【橋水雄文】深入剖析美國經濟的內部矛盾

Delving into the Six Stages of the Internal Cycle with a Particular Focus on the US Now

深入研究美國經濟內部循環的六個階段。

Internal orders typically (though not always) change through a relatively standard sequence of stages, like how a disease progresses. By looking at their symptoms we can tell what stages they are in. For example, just as Stage 3 cancer is different from Stage 4 cancer in ways defined by different conditions that exist and have come about as a result of things that happened in prior stages, the same is true for the different stages of the big internal order/disorder cycle. Like diseases, different conditions warrant different actions to address them and they produce a different range of probabilities that those actions will produce. For example, an old, unhealthy set of circumstances produces a range of possibilities and warrants different actions than a young, healthy set. As with cancer, it is best to stop the progress before getting into the later stages.

經濟的內部秩序通常（儘管並非總是如此）通過相對標準的（事件演變）的階段性以及先後順序進行轉變，比如說疾病的爆發和傳播。通過理解這些傳染病的症狀，我們可以大致判斷出疫情本身處於哪個階段。

例如，正如第三階段癌症與第四階段癌症的不同之處在於，由於先前階段發生的事情而存在和發生的不同狀況決定了這種方式，對於內部秩序/混亂週期的不同階段，情況亦然。

和疾病類似，不同的宏觀經濟外部條件將要求我們採取不同的措施來應對這些疾病，並且它們會產生不同的概率範圍，這些概率將產生不同的事件以及行為。

例如，一組陳舊，不健康的環境的數據組會產生一系列可能性，並且需要採取與年輕，健康的環境不同的行動。與和癌症戰鬥一樣，我們最好在進入癌症末期之前就介入並阻止其蔓延。

Below is the list of measures of health that I first passed along to you in Chapter 1. Most of these measures of health can be quantitatively measured to create a country’s health index. When the ratings of each of these items are strong/good (i.e., on the left side of the continuum) the health is strong/good and the period ahead is much more likely to be strong/good; when the ratings of these items are weak/bad, the condition of the country is weak and the period ahead is more likely weak/bad. The dimensions that we are measuring the strengths of are the most important determinants of total strength. In this chapter we will examine how these conditions together define a stage, so one will be able to look at the conditions that exist to tell what stage a country is in and then come up with a prognosis. In the concluding chapter of this book, which is on the future, I will show each country’s ratings for each of these measures, as well as use them in my attempt to explore what might be ahead. For now I just want to convey the concepts.

下圖是我在第1章中首先向讀者們介紹的健康措施列表。可以對這些健康措施中的大多數進行量化，以創建一個國家的健康指數。那麼當這些項目中的每一個的評分都為強/好時（即，在連續體的左側），則健康為強/好，並且以後的時期更有可能為強/好；當這些項目的評級為弱/差時，則表明該國的狀況較弱，而未來一段時間則更可能為弱/差。我們測量強度的尺寸是決定總強度的最重要因素。

在本章中，我們將研究這些條件如何共同定義一個階段，因此人們將能夠查看存在的條件以判斷一個國家所處的階段，然後得出一個預後。在本書的結語部分（即將結束）中，我將顯示每個國家對這些措施的評級，並將其用於嘗試探索未來可能發生的情況。現在，我只想闡述這些基本的概念。

These strengths evolve together in archetypical ways to create the stages of the archetypical cycle. By using markers of them, we can identify where in the cycle each country, state, and city is and form our expectations of what the probabilities of different next developments will be based on the conditions at hand. In the following table, to help convey the picture, I converted most of our measures into colors with bright green being a very favorable reading and bright red being a very unfavorable reading. It is the average of these readings that defines at what stage the cycle is in, in much the same way as it was the average of the eight readings of power that I used as my measure of total power. Like those power readings, while one could reconfigure them to produce marginally different readings, they are broadly indicative in a by-and-large way. I am showing this to exemplify the typical process, not to look at any specific cases. I will look at the specific cases and their readings in the conclusion of this study.

這些優勢以原型的方式共同發展，從而創造出原型循環的各個階段。通過使用它們的標記，我們可以確定每個國家，州和城市在周期中的哪個位置，並根據當前條件形成對未來不同發展可能性的期望。在下表中，為了讓讀者更好的理解圖表本身的含義，我將大多數度量標準轉換為不同顏色進行標記，其中亮綠色是非常有利的讀數，亮紅色是非常不利的讀數。

這些讀數的平均值定義了周期處於哪個階段，其方式與我用作總功率的八個讀數的平均值非常相似。像那些功率讀數一樣，儘管可以重新配置它們以產生略有不同的讀數，但它們以大致的方式廣泛地表示出來。我展示此內容是為了舉例說明典型過程，而不是查看任何特定情況。在本研究的結論中，我將研究具體案例及其閱讀材料。

More specifically, from studying history it appears to me that the stages of the archetypical big internal cycle from internal order to internal disorder and back are as follows:

• Stage 1 when the new order begins and the new leadership consolidates power, which leads to…
• …Stage 2 when the resource-allocation systems and government bureaucracies are built and refined, which if done well leads to…
• …Stage 3 when there is peace and prosperity, which leads to…
• …Stage 4 when there are great excesses in spending and debt and the widening of wealth and political gaps, which leads to…
• …Stage 5 when there are very bad financial conditions and intense conflict, which leads to…
• …Stage 6 when there are civil wars/revolutions, which leads to…
• …Stage 1, which leads to Stage 2, etc., with the whole cycle happening over again.

更具體地說，從研究歷史的角度來看，從內生性的穩定秩序到內部混亂再到內部的混亂循環階段如下：
I. 第一階段，新秩序開始，新領導層鞏固權力，導致……
II. 第二階段，建立並完善了資源分配系統和政府官僚機構，如果做得好，將會導致…
III. 和平與繁榮的第三階段導致……
IV. 第四階段，當支出和債務嚴重過剩，財富和政治鴻溝擴大時，導致…
V. 處於非常惡劣的財務狀況和激烈衝突的第5階段，導致…
VI. 產生內戰/革命的第6階段，導致…
從第1階段進入第2階段，依此類推，整個循環又發生了。

Each stage presents a different set of conditions that the people facing them have to deal with. Some of these circumstances are much more difficult than others to resolve. For example, early in a long-term debt cycle, when there is plenty of capacity of governments to create debt to finance spending, it is easier to deal with the circumstances at hand than late in the long-term debt cycle when there is little or no capacity to create money and credit to finance spending. For these reasons the range of possible paths forward and the challenges that leaders face depend on where in the cycle a country is. These different stages present different challenges that require different qualities, understandings, and skills from leaders in order to effectively deal with them.[1] How well those facing these circumstances — e.g., you facing your circumstances and our leaders facing our collective circumstances — understand and adapt to them affects how good or bad the outcomes will be within the range of possibilities that exist given the circumstances. Different cultures have different established ways of approaching these circumstances. Those leaders and cultures that understand them and can adapt to their circumstances will produce much better outcomes than those who don’t. That is where timeless and universal principles come in.

每個階段都代表著面對他們的人們必須應對的一系列不同條件。其中一些情況比其他情況要難得多。

例如，在長期債務週期的早期，當政府有足夠的能力來創造債務來為支出提供資金時，處理當前情況要比在長期債務週期的末尾幾乎沒有時要容易得多。而沒有能力創造貨幣和信貸來為支出提供資金。由於這些原因，前進的可能範圍和領導人面臨的挑戰取決於一個國家在周期中所處的位置。

這些不同階段提出了不同的挑戰，需要領導者俱備不同的素質，理解和技能，才能有效地應對這些經濟挑戰。 [1]面對這些情況的人們（例如，當我們面對自己惡化的經濟環境，而我們的領導者面對我們的集體環境）如何理解和適應它們，會影響在特定情況下存在的可能性範圍內，結果的好壞。不同的文化有不同的既定方式來應對這些情況。那些了解他們並能適應其情況的領導者和文化將比那些不了解的領導者和文化產生更好的結果。這就是永恆和普遍的原則出現的地方。

While the length of time spent in each of these stages can vary a lot, the evolution through them generally takes 100 years, give or take a lot and with big undulations within the cycle. This evolution occurs because of logical cause/effect relationships in which existing conditions propel the changes that create the new set of conditions that propel the next changes and so on like a perpetual-motion machine. Because a given set of conditions creates a limited set of possibilities, by properly identifying the conditions and understanding the cause/effect relationships, one can improve one’s imagination of the possibilities of what will come next.

雖然在每個階段花費的時間長度可以有很大的不同，但是通過這些階段的演變通常需要100年，付出或付出很多，並且週期內波動很大。之所以會發生這種演變，是因為邏輯上的因果關係，在這種情況下，現有條件會推動更改，從而創建新的一組條件來推動下一個更改，依此類推，就像永動機一樣。由於一組給定的條件會產生一組有限的可能性，因此，通過正確識別條件並理解因果關係，可以提高人們對接下來可能發生的可能性的想像力。

The cycle’s archetypical evolution transpires as shown in the following diagrams.[2] Like evolution in general, the evolution of internal orders typically occurs in a cyclical way in which one stage typically leads to the next through a progression of stages that repeat and, in the process, evolve to higher levels of development. For example, Stage 1 (when the new internal order is created by new leaders who came to power via a civil war/revolution) normally comes after Stage 6 (when there is a civil war/revolution, which is the low point in the cycle), which leads to the next stage and so on up to Stage 3 (which is the high point in the Big Cycle because there is a lot of peace and prosperity in that stage), which gets overdone in Stages 4 and 5 and so on, leading to the next new order (Stage 1). That happens over and over again in an upward-evolving way. Again, that archetypical cycle typically takes 100 years, give or take a lot.[3] Within each of these big cycles are similar, smaller cycles. For example, there is a short-term debt cycle that leads to bubbles and recessions that come along roughly every 10 years, there are political cycles that move political controls between the right and the left that come along with roughly equal frequency, etc. Every country is going through them, and many of them are at different stages. For example, China and India are at very different stages than the United States and most European countries. What stages they are at in relation to other countries affects the relations between countries and is the primary determinant of the whole world order. We will explore all of these in the last chapter of this book rather than digress into them now.

循環的原型演變過程如下圖所示。 [2]一般而言，就像內部演化一樣，內部秩序的演化通常以周期性的方式發生，其中一個階段通常通過重複的各個階段的進展而逐步進入下一個階段，並在此過程中逐步發展到更高的發展水平。

例如，第1階段（當新的內部秩序是由內戰/革命上台的新領導人創造的）通常在第6階段（當有內戰/革命，這是周期的最低點）之後），直到下一階段，直至第3階段（這是大周期的最高點，因為該階段有很多和平與繁榮），而在第4階段和第5階段則過高，依此類推，從而導致下一個新的社會秩序（第1階段）。這種情況以向上發展的方式一遍又一遍地發生。同樣，原型週期通常需要100年，付出或付出很多。 [3]在這些大周期的每個週期中，都有相似的較小的周期。

例如，有一個短期債務循環導致大約每10年發生一次泡沫和衰退，有一些政治循環使左右左右之間的政治控制權以大約相等的頻率出現，等等。國家正在經歷這些挑戰，其中許多處於不同階段。例如，中國和印度與美國和大多數歐洲國家處於截然不同的階段。它們相對於其他國家所處的階段影響著國家之間的關係，並且是整個世界秩序的主要決定因素。我們將在本書的最後一章中探討所有這些內容，而不是現在討論它們。

These cycles have taken place for as long as there has been recorded civilization (and probably before) so many cycles are linked together like so (figuratively speaking), and they are upward-sloping because of evolutionary gains that are made over time.

