧洲的通胀形势要求采取不同的政策应对措施。尽管美国因强有力的MP3（货币政策III）刺激措施而面临过热并且收紧政策的时间过长，但欧洲经济较为疲软，通货膨胀更多地受到能源供应冲击的推动。 如您所见，虽然这两个经济体面临相似的整体通胀水平，但欧洲的核心通胀较低（4% 对美国的 6%），而美国的其他周期性过热指标要强得多，例如更高的工资 增长和较低的失业率。
These conditions call for differing policy responses — while there was persistently strong nominal demand in the US that had to be cooled, demand is weaker in Europe and interest rates are unlikely to meaningfully address the problem of high energy prices. Instead, policy makers will want to prevent the growth shock from demand rationing from cascading into a self-reinforcing growth contraction; not necessarily easing, but not a sharp tightening into high inflation and slowing growth. Market pricing generally reflects this different policy approach for the ECB, with much less tightening priced in, both compared to the US today and in terms of how much tightening expectations have fallen in Europe compared to the US as Russia started further curtailing gas flow. But at the same time, the ECB is testing the limits of anchored inflation expectations by staying easy in response to persistent 7–8% levels of inflation, and a choice to stay easy today does increase the potential need for a sharp tightening into a deep economic contraction in the future.
这些情况需要采取不同的政策应对措施 — — 虽然美国的名义需求持续强劲且不得不降温，但欧洲的需求疲软且利率不太可能有效解决能源价格高企的问题。相反，政策制定者将希望防止需求配给带来的增长冲击升级为自我强化的增长收缩；这意味着欧洲央行不一定会放松，但也不会急剧收紧导致高通胀和增长放缓。市场定价通常反映了欧洲央行的这种不同政策方式，与当今的美国相比，以及随着俄罗斯开始进一步限制天然气流量，欧洲的紧缩预期与美国相比，欧洲央行的紧缩预期要低得多。但与此同时，欧洲央行正在通过保持宽松政策以应对持续的 7–8% 通胀水平来测试锚定通胀预期的极限，而今天选择保持宽松政策确实增加了大幅收紧货币政策的潜在需求未来经济收缩。
A major element of the European policy response to the energy shortage thus far has been fiscal support to cushion the blow of high energy prices in the form of policies aimed at reducing energy costs (fuel tax cuts, price caps) and direct support to the most vulnerable households and most affected companies. These policies have been a moderate support to GDP, and we expect additional fiscal stimulus to be announced from here, as many of the programs announced are due to expire soon even though energy prices will remain high — for example, German fuel tax credits and public transport subsidies were due to expire at the end of August, though Chancellor Scholz clarified in a recent press conference, “We will bring another relief package on the way to protect citizens…People can rely on us not to leave them alone.”
迄今为止，欧洲应对能源短缺政策的一个主要内容是财政支持，以旨在降低能源成本（燃油税削减、价格上限）的政策形式缓冲高能源价格的冲击，并直接支持最 弱势家庭和受影响最大的公司。交通补贴原定于 8 月底到期，尽管肖尔茨总理在最近的新闻发布会上澄清说：“我们将在途中推出另一套救济方案以保护公民……人们可以相信我们不会让他们孤单。”
Elevated Energy Prices Pose a Long-Term Threat to German Competitiveness
Looking beyond this winter, Europe will continue to face elevated energy prices in response to reduced supply, dealing a major blow to its competitiveness. Europe has lost a major source of cheap energy, and the alternatives available are either expensive (bidding up the price of LNG to direct it away from Asia) or only short-term solutions (temporarily compromising environmental objectives to increase coal production, delaying the retirement of old nuclear plants). Other factors that have kept a lid on natural gas prices are also likely to fade, such as China’s zero-COVID policies suppressing demand and China ramping up coal production to meet its energy needs, contrary to its environmental objectives. Long-term solutions such as expanded renewable energy and potentially new nuclear plants will require years to come online. TTF futures reflect the difficulty of the path ahead for Europe — through 2024, natural gas is priced to remain roughly 5x more expensive than the 2015–2019 average.
能源价格上涨对德国竞争力构成长期威胁
展望今年冬天之后，欧洲将因供应减少而继续面临能源价格上涨，对其竞争力造成重大打击。欧洲已经失去了廉价能源的主要来源，可用的替代品要么价格昂贵（抬高液化天然气的价格以将其从亚洲转移出去），要么只是短期解决方案（暂时牺牲环境目标以增加煤炭产量，推迟退役）旧核电站）。其他限制天然气价格的因素也可能会消失，例如zero COVID 政策抑制需求，以及中国提高煤炭产量以满足其能源需求，这与其环境目标背道而驰。扩大可再生能源和潜在的新核电站等长期解决方案将需要数年才能上线。TTF 期货反映了欧洲前进道路的困难 — — 到 2024 年，天然气价格仍将比 2015–2019 年平均价格高出约 5 倍。
In many ways, the European energy crisis has similarities with the Brexit shock in the UK — a massive blow to productive capacity that will weaken demand and increase prices, leaving the economy in a secularly less-competitive position. There are no easy policy solutions for restoring productive capacity, and Europe will have to muddle through higher energy costs for some time. While competitiveness is far from the only driver of currency pricing, it is notable that the euro is approaching secular lows against the dollar, as an indication of the secular challenges ahead.
在许多方面，欧洲能源危机与英国脱欧冲击有相似之处 — — 对生产能力的巨大打击将削弱需求并推高价格，使经济长期处于缺乏竞争力的地位。恢复产能没有简单的政策解决方案，欧洲将不得不在一段时间内应付更高的能源成本。虽然竞争力远非货币定价的唯一驱动因素，但值得注意的是，欧元兑美元正接近长期低点，这表明未来将面临长期挑战。
European equities stand out to us as a market where the pricing doesn’t reflect the scope and intensity of the challenges ahead. Earnings are priced to continue growing at a relatively sanguine rate, but the upcoming winter will require painful demand destruction. There is a decent chance that fiscal policy is able to support companies and limit the hit to earnings over the next few months but doing so risks inflation and a more substantial tightening down the line.
欧洲股票板块对我们来说是一个颇具吸引力的市场，其定价并未反映未来挑战的范围和强度。 收益预计将继续以相对乐观的速度增长，但即将到来的冬季将需要痛苦的需求破坏。未来几个月，财政政策很有可能能够支持企业并限制对收益的冲击，但这样做可能会导致通胀和更大幅度的紧缩。