這些社會周期一直持續到有記錄的文明發生（甚至在這種社會形態以前），如此之多的周期就這樣鏈接在一起（象徵性地講），並且由於隨著時間的推移獲得了進化上的收益，因此它們是向上傾斜的。

The following chart shows our estimates of China’s absolute powers and its figurative Big Cycles going back to the year 600. This is an ultra-simplified chart (e.g., there were many more dynasties and complexities) that I am presenting in this way so you can see how this evolution transpired from the 50,000-foot level.

下圖顯示了我們對600年以前中國絕對力量崛起及其像徵性大周期的估計。這是我以這種方式介紹的超簡化圖表（例如，有許多朝代和復雜情況），因此讀者可以 自行研究這種演變是如何形成的，而最終中國的經濟實力到達了非常高的水平線上。

The next chart, which I showed you in earlier chapters, shows China’s relative powers. The differences in this chart and the previous one are due to the fact that the first one shows the absolute level of power while the second one shows the relative level of power.

下圖顯示了我們對600年以前中國絕對力量崛起及其像徵性大周期的估計。這是我以這種方式介紹的超簡化圖表（例如，有許多朝代和復雜情況），因此讀者可以 自行研究這種演變是如何形成的，而最終中國的經濟實力到達了非常高的水平線上。

Since different countries are typically in different stages of the cycle and since they take wealth and global political power from each other, some countries are rising while others are declining, so the whole is less volatile than any one country. In other words, the differences have had a diversification effect that has made the whole world’s evolution smoother than any of the individual countries’ evolutions. That is reflected in actual global real GDP, which I showed you in Chapter 1 and is shown in the following chart. The chart is not a figurative representation. It is literally the best estimates we have of real GDP per capita. Embedded in this chart are the rises and falls of major empires (particularly the Dutch, British, and the Ming and Qing dynasties in China), numerous wars, and numerous booms and busts. They don’t show up because they diversify each other and because they are small relative to the big trends, even though they are huge from the perspective of the people living through them.

由於不同國家通常處於週期的不同階段，並且它們相互獲取財富和全球政治權力，因此一些國家的經濟實力正在崛起，而另一些國家則在迅速下降，因此，整個國家的動盪性低於任何一個國家。換句話說，這種差異產生了多樣化的影響，使整個世界的發展比任何一個國家的發展都更加順暢。這反映在實際的全球實際GDP中，我在第1章中已向讀者展示了這些成果。

如下圖所示，圖表不是絕對的。從字面上看，這是我們對人均實際GDP的最佳估計。此圖表中嵌入了主要帝國（特別是中國的荷蘭，英國和明清時期）的興衰，以及歷史來看，無數次戰爭，無數興衰都嵌套其中。它們之所以不會出現，是因為它們彼此消解，分化，並且相對於大趨勢而言雖然相對而言很小，但即使從生活在其中的人們的角度來看，它們都是巨大的轉變。

To reiterate, the figurative pictures of the archetypical six-stage cycle I just painted are simplified versions of what really happens. I simplified them to provide clarity. I find that too often in order to be precise people show so many details that one can’t see the essence of the big picture, and I don’t want to do that. I wanted to show you a simplified version that conveys the essence of the stages and then descend down into the details. While the cycle by and large progresses as I described, it doesn’t always progress exactly as I described. For example, like the stages of disease (let’s say Stage 3 cancer), being in one stage doesn’t mean that the progression to the next stage is inevitable. But it does tell us a lot that is very valuable. As with a disease a) certain symptoms are clearly exhibited that allow one to identify which stage in the cycle one is in, and b) being in that stage signifies the risks and ways of treating the situation that are essential to know are different from those that exist at different stages. For example, being in Stage 5 means that certain conditions exist that make it less likely, though not impossible, that the cycle won’t progress to Stage 6 than if it was in Stage 4 with those conditions existing. By having clear and objective markers to identify at what stage each country (or state or city) is in, and by having an understanding of the cause/effect relationships that produce change, one can better know the range of possibilities and position oneself accordingly, though one can never get them exactly right.

重申一下，我剛剛繪製的原型六階段循環的形象照片是實際發生情況的簡化版本。我簡化了它們以提供清晰性。我發現，為了精確起見，人們經常過多展示太多細節，以至於看不到大圖表的本質，而我也不想這樣做。

我想向讀者們展示一個簡化的版本，它傳達了階段的本質，然後深入到細節中。正如我所描述的，雖然整個週期大體上都在進步，但它並不一定總是按照我所描述的那樣進行。例如，就像疾病的各個階段（例如3期癌症）一樣，處於一個階段並不意味著不可避免地會進入下一階段。但這確實告訴了我們很多非常有價值的東西。

與疾病一樣，
a）清楚地表現出某些症狀，使人們能夠確定一個週期處於哪個階段，並且b）處於該階段表示必須知道的風險和治療情況的方法與已知的情況不同。存在於不同階段。
例如，進入第5階段意味著存在某些條件，儘管並非不可能，但與存在這些條件的第4階段相比，進入第6階段的可能性較小。通過使用清晰客觀的標記來識別每個國家（或州或城市）所處的階段，並了解產生變化的因果關係，人們可以更好地了解可能性的範圍並據此定位自己，儘管永遠無法使它們完全正確。

As an example, we made an index of the number of economic “red flags” that have existed at different times in history, including measures of high inequality, high debt and deficits, inflation, and bad growth, to show how indicative they are of subsequent civil wars and revolutions. The following chart shows the estimated likelihood of a civil-war-type conflict based on the number of red flags. Based on what we have seen in the past, we estimate that when there are 60–80% of the red flags present, there is around a 1-in-6 chance of severe internal conflict. When lots of these conditions are in place (greater than 80%) there is around a 1-in-3 chance of a civil war or revolution — so still not probable but too probable for comfort. The US is in the 60–80% bucket today. In the concluding chapter of this book I will much more comprehensively pass along the indicators and what they show. Right now, I just want to convey the concept.

例如，我們對歷史上不同時期存在的經濟”危險信號”的數量進行了索引，包括對高不平等，高債務和赤字，通貨膨脹和不良增長的衡量，以表明它們在經濟上的指示性。

隨後產生的激烈的內戰和革命。
從下圖顯示了根據危險信號數量估算的內戰型沖突的可能性。根據我們過去的觀察，我們估計，當危險信號出現的比例為60–80％時，發生內部衝突的機率約為六分之一。當這些條件很多時（大於80％），發生內戰或革命的可能性約為三分之二，因此仍然不太可能，換句話說如今的我們過於舒適。然而今天來看，美國處於60–80％的水平。這意味著美國人如今屬於過度的舒適。
在本書的最後一章中，我將更全面地介紹指標及其顯示的內容。現在，我只想傳達這個概念。

I know that this model of mine is starting to get pretty complicated for the brain to process (though it’s not complicated for a computer to process), so I will describe just the highlights of each stage and just the most important factors. While I won’t take you through all 108 factors (i.e.,18x6) in these stages and their various configurations, below I will outline the forces and milestones to pay most attention to in each stage, with a special emphasis on the current state of disorder in the United States and how things are progressing.

我知道我的這種經濟數據模型對大腦的處理開始變得相當複雜（儘管計算機本身的處理流程並不復雜），所以我將僅描述每個階段的亮點以及中間重要的經濟因素。

雖然我不會在這些階段及其各種配置中介紹所有108個因素（即18x6），但下面我將概述在每個階段中應重點關注的力量和里程碑，特別著重於闡釋當今階段的經濟現狀，美國的疾病防治以及進展。

We will now delve into what the archetypical six stages look like in greater detail so we can identify them easily when we see them and so we can better imagine what might come next.

現在，我們將更詳細地研究數據模型中六個階段的模式，以便我們在看到它們時可以輕鬆地識別不同的信號以及模式，從而幫助我們更好地推演接下來將發生什麼。

Because these circumstances transpire in repeating cycles (e.g., Stage 5 precedes Stage 6, which precedes Stage 1), we can start our examination at any stage and follow the sequence from there. Since the United States now appears to be in Stage 5, let’s start there.

`然而由於這些情況反復出現（例如，第5階段先於第6階段，而第6階段先於第1階段），因此我們可以在任何階段開始檢查並按照順序進行檢查，由於美國現在似乎處於第5階段，因此我們從這裡開始。

Stage 5: When There Are Bad Financial Conditions and Intense Conflict

階段5：當經濟體陷入財務狀況惡劣和激烈衝突時

The most important influence that transpires in a big cycle is that of debt, money, and economic activity. Because I covered that cycle comprehensively in Chapters 2 and 3, I won’t explain it here in detail. But to understand Stage 5, you need to know that it follows Stage 3, in which there is peace and prosperity and favorable debt and credit conditions, and Stage 4, in which excess and decadence begin to bring about worse conditions. This process culminates in the most difficult and painful stage — Stage 6 — when the entity (country, state, city, company, or person) runs out of money and there is typically terrible conflict in the form of revolution or civil war. Stage 5 is the period during which the interclass tensions that go along with worsening financial conditions come to a head. How different leaders, policy makers, and groups of people deal with conflict has a major impact on whether the country will undergo the needed changes peacefully or violently.

在一個大周期中發生的最重要影響是債務，金錢和經濟活動。因為我在第2章和第3章中全面介紹了該循環，所以在此不再詳細說明。

但是要了解階段5，我們需要知道階段3是和平與繁榮以及有利的債務和信貸條件，階段4是過度期和開始帶來更糟條件的階段。當實體（國家，州，城市，公司或個人）的資本用光，並且通常以革命或內戰的形式發生可怕的衝突時，該過程最終到達最困難和痛苦的階段（第6階段）。

而第五階段是隨著財務狀況惡化而引起的階級間緊張局勢加劇的時期。不同的領導人，決策者和一群人如何應對沖突，對該國將以和平還是暴力方式進行必要的變革產生重大影響。

You can see signs of this happening now in a number of countries. Those that have adequate financial conditions (i.e., have incomes that are greater than their expenses and assets that are greater than their liabilities) are in relatively good shape. Those that do not are in relatively bad shape. You can also see that these different conditions are big drivers of the differences in what is now happening to most aspects of these countries, states, cities, companies, and people — e.g., their education, healthcare, infrastructure, and well-being. You can also see big cultural differences in how countries approach their stressful conditions, with some approaching them more harmoniously than others who are more inclined to fight.

而現在可以在許多國家看到這種情況。對於那些財務狀況適當的公司（即收入大於其支出，資產大於其負債）的狀況相對良好。然而對於那些沒有的狀態相對較差。

我們還可以看到，這些不同的條件是這些國家，州，城市，公司和人民的大多數方面（例如，他們的教育，醫療保健，基礎設施和福祉）現在正在發生變化的主要驅動因素。

讀者們同樣還可以看到文化在國家應對壓力條件的方式上存在巨大差異，有些國家比其他更傾向於戰鬥的國家更和諧地對待它們。

Because Stage 5 is such a pivotal stage in the internal cycle and because it’s the stage that many countries are now facing, I will devote some time to going through the cause/effect relationships at play during it and the key indicators to watch in examining its progression. Then I will turn more specifically to where the United States stands and how it might best handle its internal conflicts.

由於第5階段是經濟內部周期中如此關鍵的階段，而且因為這是許多國家現在面臨的階段，所以我將花一些時間來研究其間的因果關係，以及在檢查其因果關係時要注意的關鍵指標進展。然後，我將更具體地談談美國的立場以及如何最好地解決其內部衝突。

The Classic Toxic Mix

經典的有毒混合物

The classic toxic mix of forces that brings about big internal conflicts consists of 1) the country and the people in the country (or state or city) being in bad financial shape (e.g., they have big debt and non-debt obligations like pension and healthcare obligations), 2) large income, wealth, and values gaps within that entity, and 3) a severe negative economic shock. The economic shock can come about for many reasons, including financial bubbles that burst; acts of nature such as diseases, droughts, and floods; and wars. It creates a financial stress test. The financial conditions (as measured by incomes relative to expenses and assets relative to liabilities) that exist at the time of the stress test are the shock absorbers; the sizes of the gaps in incomes, wealth, and values are the degrees of fragility of the system. When the financial problems occur, they typically first hit the private sector and then the public sector. Because governments will never let the private sector’s financial problems sink the entire system, it is the government’s financial condition that matters most. When the government runs out of buying power, there is a collapse. But on the way to a collapse there is a lot of fighting for money and political power.

導致內部大衝突的經典的有毒腐蝕性力量混合包括：

1）國家和該國（或州或城市）的人民財務狀況不佳（例如，他們有大量債務和非債務義務，例如養老金和醫療保健義務）；
2）該實體內部的大量收入，財富和價值缺口；以及
3）嚴重的負面經濟衝擊。造成經濟震蕩的原因可能很多，其中包括金融泡沫破裂；自然行為，例如疾病，乾旱和洪水；和戰爭。

而美國開始了經濟學意義上的壓力測試。而壓力測試時存在的財務狀況（以相對於費用的收入和相對於負債的資產來衡量）是減震器；收入，財富和價值差距的大小是系統的脆弱程度。當發生財務問題時，它們通常首先沖擊私營部門，然後衝擊公共部門。由於政府永遠不會讓私營部門的財務問題淹沒整個系統，因此最重要的是政府的財務狀況。當政府用盡貨幣本身的購買力時，就會崩潰。但是在走向崩潰的道路上，有很多為金錢和政治力量而戰的鬥爭。

From studying 50+ civil wars and revolutions, it became clear that the single most reliable leading indicator of civil war/revolution is bankrupt government finances, often after an economic shock and when there are big wealth gaps. That is because when the government lacks financial power, it can’t financially save those entities in the private sector that the government needs to save to keep the system running (as most governments, led by the United States, did at the end of 2008), it can’t buy what it needs, and it can’t pay people to do what it needs them to do. It is out of power.

通過研究50多次內戰和革命，可以清楚地看到，內戰/革命的最可靠的領先指標是政府資金的枯竭直到破產，通常是在經濟動蕩之後以及出現巨大的貧富差距時。

然而這是因為，當政府缺乏財務權力時，它就無法從財務上挽救政府為保持系統正常運轉而需要保存的私營部門中的實體（就像美國領導的大多數政府在2008年底所做的那樣） ），它無法購買所需的東西，也無法付錢給人們去做它需要他們去做的事情，那麼這樣的政府就會被終結。

A classic marker of being in Stage 5 and a leading indicator of the loss of borrowing and spending power, which is one of the triggers for going into Stage 6, is that the government has large deficits that are creating more debt to be sold than buyers other than the government’s own central bank are willing to buy — i.e., that leading indicator is turned on when governments that can’t print money have to raise taxes and cut spending, or when those that can print money print a lot of it and buy a lot of government debt. To be more specific, when the government runs out of money (by running a big deficit, having large debts, and not having access to adequate credit) it has limited options. It can either 1) raise taxes and cut spending a lot or 2) print a lot of money, which depreciates its value. Those governments that have the option to print money always do so because that is the much less painful path, but it leads investors to run out of the money and debt that is being printed. Those governments that can’t print money have to raise taxes and cut spending, which drives those with money to run out of the country, state, or other jurisdiction because paying more taxes and losing services is intolerable. If these entities that can’t print money have large wealth gaps among their constituents, these moves typically lead to some form of civil war/revolution.[5]

進入第5階段的經典標誌和進入和進入第6階段的觸發因素之一是藉款和消費能力喪失的領先指標，這是政府的巨額赤字正在產生比買者更多的出售債務。除了政府自己的中央銀行願意購買以外，即，當無法印鈔票的政府不得不提高稅收和削減支出，或者可以印鈔票的政府印大量併購買鈔票時，該領先指標就會打開，而這意味著大量的政府債務的增長。

更具體地講，當政府用盡資金（由於出現巨額赤字，背負巨額債務並且無法獲得足夠的信貸）時，政府的選項就非常有限。它可以1）提高稅收和削減開支，或者2）印很多錢，從而貶值其價值。那些有權選擇印製鈔票的政府總是這樣做，因為那是一條痛苦得多的道路，但它導致投資者用光了印製的貨幣和債務。那些無法印鈔的政府必須提高稅收和削減支出，這使有錢政府趕出了國家，州或其他管轄區，因為繳納更多的稅款和服務損失是無法忍受的。如果這些無法印鈔的實體在其選民之間存在巨大的貧富差距，那麼這些舉動通常會導致某種形式的內戰/革命。 [5]

This late-cycle debt dynamic is now playing out in the United States at both the state and federal levels, with the main difference between them being that state governments can’t print money to pay their debts while the federal government can. Near the beginning of this chapter I showed where debt levels, wealth gaps, and political gaps — which are all at the highest since the 1930s — now stand in the United States.

這種晚期債務動態現在在美國的州和聯邦層面都在發揮作用，它們之間的主要區別在於，州政府不能印鈔票來償還債務，而聯邦政府可以。在本章開頭，我展示了美國的債務水平、財富差距和政治差距 — — 這些都處於 1930 年代以來的最高水平。

For example, in the United States now, the federal government and many state and city governments have large deficits, large debts, and large wealth gaps, and the central bank (the Federal Reserve) has the power to print money. So, it now prints a lot of money and buys a lot of federal government debt, which finances the government spending that is much bigger than the federal government’s intake. That has helped the federal government and those it is trying to help, though it has also cost those who are holding dollars and dollar debt a lot in real purchasing power. Thus far this money printing and buying of debt has not materially helped state and municipal governments that also have big shortfalls to deal with and can’t easily get printed money to fill them.

比如現在的美國，聯邦政府和很多州和市政府都有巨額赤字、巨額債務、巨大的貧富差距，中央銀行（美聯儲）有印鈔權。因此，它現在印大量鈔票併購買大量聯邦政府債務，為政府支出提供資金，遠遠超過聯邦政府的攝入量。

這幫助了聯邦政府和它試圖幫助的人，儘管它也讓那些持有美元和美元債務的人在實際購買力方面付出了很大的代價。到目前為止，這種印鈔和購買債務並沒有實質性地幫助州和市政府，這些政府也有很大的資金缺口需要處理，並且不容易得到印鈔來填補它們。

As a rule, those places (cities, states, and countries) that have the largest wealth gaps, the largest debts, and the worst declines in incomes are most likely to have the greatest conflicts. Interestingly, those states and cities in the US that have the highest per capita income and wealth levels tend to be the states and cities that are the most indebted and have the largest wealth gaps — e.g., New York City, Chicago, San Francisco, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York State, and New Jersey. If you are interested in seeing these numbers for the major states and cities in the US, they are shown in the appendix.

通常，那些貧富差距最大、債務最大、收入下降最嚴重的地方（城市、州和國家）最有可能發生最大的衝突。有趣的是，美國人均收入和財富水平最高的州和城市往往是負債最多、貧富差距最大的州和城市 — — 例如紐約市、芝加哥、舊金山、康涅狄格、伊利諾伊州、馬薩諸塞州、紐約州和新澤西州。如果讀者有興趣查看美國主要州和城市的這些數字，請參閱附錄。

Facing these conditions, expenditures have to be cut or more money has to be raised in some way. The next question becomes who will pay to fix them, the “haves” or the “have-nots”? Obviously, it can’t be the have-nots. Expenditure cuts are most intolerable for those who are poorest, so there needs to be more taxation of people who can afford to pay more and there is a heightened risk of some form of civil war or revolution. But when the haves realize that they will be taxed to pay for debt service and to reduce the deficits, they typically leave, causing the hollowing-out process previously described. If bad economic conditions occur, that hastens the process. These circumstances largely drive the tax cycle.

面對這些情況，必須削減開支或以某種方式籌集更多資金，下一個問題變成了誰來付錢修理它們，”有”還是”沒有”？顯然，它不可能是窮人。

對於最貧窮的人來說，削減開支是最不能容忍的，因此需要對有能力支付更多費用的人徵稅，並且增加某種形式的內戰或革命的風險。但是，當富人意識到他們將被徵稅以償還債務和減少赤字時，他們通常會離開，從而導致前面描述的空心化過程。如果出現糟糕的經濟狀況，就會加速這一進程。這些情況在很大程度上推動了稅收週期。

History shows that raising taxes and cutting spending when there are large wealth gaps and bad economic conditions has, more than anything else, been a leading indicator of civil wars or revolutions of some type. To be clear they don’t have to be violent, though they could be.

歷史表明，在貧富懸殊和經濟狀況不佳的情況下，加稅和削減開支最重要的是內戰或某種類型的revolution。需要明確的是，他們不必是暴力的，儘管他們可能是。

I see these cycles transpiring in my personal interactions where I live. I live in the state of Connecticut, which has the highest average per capita income in the country, the largest wealth gap and income gap in the country, and one of the largest per capita debt and unfunded pension obligations in the country. I see how the haves and the have-nots don’t have contact and/or don’t worry about the other because they don’t have much contact with each other and are focused on living their own lives. I have windows into what the lives of both the haves and the have-nots are like because I have contact with the people in our community of haves and because the work my wife does to help disengaged and disconnected high school students in disadvantaged communities brings her into contact with people who live in the communities of the have-nots. I see how terrible the conditions are in those have-not communities and how the haves who appear rich and decadent to the have-nots don’t feel rich. I see how they are all focused on their own struggles — with the haves struggling with work-life balance, making sure their kids are well educated, etc., and the have-nots struggling with finding income, food security, avoiding violence, trying to have their kids well educated, etc.[6] I see how they are more likely to have critical, stereotypical impressions of each other that make them more inclined to dislike each other than to view themselves empathetically as members of one community in which they help each other. I see how difficult it can be to help each other because of these stereotypes and because the haves don’t feel that they have more than enough or that the have-nots deserve their financial support and I fear what the future might hold because of the existing circumstances and how they are likely to worsen. I have seen close up how COVID-inflicted health and budget shocks have brought to the surface the terrible conditions of the have-nots and are worsening the financial gaps that could bring about the previously described dynamic that happens when there is not enough money and taxes have to rise which drives the haves away, expenses have to be cut which is inhumane for the have-nots, or obligations like those for debt and pensions have to be defaulted on which is bad for those who were promised them, unless somehow they, like the federal government, have access to the money creation that only the central bank can provide.

我看到這些循環在我居住的地方的個人互動中發生。我住在康涅狄格州，這裡是全國人均收入最高、貧富差距和收入差距最大的州，也是全國人均債務和無準備金養老金義務最大的州之一。我看到富人和窮人如何沒有聯繫和/或不擔心對方，因為他們彼此沒有太多聯繫並且專注於過自己的生活。我有機會了解富人和窮人的生活，因為我與富人社區的人們有聯繫，而且我的妻子為幫助弱勢社區的失學和與世隔絕的高中生所做的工作給她帶來了與生活在窮人社區的人接觸。我看到那些窮人社區的條件是多麼糟糕，以及在窮人看來富有和頹廢的富人是如何感覺不到富有的。我看到他們都專注於自己的掙扎 — — 富人在工作與生活的平衡上掙扎，確保他們的孩子接受良好的教育等，而窮人在尋找收入、糧食安全、避免暴力、嘗試讓他們的孩子接受良好的教育等[6]

我看到他們更有可能對彼此產生批判性的、刻板印象，這使他們更傾向於不喜歡對方，而不是同情地將自己視為一個社區的成員，他們互相幫助。我看到由於這些刻板印象而互相幫助是多麼困難，因為富人認為他們擁有的還不夠多，或者窮人不應該得到他們的經濟支持，我擔心未來可能會因為現有情況以及它們可能如何惡化。

我親眼目睹了COVID造成的健康和預算衝擊如何使窮人的可怕狀況浮出水面，並加劇了財務缺口，這可能導致之前描述的在沒有足夠的資金和稅收時發生的動態必須增加這驅逐富人，必須削減開支，這對窮人來說是不人道的，或者必須拖欠債務和養老金等義務，這對那些被承諾的人來說是不利的，除非他們以某種方式，像聯邦政府一樣，可以使用只有中央銀行才能提供的貨幣創造。

Averages don’t matter as much as the number of people who are suffering and their power. Those who favor policies that are good for the whole — e.g., free trade, globalization, advances in technology that replace people — without thinking about what happens if the whole is not divided in a way that benefits most people are missing the fact that the whole is at risk. To have peace and prosperity, a society must have productivity that benefits most people. Do you think we have these things today?

普羅大眾以及苦難民眾並不如他們所掌握的權力那麼重要。那些贊成有利於整體的政策的人 — — 例如自由貿易、全球化、取代人的技術進步 — — 沒有考慮如果整體沒有以惠及大多數人的方式分割會發生什麼，他們忽略了世界是如何被全球化所推動進步的事實因此當今社會處於危險之中。因此為了實現和平與繁榮，一個社會必須具有使大多數人受益的生產力。

然而讀者你們認為我們今天有這些東西嗎？

What does history show as the path that bankrupt governments can follow to raise productivity that benefits most people? It shows that restructuring and/or devaluing enough of the previously created debt and non-debt obligations helps a lot. That is classic in Stages 5 and 6. Once the restructuring or devaluation reduces the debt burdens, which is typically painful at the time, the reduced debt burdens allow for a rebuilding.

歷史表明，破產政府可以採取哪些途徑來提高使大多數人受益的生產力？它表明，對先前產生的債務和非債務義務進行足夠的重組和/或貶值有很大幫助。這在第 5 和第 6 階段是典型的。一旦重組或貶值減輕了債務負擔，這在當時通常是痛苦的，減輕的債務負擔允許重建。

An essential ingredient for success is that the debt and money that is created is used to produce productivity gains and favorable return on investment rather than just being given away without yielding productivity and income gains because if it is given away without yielding these gains the money will be devalued to the point that it won’t leave the government or anyone else with much buying power. When we turn to Stage 3, we will look at how that virtuous cycle typically arises from the terrible conditions in Stages 5, 6, and 1, and how the conditions in one stage are good indicators of the probabilities of moving to the next stage. We will also look at several historical examples.

成功的一個基本要素是，所創造的債務和金錢用於提高生產力和有利的投資回報，而不是僅僅在沒有產生生產力和收入收益的情況下被贈送，因為如果在沒有產生這些收益的情況下贈送資金並貶值到它不會讓政府或其他任何人擁有太多購買力的程度。然而當我們轉向第3階段時，我們將研究該良性循環通常如何從第 5、6 和 1 階段的可怕條件中產生，以及一個階段的條件如何很好地指示進入下一階段的概率。我們還將研究幾個歷史例子。

History shows that lending and spending on items that produce broad-based productivity gains and return on investment that exceed the borrowing costs result in living standards rising with debts being paid off, so these are good policies. If the amount of money being lent to finance the debt is inadequate, it is perfectly fine for the central bank to print the money and be the lender of last resort as long as the money is invested to have an ROI that is large enough to service the debt. History shows and logic dictates that investing well (i.e., so it yields productivity) in education at all levels (including job training), infrastructure, and research that yields productive discoveries works very well. For example, big education programs and infrastructure programs have paid off nearly all the time (e.g., in the Tang Dynasty and many other Chinese dynasties, in the Roman Empire, in the Islamic Umayyad Caliphate, in the Mughal Empire in India, in Japan’s Meiji Restoration, and in China’s educational development programs over the last couple of decades), though they have rather long lead times. In fact improvements in education and infrastructure (among the other things in the list of factors shown earlier), even those financed by debt, were essential ingredients behind the rises of virtually all empires and declines in the qualities of these investments were almost always ingredients behind their declines. If done well, these interventions can more than counterbalance the classic toxic mix.

歷史表明，在產生廣泛的生產力收益和超過借貸成本的投資回報的項目上的貸款和支出會導致生活水平提高，債務得到償還，因此這些都是很好的政策。如果用於債務融資的貸款金額不足，那麼中央銀行印製這些貨幣並成為最後貸款人是完全沒問題的，只要投資的資金具有足夠大的 ROI 可以提供服務債務。歷史表明和邏輯表明，在各級教育（包括職業培訓）、基礎設施和研究方面進行良好的投資（即產生生產力），可以產生富有成效的發現。

例如，大型教育項目和基礎設施項目幾乎一直都有回報（例如，在唐朝和許多其他中國朝代、羅馬帝國、伊斯蘭倭馬亞哈里發、印度莫臥兒帝國、日本明治恢復，以及中國過去幾十年的教育發展計劃），儘管它們的準備時間相當長。事實上，教育和基礎設施的改善（以及前面列出的因素列表中的其他因素），甚至是那些由債務融資的因素，都是幾乎所有帝國崛起的重要因素，而這些投資質量的下降幾乎總是背後的因素他們的拒絕。如果做得好，這些干預措施不僅可以抵消經典的有毒混合物。

While I just described the classic toxic mix, it is usually accompanied by other problems. The more of the following conditions that are in place, the higher the probability of having a severe conflict like a civil war or revolution.

雖然我剛剛描述了經典的有毒混合物，但它通常伴隨著其他問題。以下條件越多，發生內戰或革命等嚴重衝突的可能性就越大。

+ Decadence

While early in the cycle there is typically more spending of time and money on productive things, later in the cycle time and money go more toward indulgent things (e.g., “the finer things in life” like expensive residences, art, jewelry, and clothes). This begins in Stage 4 when such spending is fashionable, but by Stage 5 it begins to appear grotesque. Often that decadent spending is debt-financed, which worsens the financial conditions. The change in psychology that typically goes along with these changes is understandable. The haves feel that they legally acquired their money so they can spend it on luxuries if they like, while the have-nots view such spending at the same time they are suffering as unfair and selfish. Besides increasing resentments, decadent spending (as distinct from saving and investing) reduces productivity. What a society spends money on matters. When it spends on investment items that yield productivity and income gains, it makes for a better future than when it spends on consumption items that don’t raise productivity and income.

• 社會廣泛的頹廢風氣（躺平）

雖然在周期的早期，通常會有更多的時間和金錢花在生產性事物上，但在周期後期，時間和金錢更多地用於放縱的事物（例如，”生活中更美好的事物”，如昂貴的住宅、藝術品、珠寶和衣服）。這從第4階段開始，當時這種支出很流行，但到第5階段，它開始顯得怪誕。通常，這種頹廢的支出是由債務融資的，這會使財務狀況惡化。通常伴隨這些變化而發生的心理變化是可以理解的。富人認為他們的錢是合法獲得的，因此他們可以根據自己的意願將其花在奢侈品上，而窮人則認為這樣的支出同時他們正在遭受不公平和自私的折磨。除了增加怨恨外，頹廢的支出（不同於儲蓄和投資）還會降低生產力。一個社會在什麼事情上花錢。當它把錢花在能提高生產力和收入的投資項目上時，它比花在不能提高生產力和收入的消費項目上的未來更美好。

+ Bureaucracy

+ 官僚主义

While early in the big cycle bureaucracy is low, it is high late in the cycle, which makes sensible and needed decision making more difficult. That is because things tend to get more complex as they develop until they reach the point where even obviously good things can’t be done — necessitating revolutionary changes. In a legal and contract-based system (which has many benefits), this can become a problem because the law can stand in the way of doing obviously good things. I will give you an example that I’m close to because my wife and I care about it.

雖然在大周期早期官僚作風很低，但在周期後期很高，這使得明智和必要的決策變得更加困難。那是因為事情在發展過程中往往會變得更加複雜，直到達到即使明顯的好事也無法完成的地步 — — 需要革命性的變革。在以法律和合同為基礎的系統（有很多好處）中，這可能會成為一個問題，因為法律可能會阻礙做明顯的好事。我會給你一個我很親近的例子，因為我和我的妻子都很關心它。

Because the US Constitution doesn’t make education a central government responsibility, it has predominantly been a state and local responsibility with school funding coming from revenue raised by taxes in local cities and towns. Though it varies from state to state, typically those children in richer towns in richer states have much better educations than those in poorer towns in poorer states. This is obviously unfair and unproductive even though most people agree that children should have equal opportunities in education. But because this structure is so ingrained in our political system, it is nearly impossible to fix without a revolutionary reinvention of how we approach it. There are more examples of the bureaucracy standing in the way of doing sensible, productive things than I have time and space to convey here — i.e., it is now a big problem.

由於美國憲法沒有將教育作為中央政府的責任，它主要是州和地方的責任，學校資金來自當地城鎮稅收籌集的收入。雖然它因州而異，但通常情況下，富裕州較富裕城鎮的兒童比貧困州較貧困城鎮的兒童受教育好得多。

然而儘管大多數人都同意孩子們應該有平等的教育機會，但這顯然是不公平和沒有成效的。但由於這種結構在我們的政治體系中根深蒂固，如果不對我們的處理方式進行革命性的改造，幾乎不可能修復。官僚主義阻礙做明智的、富有成效的事情的例子比我在這裡有時間和空間要表達的要多 — — 也就是說，現在這是一個大問題。

+ Populism and Extremism

+ 民粹主義和極端主義

Populism is a political and social phenomenon that appeals to ordinary people who feel that their concerns are not being addressed by elites. It typically develops when there are 1) wealth and opportunity gaps, 2) perceived cultural threats from those with different values both inside and outside the country, and 3) “establishment elites” in positions of power who are not working effectively for most people. Populists come into power when these conditions create anger among ordinary people who want those with political power to be fighters for them. Populists can be of the right or the left, are much more extreme than moderates, and tend to appeal to the emotions of the common man. They present themselves as fighters for their constituents. They are typically confrontational rather than collaborative and exclusive rather than inclusive. This leads to a lot of fighting between populists of the left and populists of the right over irreconcilable differences. The extremity of the revolution that occurs under them varies. For example, in the 1930s, populism of the left took the form of communism and that of the right took the form of fascism while nonviolent revolutionary changes took place in the US and UK. More recently, in the United States, the election of Donald Trump in 2016 was a move to populism of the right while the popularity of Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez reflects the popularity of populism of the left. There are increased political movements toward populism in a number of countries. It can be said that the election of Joe Biden reflects a desire for less extremism and more moderation, though time will tell.

民粹主義是一種政治和社會現象，它吸引了那些認為自己的問題沒有得到精英解決的普通人。它通常在以下情況下發展：1) 財富和機會差距，2) 感知到來自國內外不同價值觀的人的文化威脅，以及 3) 處於權力位置的”建制精英”無法為大多數人有效工作。當這些條件在希望擁有政治權力的人成為他們的戰士的普通人中引起憤怒時，民粹主義者上台。民粹主義者可以是右派也可以是左派，他們比溫和派更加極端，並且傾向於訴諸普通人的情緒。他們將自己表現為選民的戰士。它們通常是對抗性的而不是協作性的，並且是排他性的而不是包容性的。這導致左翼民粹主義者和右翼民粹主義者之間因不可調和的分歧而進行大量鬥爭。在他們之下發生的革命的極端情況各不相同。例如，在1930年代，左翼民粹主義採取共產主義形式，右翼民粹主義採取法西斯主義形式，而美國和英國則發生了非暴力的革命變革。

最近，在美國，2016年的唐納德特朗普勝選是民粹思想崛起的產物，而伯尼桑德斯，伊麗莎白沃倫和亞歷山大奧西奧·科爾科斯的普及反映了左側民粹主義的普及。在一些國家，走向民粹主義的政治運動越來越多。可以說，Joe Biden的選舉反映了對極端主義和更為溫和的渴望，但時間會告訴我們一切。

The following chart shows a populism index that is based on a combination of populists who were elected to office and populist vote share. The election shift from the Trump populist, anti-establishment presidency to the Biden moderate, establishment presidency is what led the index to fall from its highly elevated level. Still it remains relatively high, though Biden scored as a moderate. Note that voters on both sides score high for supporting populists, as reflected in US election results and polling data, which makes clear how evenly and extremely divided the country is.

The following chart shows a populism index that is based on a combination of populists who were elected to office and populist vote share.

下一個顯示了一個民粹主義指數圖表，該指數基於未來公職的民粹主義和民粹主義支持宣傳的組合。

選舉從特朗普民粹主義、反建制總統到拜登溫和、建制總統職位的轉變導致該指數從高位回落。儘管如此，它仍然相對較高，儘管拜登的得分是溫和的。請注意，正如美國大選結果和民意調查數據所反映的那樣，雙方選民在支持民粹主義者方面的得分都很高，這清楚地表明了這個國家的分裂程度和極端程度。

Along with the rise of populists come more extreme positions on both sides and increased polarization.

隨著民粹主義者的崛起，雙方的立場更加極端，兩極分化加劇。

Right now there is an exceptional amount of polarization in the US as reflected in the stats. In Chapter 8 I showed you charts of the Republican and Democratic voting records of those in the Senate and House of Representatives being the largest and the party-line voting being the greatest since 1900. Survey data about the sentiments of the voters who elected these representatives paints a similar picture of polarization and intransigence. For example, in a 2019 Pew survey 55% of Republicans and 47% of Democrats view the other as more immoral than average Americans, and 61% of Republicans and 54% of Democrats say that those of the other party don’t share their values. When asked whether they had warm or cold feelings to those of the other party, 79% of Democrats and 83% of Republicans had cold or very cold feelings for members of the other party, with 57% of Democrats and 60% of Republicans reporting very cold feelings about members of the other party.[7] Another study reported that 80% of Democrats think that the Republican Party has been taken over by racists and 82% of Republicans think that the Democratic Party has been taken over by socialists.[8] A 2020 study showed that nearly half of Republican parents and a third of Democratic parents would be displeased if their child married someone from the other political party. This compares with about 5% for both parties in 1960.[9] One recent survey showed that 15% of Republicans and 20% of Democrats thought the country would be better if large numbers of the other side “just died.”[10] Based on these and other surveys, it appears that large numbers of members of both parties are more inclined to fight for deeply held preferences rather than compromise. While who is president has changed, the people have not changed, and in the long run what happens in a democracy depends on what the people are like in dealing with the system.

正如統計數據所反映的那樣，目前美國存在異常多的兩極分化。在第 8 章中，我向您展示了自 1900 年以來參議院和眾議院的共和黨和民主黨投票記錄最大，黨派投票記錄最大。關於選舉這些代表的選民情緒的調查數據描繪了類似的兩極分化和不妥協的畫面。例如，在2019 年的皮尤調查中，55% 的共和黨人和47% 的民主黨人認為對方比普通美國人更不道德，61% 的共和黨人和54% 的民主黨人表示對方不認同他們的價值觀.當被問及對對方的感情是暖還是冷時，79% 的民主黨人和83% 的共和黨人對對方成員的感情是冷的或非常冷的，57% 的民主黨人和60% 的共和黨人表示非常冷淡。 [7] 對對方成員的冷淡感情。另一項研究報告稱，80% 的民主黨人認為共和黨已被種族主義者接管，82% 的共和黨人認為民主黨已被社會主義者接管。 [8] 2020 年的一項研究表明，如果他們的孩子嫁給另一個政黨的人，那麼近一半的共和黨父母和三分之一的民主黨父母會不高興。相比之下，1960 年雙方的這一比例約為 5%。 [9]最近的一項調查顯示，15% 的共和黨人和 20% 的民主黨人認為，如果大量的另一方”死了”，國家會更好。 [10] 根據這些和其他調查，似乎有大量的民主黨成員雙方更傾向於爭取根深蒂固的偏好而不是妥協。雖然誰是總統變了，但人民沒有變，從長遠來看，一個民主國家會發生什麼，取決於人民對待制度的態度。

Watch populism and polarization as markers. The more populism and polarization there is, the further along the cycle a nation is in Stage 5, and the closer it is to civil war and revolution. In Stage 5, moderates become the minority. In Stage 6, they cease to exist.

將民粹主義和兩極分化視為標誌。民粹主義和兩極分化越多，一個國家在第五階段的周期越遠，離內戰和革命越近。在第五階段，溫和派成為少數派。在第 6 階段，它們不復存在。

+ Class Warfare

+ 階級戰爭

In Stage 5 class warfare intensifies. That is because, as a rule, during times of increased hardship and conflict there is an increased inclination a) to look at people in stereotypical ways as members of one or more classes and b) to look at these classes as either being evil enemies or good allies. It is important to watch whether or not this is happening because it’s a marker. In Stage 5 this begins to become much more apparent. In Stage 6 it becomes dangerous.

在第5階段，階級鬥爭愈演愈烈。這是因為，作為一項規則，在困難和衝突加劇的時期，人們更傾向於

a) 以刻板的方式將人們視為一個或多個階級的成員，以及
b) 將這些階級視為邪惡的敵人或 好盟友。重要的是要注意這是否正在發生，因為它是一個標記。在第 5 階段，這開始變得更加明顯。在第 6 階段，它變得危險。

A classic marker in Stage 5 that increases in Stage 6 is the demonization of those in other classes, which typically produces one or more scapegoat classes who are commonly believed to be the source of the problems, and if they are destroyed, imprisoned, or kept out, this will lead to better results. Minority ethnic, racial, rich, and poor groups are often demonized. Perhaps the most classic example of this is the demonizing and scapegoating of Jews, who were blamed and persecuted for virtually all of Germany’s problems by the Nazis. Similarly, Chinese minorities living in non-Chinese countries have been demonized and scapegoated during periods of economic and social stress. In the UK Catholics were demonized and scapegoated in numerous stressful periods since the 1500s, such as the Glorious Revolution and the English Civil War. The rich are also commonly demonized, especially those who are viewed to be making their money at the expense of the poor. Demonizing and scapegoating are a classic symptom and problem that we must keep an eye on.

第5 階段中一個在第6 階段增加的經典標誌是其他班級的妖魔化，這通常會產生一個或多個通常被認為是問題根源的替罪羊班級，如果他們被摧毀、監禁或保留出來，這會帶來更好的結果。少數民族、種族、富人和窮人群體經常被妖魔化。也許最經典的例子是對猶太人的妖魔化和替罪羊，他們因納粹幾乎所有的德國問題而受到指責和迫害。同樣，在經濟和社會壓力時期，居住在非華人國家的華人少數民族也被妖魔化和成為替罪羊。在英國，天主教徒在 1500 年代以來的許多壓力時期都被妖魔化和成為替罪羊，例如光榮革命和英國內戰。富人通常也被妖魔化，尤其是那些被視為以犧牲窮人為代價來賺錢的人。妖魔化和替罪羊是我們必須密切關注的典型症狀和問題。

+ The Loss of Truth in the Public Domain

Not knowing what is true because of distortions in the media and propaganda increases as people become more polarized, emotional, and politically motivated.

+ 公共領域真相的喪失
隨著人們變得更加兩極分化、情緒化和政治動機越來越強，媒體和宣傳的扭曲導致不知道什麼是真實的。

In Stage 5 those who are fighting typically work with those in the media to manipulate people’s emotions to gain support and to destroy the opposition. In other words, media folks of the left join with others of the left and media folks of the right join with others of the right in the dirty fight. For example, a common move among 1930s populists of the left (e.g., communists) and of the right (e.g., fascists) was to take control of the media and establish “ministers of propaganda” to guide them. The media they produced was explicitly aimed at polarizing the population against the groups that the governments considered “enemies of the state.” The government of the democratically run United Kingdom created a “Ministry of Information” during World War I and World War II to spread government propaganda, and leading newspaper publishers were elevated by the government if they did what the government wanted them to do to win the propaganda war[11] or were vilified and suffered if they didn’t cooperate. Revolutionaries did the same distorting of the truth in all sorts of publications. During the French Revolution, newspapers run by revolutionaries pushed anti-monarchical and anti-religious sentiment, but when those revolutionaries attained power, they shut down dissenting newspapers during the Reign of Terror. During times of great wealth gaps and populist thinking, stories that bring down elites are popular and lucrative, especially those that bring down left-leaning elites in right-leaning media outlets and those that bring down right-leaning elites in left-leaning media outlets. History shows that significant increases in these activities are a problem that is typical of Stage 5, and that when combined with the ability to inflict other punishments, the media becomes a powerful weapon.

在第五階段，那些打架的人通常與媒體合作，操縱人們的情緒以獲得支持並摧毀反對派。換句話說，左翼媒體人與其他左翼媒體人一起，右翼媒體人與其他右翼媒體人在骯髒的鬥爭中加入。例如，1930 年代左翼（例如共產主義者）和右翼（例如法西斯主義者）民粹主義者的共同舉措是控制媒體並設立”宣傳部長”來指導他們。他們製作的媒體明確旨在將民眾與政府視為”國家敵人”的群體進行兩極分化。民主運作的英國政府在第一次世界大戰和第二次世界大戰期間創建了”信息部”來傳播政府宣傳，如果領先的報紙出版商按照政府要求他們做的事情贏得了政府的青睞，他們就會被政府提升。宣傳戰[11] 或者如果他們不合作就會受到誹謗和傷害。革命者在各種出版物中對真相進行了同樣的歪曲。在法國大革命期間，由革命者經營的報紙推動了反君主制和反宗教的情緒，但當這些革命者掌權時，他們在恐怖統治期間關閉了持不同意見的報紙。在貧富懸殊和民粹思潮的時代，打壓精英的故事很火爆，尤其是打倒右傾媒體上的左傾精英和打倒左傾媒體上的右傾精英的故事。歷史表明，這些活動的顯著增加是第五階段的典型問題，當與施加其他懲罰的能力相結合時，媒體就成為了強大的武器。

It is well-recognized this is happening now — that truth in media, both traditional and social, is lower than at any other time in our lifetimes. For example, a 2019 Gallup study[12] said that only 13% of Americans surveyed have “a great deal” of trust in the media and only 41% of those surveyed said that they have either a “fair” or “great deal” of trust in media. That compares with 72% who trusted media in 1976. This is not just a fringe media problem; it is a mainstream media problem and a problem for our whole society. The dramatically decreased trustworthiness has even plagued former icons of journalistic trust such as the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times, which have seen their trust ratings plunge. In addition to being politically motivated, sensationalistic stories have become commercially rewarding at a time when the media business is in financial trouble. Most of the media folks I speak with share my concerns, though they typically won’t share them openly. Still, in reflecting on the problem, Martin Baron, executive editor of the Washington Post, said, “If you have a society where people can’t agree on the basic facts, how do you have a functioning democracy?”[13] This dynamic is impeding free speech because people are afraid to speak up because of how they will be attacked in both traditional and social media by distortions that are meant to bring them down.

在第五階段，那些打架的人通常與媒體合作，操縱人們的情緒以獲得支持並摧毀反對派。換句話說，左翼媒體人與其他左翼媒體人一起，右翼媒體人與其他右翼媒體人在骯髒的鬥爭中加入。例如，1930 年代左翼（例如共產主義者）和右翼（例如法西斯主義者）民粹主義者的共同舉措是控制媒體並設立”宣傳部長”來指導他們。他們製作的媒體明確旨在將民眾與政府視為”國家敵人”的群體進行兩極分化。民主運作的英國政府在第一次世界大戰和第二次世界大戰期間創建了”信息部”來傳播政府宣傳，如果領先的報紙出版商按照政府要求他們做的事情贏得了政府的青睞，他們就會被政府提升。宣傳戰[11] 或者如果他們不合作就會受到誹謗和傷害。革命者在各種出版物中對真相進行了同樣的歪曲。在法國大革命期間，由革命者經營的報紙推動了反君主制和反宗教的情緒，但當這些革命者掌權時，他們在恐怖統治期間關閉了持不同意見的報紙。在貧富懸殊和民粹思潮的時代，打壓精英的故事很火爆，尤其是打倒右傾媒體上的左傾精英和打倒左傾媒體上的右傾精英的故事。 .歷史表明，這些活動的顯著增加是第五階段的典型問題，當與施加其他懲罰的能力相結合時，媒體就成為了強大的武器。

Even very capable and powerful people are now too afraid of the media to speak up about important matters or run for public office. Since most high-profile people are torn down, most everyone agrees that it is dangerous to be a high-profile, vocal person who fights for truth and justice, especially if one offends people who are inclined to use the media to fight. Though not discussed in public because of fears of media reprisals, this issue is continuously discussed in private. For example, during a lunch I had not long ago with a general who had held a very high political position and had just left government service, we explored what he would do next. I asked him what he was most passionate about. He said, “Of course helping my country.” I asked him whether he would consider running for elected office, and he explained that while he was willing to die for his country he couldn’t bring himself to run for public office because of how enemies would use the media and social media to make up lies to harm his family as well as himself. Ironically, the result of such untruthful media attacks is less free speech: this general and almost everyone I know who I wish the world could hear what they honestly think are afraid to speak openly because they fear that attacks by extremists who oppose them will be enabled and amplified by the sensationalistic media. Many of my friends tell me that I’m crazy to speak so openly about controversial things such as those covered in this book because it is inevitable that some people or groups will try to take me down via the media. I think they are probably right, but I won’t let the risks dissuade me.[14]

即使是非常有能力的權貴現在也非常恐懼媒體，尤其是害怕違抗主流觀點。不敢談論重要的事情或競選公職。由於大多數高調的人都被推倒了，大多數人都同意成為一個高調、直言不諱、為真理和正義而戰的人是危險的，尤其是如果冒犯了傾向於利用媒體進行鬥爭的人。雖然由於擔心媒體報復而沒有公開討論，但私下里一直在討論這個問題。例如，不久前我與一位身居高位、剛剛離開政府部門的將軍共進午餐時，我們探討了他接下來要做什麼。我問他最喜歡什麼。他說：”當然是幫助我的國家。”我問他是否會考慮競選公職，他解釋說，雖然他願意為國家而死，但他不能讓自己競選公職，因為敵人會如何利用媒體和社交媒體來彌補謊言傷害了他的家人和他自己。具有諷刺意味的是，這種不真實的媒體攻擊的結果是減少了言論自由：這位將軍和我認識的幾乎所有我希望世界能聽到他們真實想法的人都不敢公開發言，因為他們擔心反對他們的極端分子的攻擊將成為可能並被聳人聽聞的媒體放大。我的許多朋友告訴我，我瘋狂地公開談論本書所涵蓋的那些有爭議的事情，因為不可避免地會有一些人或團體試圖通過媒體來貶低我。我認為他們可能是對的，但我不會讓風險勸阻我。 [14]

+ Rule-Following Fades and Raw Fighting Begins

History has shown that when the causes that people are passionately behind are more important to them than the system for making decisions, the system is in jeopardy. Rules and laws work only when a) they are crystal clear and b) most people value working within them enough that they are willing to compromise in order to make them work well. If both of these are less than excellent, the legal system is in jeopardy. If the competing parties are unwilling to try to be reasonable with each other and to make decisions civilly in pursuit of the well-being of the whole, which will require them to give up things that they want and might win in a fight, there will be a sort of “civil war” that will test the relative powers of the relevant parties. In this stage, winning at all costs is the game and playing dirty is the norm. Late in Stage 5 is when reason is abandoned in favor of passion. When winning becomes the only thing that matters, unethical fighting becomes progressively more forceful in self-reinforcing ways. When everyone has opinions that they are fighting for and no one can agree on anything, the system is on the brink of civil war/revolution.

+ 遵循規則的淡出和原始的戰鬥開始
歷史表明，當人們熱情支持的原因對他們來說比決策系統更重要時，系統就處於危險之中。規則和法律只有在 a) 非常清晰並且 b) 大多數人非常重視在其中工作以至於他們願意妥協以使它們運作良好時才起作用。如果這兩者都不出色，那麼法律體係就處於危險之中。如果競爭雙方不願意試圖與對方講道理，不願意為了追求整體的幸福而做出文明的決定，這將要求他們放棄他們想要的並且可能在戰鬥中獲勝的東西，就會出現是一種考驗有關各方相對權力的”內戰”。在這個階段，不惜一切代價獲勝是遊戲，玩臟是常態。第五階段的後期是放棄理性以支持激情。當勝利成為唯一重要的事情時，不道德的戰鬥以自我強化的方式逐漸變得更加有力。當每個人都有他們為之奮鬥的意見並且沒有人就任何事情達成一致時，系統就處於內戰/革命的邊緣。

This typically happens in a couple of ways:

這通常以兩種方式發生：

• Late in Stage 5 it is common for the legal and police systems to be used as political weapons by those who can control them. Also private police systems form — e.g., thugs who beat people up and take their assets, and bodyguards to protect people from these things happening to them. For instance, the Nazi party formed a paramilitary wing before it came to power that then became an official force when the Nazis were in power. So did the short-lived British Union of Fascists in the 1930s. The Ku Klux Klan in the US was effectively a paramilitary group as well. Such cases were quite normal, so view their development as a marker of moving to the next stage.

在第5階段後期，法律和警察系統被可以控制它們的人用作政治武器是很常見的。還形成了私人警察系統 — — 例如，打人並奪走他們資產的暴徒，以及保護人們免受這些事情發生在他們身上的保鏢。例如，納粹黨在上台之前組建了一個準軍事組織，然後在納粹掌權時成為官方力量。 1930年代短暫的英國法西斯聯盟也是如此。美國的三K黨實際上也是一個準軍事組織。這種情況很正常，因此將其發展視為進入下一階段的標誌。

• Late in Stage 5 there are increasing numbers of protests that become increasingly violent. Because there is not always a clear line between a healthy protest and the beginnings of a revolution, leaders in power often struggle over how to allow protests without giving the perceived freedom to revolt against the system. Leaders must manage these situations well. A classic dilemma arises when demonstrations start to push the limits of revolution. Both giving the freedom to protest and suppressing protests are risky paths for leaders, as either path could lead the revolution to get strong enough to topple the system. No system allows people to bring down the system — in most, an attempt to do so is treason, typically punishable by death. Nonetheless, it is the job of revolutionaries to bring down systems, so governments and revolutionaries test each other to see what the limits are. When broad-based discontent bubbles up and those in power allow it to grow, it can boil over to the point that when they try to put a lid on it, it explodes. The conflicts in the late part of Stage 5 typically build up to a crescendo that triggers the violent fighting that signifies the transition into what historians stamp as the official civil-war periods, which I am identifying as Stage 6 in the Big Cycle. People dying in the fighting is the marker that almost certainly signifies the progression to the next and more violent civil-war stage, which will continue until the winners and losers are clearly determined.

在第5階段後期，越來越多的抗議活動變得越來越暴力。因為在良好有序的抗議和革命爆發之間並不總是有明確的界限，當權的領導人經常為如何允許抗議而不給予反抗制度的自由而鬥爭。領導者必須妥善處理這些情況。當示威開始突破革命的極限時，就會出現一個典型的困境。給予抗議自由和鎮壓抗議對領導人來說都是危險的道路，因為任何一條道路都可能導致革命變得強大到足以推翻體制。沒有系統允許人們破壞系統 — — 在大多數情況下，試圖這樣做是叛國罪，通常會被處以死刑。儘管如此，破壞系統是革命者的工作，因此政府和革命者互相測試，看看有什麼限制。當廣泛的不滿情緒爆發，當權者任其發展時，它可能會沸騰，以至於當他們試圖蓋住它的蓋子時，它就會爆炸。第 5 階段後期的衝突通常會逐漸加劇，引發暴力戰鬥，這標誌著過渡到歷史學家所標記的官方內戰時期，我將其確定為大周期的第 6 階段。在戰鬥中死去的人幾乎可以肯定地標誌著進入下一個更加暴力的內戰階段，這種階段將持續到贏家和輸家明確確定為止。

That brings me to my next principle: when in doubt get out. If you don’t want to be in a civil war or a war, you should get out while the getting is good. History has shown that when things get bad, the doors typically close for people who want to leave. The same is true for investments and money as countries introduce capital controls and other measures during such times.

這讓我想到了我的下一個原則：有疑問時退出。如果你不想陷入內戰或戰爭，你應該趁著形勢好時離開。歷史表明，當事情變得糟糕時，大門通常會對想要離開的人關閉。投資和貨幣也是如此，因為各國在此期間引入了資本管制和其他措施。

Before I move on to look at Stage 6, I want to distinguish between revolutions and civil wars and put them in the right buckets.

在我繼續研究第6階段之前，我想區分革命和內戰並將它們放在正確的桶中。

What Is the Difference between a Civil War and a Revolution?

內戰和革命有什麼區別？

A revolution is the process of bringing about revolutionary changes in how the system works. Revolutions needn’t be violent, though they typically are. They can occur within the system/order without breaking the system, or they can occur after disposing of the old order and starting a new one. Civil wars, on the other hand, are violent fights for controlling wealth and political power or fights over ideologies that people feel are even more important than themselves. They produce a lot of injury and death[15] and the breakdown of basic protections for people and basic services including healthcare, education, and normal economic activities. They are attempts to end the old order and replace it with a new order. The difference between civil wars and revolutions can be confusing — e.g., were the French and Russian revolutions really civil wars, and was Franklin Roosevelt’s big move to the left a peaceful revolution? How does one distinguish between successful and unsuccessful civil wars and revolutions — e.g., should the US Civil War not be counted as a civil war since it was unsuccessful in changing the system? I will explain how I chose to categorize them.

革命是對系統的運作方式帶來革命性變化的過程。革命不一定是暴力的，儘管它們通常是。它們可以在不破壞系統的情況下在系統/訂單內發生，也可以在處理舊訂單並開始新訂單後發生。另一方面，內戰是控制財富和政治權力的暴力鬥爭，或者是人們認為比自己更重要的意識形態的鬥爭。它們造成了大量傷害和死亡[15]，並破壞了對人民的基本保護和包括醫療、教育和正常經濟活動在內的基本服務。他們試圖結束舊秩序並用新秩序取而代之。內戰和革命之間的區別可能令人困惑 — — 例如，法國革命和俄羅斯革命真的是內戰嗎，富蘭克林·羅斯福向左的大動作是和平革命嗎？如何區分成功和失敗的內戰和革命 — — 例如，美國內戰不應該被視為一場內戰，因為它改變了製度不成功？我將解釋我如何選擇對它們進行分類。

In categorizing civil wars and revolutions I decided to distinguish those that occurred within a system/order from those that were attempts or successes to break the order and start a new one. In other words, revolutions can happen as a way of addressing the challenges of Stage 5 before a nation progresses to civil war (i.e., Stage 6). These revolutionary changes can occur within the system even if there is brutal arguing, as long as there is not lots of killing (civil wars) and/or changes in systems/orders (which fall into the next category and section). Examples of revolutionary changes within the existing orders include Roosevelt’s revolutionary shifts to the left in the early 1930s and Reagan’s and Thatcher’s revolutionary shifts to the right in the early 1980s. They were reflected in radically different wealth distribution policies that were exemplified by the radically different top income tax rates. For example, the top marginal tax rate in the US and UK since 1900, the changes in which are shown in the following charts, went from 0% to over 90% in 30 years and almost all wealth was redistributed in the 30 years between 1914 and 1944. This is just one of a number of measures we use to show the revolutionary changes that took place within the system.

在對內戰和革命進行分類時，我決定將那些發生在系統/秩序中的事件與那些試圖或成功打破秩序並開始新秩序的事件區分開來。換句話說，革命可以作為在一個國家進入內戰（即第 6 階段）之前解決第 5 階段挑戰的一種方式發生。即使存在殘酷的爭論，只要沒有大量殺戮（內戰）和/或系統/秩序的變化（屬於下一個類別和部分），這些革命性的變化也可能發生在系統內。現有秩序中革命性變化的例子包括1930年代初期羅斯福的革命性向左轉變以及 1980 年代初期裡根和撒切爾的革命性向右轉變。它們反映在截然不同的財富分配政策中，以截然不同的最高收入稅率為例。

例如，美國和英國自1900 年以來的最高邊際稅率，其變化如下圖所示，在30 年內從0% 上升到90% 以上，並且幾乎所有的財富都在1914 年之間的30 年中進行了重新分配和1944 年。這只是我們用來展示系統內發生的革命性變化的眾多措施之一。

History shows us that revolutionary changes that take place within a system/order can be as large as those that come from civil wars. For example, the Big Cycle revolutionary changes that took place within the US system in the 90 years from 1860 to 1950 were nearly total in that they almost completely changed who had wealth and power from the boom to the unimaginable busts, wars, and redistributions. More specifically, after the US Civil War ended in 1865, the US joined other major Western countries in having great productivity, prosperity, and wealth creation.[16] This period was known as the Second Industrial Revolution. That was when the “robber barons” such as John D. Rockefeller, Cornelius Vanderbilt, Andrew Carnegie, and J.P. Morgan accumulated vast fortunes, which led to popular reactions against them and their powers. This period was also called the Gilded Age in the US, the Victorian Era in the UK, and the Belle Époque in France because of the decadent spending that set in motion the revolutionary changes that started gradually and then accelerated to wipe out or redistribute virtually all wealth by 1950.

歷史告訴我們，系統/秩序內發生的革命性變化可能與內戰帶來的變化一樣大。例如，從1860 年到1950 年的90 年間，美國體制內發生的大循環革命性變化幾乎是全面的，因為它們幾乎完全改變了誰擁有財富和權力，從繁榮到難以想像的蕭條、戰爭和再分配。更具體地說，在美國內戰於 1865 年結束後，美國與其他主要西方國家一起擁有巨大的生產力、繁榮和財富創造。 [16]這一時期被稱為第二次工業革命。就在那時，約翰·D·洛克菲勒、科尼利厄斯·范德比爾特、安德魯·卡內基和摩根大通等”強盜大亨”積累了巨額財富，這導致了民眾對他們及其權力的反應。這一時期在美國也被稱為鍍金時代，在英國被稱為維多利亞時代，在法國被稱為美好年代，因為頹廢的支出引發了革命性的變化，這些變化逐漸開始，然後加速消滅或重新分配幾乎所有1950 年的財富。

For example, in the US, strikes first began in the 1880s, the Sherman Antitrust Act was passed in 1890 to break up monopolies and was increasingly used to break up companies, and the debt-bubble-induced depression of 1893 raised tensions especially as money was kept hard (i.e., tied to gold), so in 1896 a populist — William Jennings Bryan — emerged and campaigned for the presidency on the platform of breaking the link with gold, printing money, and distributing it liberally. Bryan wasn’t elected. Theodore Roosevelt became president in 1901, and “muckrakers” in the mass media led to investigative journalism that helped stir up the public and was used by Roosevelt to make reforms. A new political party, the Populist Party, and the Progressive movement came into existence in support of a number of actions to deal with industrial and labor issues, trust busting, food and drug quality, women’s suffrage, etc. In 1913 the 16th Amendment to the Constitution allowing a federal income tax was passed. From that point of having no taxes to speak of, the top marginal tax rates increased to around 70–80% for both income and estate taxes. In the 30 years from 1914 and 1944, there were two world wars and the global depression, which led to the creation of a lot of debt that had the interest rates on it legally capped while all major currencies were delinked from gold, gold ownership was outlawed, the abilities to take money out of most countries were eliminated, and price controls on rent and other items were created. Then central banks printed a lot of money, which produced a lot of inflation, sharply reducing the real value of fixed-income and equity assets. Additionally, in most countries (especially in Europe) businesses were expropriated or nationalized, and the war damage destroyed a lot of property. Capitalists and capitalism were widely blamed and hated especially as a result of the stock market crashes and depressions, so many of them were killed.[17]

例如，在美國，罷工最早始於1880 年代，1890 年通過了《謝爾曼反托拉斯法》以打破壟斷並越來越多地用於拆分公司，1893 年債務泡沫引發的蕭條加劇了緊張局勢，尤其是貨幣被嚴格控制（即與黃金掛鉤），因此在1896 年，一位民粹主義者 — — 威廉詹寧斯·布萊恩（William Jennings Bryan）出現並在打破與黃金的聯繫、印鈔和自由分配的平台上競選總統。 Bryan wasn’t elected.西奧多·羅斯福 (Theodore Roosevelt) 於 1901 年成為總統，大眾媒體中的”誹謗者”導致了調查性新聞，這有助於煽動公眾並被羅斯福用來進行改革。一個新的政黨、民粹黨和進步運動應運而生，以支持處理工業和勞工問題、破壞信任、食品和藥品質量、婦女選舉權等一系列行動。 1913 年第 16 條修正案允許徵收聯邦所得稅的憲法獲得通過。從沒有稅收的角度來看，所得稅和遺產稅的最高邊際稅率都增加到了 70–80% 左右。從1914 年到1944 年的30 年間，兩次世界大戰和全球經濟蕭條導致大量債務的產生，其利率受到法律限制，而所有主要貨幣都與黃金脫鉤，黃金所有權被取締，從大多數國家取錢的能力被取消，並對租金和其他物品進行價格控制。然後中央銀行大量印鈔，產生了大量通貨膨脹，大幅降低了固定收益和股權資產的實際價值。此外，在大多數國家（尤其是歐洲），企業被徵用或國有化，戰爭破壞摧毀了大量財產。資本家和資本主義被廣泛指責和憎恨，特別是由於股市崩盤和蕭條，他們中的許多人被殺了。 [17]

Those revolutionary changes in wealth and power that took place within the system that we looked at, are still studying, and by and large were driven in this archetypical way are:

• 1828 US Election: Andrew Jackson — Conservative populist, refused to renew the charter of the US’s central bank (Second Bank of the US).
• 860s Russia: Abolition of serfdom.
• 880s Germany: Otto von Bismarck’s social legislation.
• 1890s-1920s: The Progressive Era — Trust busting, anticorruption, scientific thinking.
• 1906: Theodore Roosevelt introduced progressive estate taxation and, in 1909, the income tax.
• 1908 UK Election: H.H. Asquith’s passage of big tax hikes and the major welfare reforms that led to the emergence of the modern welfare system in the UK.
• 1912 US Election: Woodrow Wilson — First Democratic president elected in 20 years, second in 55, which kicked off big tax changes and reform.
• 1920: The women’s rights movement led to the 19th Amendment of the US Constitution, which gave women the right to vote.
• 1932 US Election: FDR’s move to the left — Upon election, Franklin Roosevelt immediately devalued the dollar to produce debt relief and implemented sweeping reforms on an unprecedented scale. His New Deal policies sought to tackle the economic depression through a vast expansion of the role of government and support for workers, debtors, and the unemployed. He created Social Security and unemployment insurance, increased financial regulation, created large government programs that directly employed people, and strengthened labor rights.
• 1936 French Election: Blum’s move to the left — Léon Blum passed a slew of labor reforms that gave workers increased rights, better working conditions, and higher pay.
• 1940s-50s Argentina: Perónist moves to the left — Juan Perón nationalized industries, increased wages for workers, increased the numbers covered by social security, and expanded health insurance.
• 1950s Soviet Union: Nikita Khrushchev’s anti-Stalin reforms to eliminate oppression and raise agricultural production.
• 1960s-70s India: Gandhi’s socialist policies — Indira Gandhi expanded the public sector and helped enable the “Green Revolution” (protecting Indians from famine and dependence on imported grains).
• 1964 US Election: Lyndon Johnson’s tax cuts and civil rights and anti-poverty programs.
• 1978: Deng Xiaoping/“Capitalist Revolution.”
• 1979 UK Election: Margaret Thatcher’s move to the right.
• 1980 US Election: Ronald Reagan’s move to the right.

在我們所研究的系統內發生的財富和權力的革命性變化，仍在研究中，並且大體上是以這種典型方式驅動的：
1.1828 年美國大選：安德魯杰克遜 — — 保守的民粹主義者，拒絕更新美國中央銀行（美國第二銀行）的章程。
2. 860 年代的俄羅斯：廢除農奴制。
3. 880 年代的德國：奧托·馮·俾斯麥的社會立法。
4. 1890 年代-1920 年代：進步時代 — — 破壞信任、反腐敗、科學思維。
5. 1906 年：西奧多·羅斯福引入了累進遺產稅，並於 1909 年引入了所得稅。
6. 1908 年英國大選：H.H. Asquith 通過大幅增稅和重大福利改革，導致英國出現現代福利制度。
7. 1912年美國選舉：伍德羅威爾遜 — 第一民主黨總統在20年代選出，第二次促進了大稅收變化和改革。
8. 1920 年：婦女權利運動促成了美國憲法第 19 條修正案，該修正案賦予婦女投票權。
9. 1932年美國選舉：FDR的舉動到左右選舉，富蘭克林羅斯福立即貶值，以生產債務救濟，並在前所未有的規模上實施徹底改革。他的新政政策試圖通過擴大政府的作用以及對工人、債務人和失業者的支持來應對經濟蕭條。他創建了社會保障和失業保險，加強了金融監管，創建了直接僱用人員的大型政府計劃，並加強了勞工權利。
10. 1936 年法國大選：布盧姆向左移動 — — 萊昂·布盧姆通過了一系列勞工改革，賦予工人更多的權利、更好的工作條件和更高的工資。
11. 1940 年代至 50 年代阿根廷：庇隆主義向左移動 — — 胡安·庇隆將工業國有化，提高工人工資，增加社會保障覆蓋的人數，並擴大醫療保險。
12. 1950 年代的蘇聯：尼基塔·赫魯曉夫 (Nikita Khrushchev) 為消除壓迫和提高農業生產而進行的反斯大林改革。
13. 1960–70 年代印度：甘地的社會主義政策 — — 英迪拉·甘地擴大了公共部門並幫助實現了”綠色革命”（保護印度人免受飢荒和對進口穀物的依賴）。
14. 1964 年美國大選：林登約翰遜的減稅、民權和反貧困計劃。
15. 1978 年：鄧小平/”資本主義革命”。
16. 1979 年英國大選：瑪格麗特·撒切爾 (Margaret Thatcher) 向右移動。
17. 1980 年美國大選：羅納德·裡根右傾。

Crossing the line from Stage 5 (when there are very bad financial conditions and intense internal and external conflict exists) to Stage 6 (when there is civil war) occurs when the system for resolving disagreements goes from working to not working. In other words, it happens when the system is broken beyond repair. As you might imagine, it is a much bigger deal to break a system/order and build a new one than it is to make revolutionary changes within an existing system/order. Though breaking a system/order is more traumatic, it isn’t necessarily a worse path than operating within a system.

從第5階段（當財務狀況非常糟糕並且存在激烈的內部和外部衝突時）到第 6 階段（當發生內戰時）的界限發生在解決分歧的系統從工作變為不工作時。換句話說，它發生在系統損壞無法修復時。正如讀者可能想像的那樣，打破一個系統/秩序並建立一個新的系統/秩序比在現有系統/秩序中進行革命性的改變要大得多。儘管破壞系統/秩序會造成更大的創傷，但這並不一定比在系統內運作更糟糕。

Deciding whether to keep and renovate something old that is not working well or to dispose of it and replace it with something new is never easy, especially when the something new is not clearly known and is of the importance of a domestic order. Nonetheless, it happens, though typically it is not decided on intellectually; it is typically emotionally driven.

決定是保留和翻新不能正常工作的舊東西，還是處理掉它並用新東西替換它從來都不是一件容易的事，尤其是當新東西不清楚並且對國內秩序具有重要意義時。儘管如此，它還是會發生，儘管通常不是智力決定的； 它通常是情緒驅動的。

When one is in late Stage 5 (like the US is now) the biggest question is how much the system will bend before it breaks. The democratic system, which allows the population to do pretty much whatever it decides to do, produces more bending because the people can make leadership changes and only have themselves to blame. In this system regime changes can more easily happen in a peaceful way. However, the one-person, one-vote democratic process has the drawback of having leaders selected via popularity contests by people who are largely not doing the sort of thoughtful review of capabilities that most organizations would do when trying to find the right person for an important job. So, while having great ability to bend, in democracies there is a big risk in not filling the most important jobs with the most capable people. Democracy also requires consensus decision making and compromise, which requires a lot of people who have opposing views to work well with each other within the system. That ensures that parties that have significant constituencies can be represented, but like all big committees of people who have widely different views (and might even dislike each other), the decision-making system does not lend itself to efficient decision making. History shows us that the biggest risk to democracies is that they produce such fragmented and antagonistic decision making that they can be ineffective, which leads to bad results, which leads to revolutions led by populist autocrats who represent large segments of the population who want to have a strong capable leader get control of the chaos and make the country work well for them.

當一個人處於第 5 階段後期（就像美國現在這樣）時，最大的問題是系統在崩潰之前會彎曲多少。民主制度允許人民做任何他們決定做的事情，但會產生更多的彎曲，因為人們可以改變領導層，而只能怪自己。在這個系統中，政權更迭更容易以和平方式發生。然而，一人一票的民主程序有一個缺點，即領導者是通過人氣競賽選出的，而這些人在很大程度上沒有像大多數組織在試圖找到合適的人選時所做的那樣對能力進行深思熟慮的審查。重要的工作。因此，雖然有很大的屈從能力，但在民主國家，如果沒有最有能力的人填補最重要的工作崗位，則存在很大的風險。民主也需要協商一致的決策和妥協，這需要很多持不同意見的人在體制內相互配合。這確保了擁有重要選區的政黨可以得到代表，但與所有意見分歧很大（甚至可能彼此不喜歡）的人組成的大委員會一樣，決策系統不利於有效決策。歷史向我們表明，民主國家面臨的最大風險是，它們做出如此分散和對立的決策，以至於它們可能無效，從而導致糟糕的結果，進而導致由代表著想要擁有的大部分人口的民粹主義獨裁者領導的革命。一個有能力的領導者可以控制混亂並使國家為他們運轉良好。

Also noteworthy: history has shown that during times of great conflict federalist democracies (like the US) typically have conflicts between the states and the central government over their relative powers. That would be a marker to look out for that hasn’t yet arisen in the US; it happening would signify the continued progression of this cycle toward Stage 6.

同樣值得注意的是：歷史表明，在發生巨大衝突的時候，聯邦制民主國家（如美國）通常會在州和中央政府之間就其相對權力發生衝突。這將是一個需要注意的標誌，但在美國尚未出現； 它的發生將意味著這個週期繼續向第 6 階段發展。

There are far too many breakdowns of democracies to explore, let alone describe. While I looked into a number of them to see the patterns, I haven’t fully mined them, and I’m not going to dive into them here. I will say that the factors described in the explanations of Stage 5 when taken to the extreme — most importantly, terrible finances, decadence, internal strife and disorder, and/or major external conflict — lead to a dysfunctional set of conditions and a fight for power led by a strong leader. Archetypical examples that come to mind are Athens from the late 400s to the 300s BC, the end of the Roman Republic in the century or so preceding 27 BC,[18] Germany’s Weimar Republic in the 1920s, and the weak democracies of Italy, Japan, and Spain in the 1920s and 1930s that turned to autocracies of the right (fascism) to bring order to the chaos.

有太多的民主崩潰需要探索，更不用說描述了。雖然我查看了其中的一些以查看模式，但我還沒有完全挖掘它們，我不打算在這裡深入研究它們。我會說，在第5 階段的解釋中描述的因素如果被推到極致 — — 最重要的是，糟糕的財務狀況、頹廢、內部紛爭和混亂，和/或重大的外部衝突 — — 會導致一系列功能失調的條件和爭取由強大的領導者領導的權力。想到的典型例子是公元前400 年代末到300 年代的雅典、公元前27 年左右的一個世紀左右的羅馬共和國末期、[18] 1920 年代的德國魏瑪共和國，以及意大利、日本的弱民主國家和1920 年代和1930 年代的西班牙轉向右翼專制（法西斯主義）以給混亂帶來秩序。

Different stages require different types of leaders to get the best results. When one is in Stage 5 one is at a juncture in which one path could lead to civil war/revolution and the other could lead to peaceful, and ideally prosperous, coexistence. Obviously the peaceful and prosperous path is the ideal path, but it is the much more difficult path to pull off. That path requires either a “strong peacemaker” who goes out of their way to bring the country together, including reaching out to the other side to involve them in the decision making and reshaping the order in a way that most people agree is fair and works well (i.e., is highly productive in a way that benefits most people) or a “strong revolutionary” who is capable of taking the country through the hell of civil war/revolution. In our discussion of the next two stages about civil war/revolution and the times right after them, we will explore what is required.

不同的階段需要不同類型的領導才能得到最好的結果。當一個處於第5階段時，一個途徑可能會導致內戰/革命，而另一種可能會導致和平、理想的繁榮共存。顯然，和平繁榮的道路是理想的道路，但這是更難實現的道路。這條道路需要一個”強大的和平締造者”，他會不遺餘力地將國家團結起來，包括與另一方接觸，讓他們參與決策，並以大多數人認為公平且有效的方式重塑秩序好吧（即，以一種使大多數人受益的方式具有高生產力）或能夠帶領國家度過內戰/革命地獄的”強大的革命者”。在我們關於內戰/革命及其之後的時代的接下來兩個階段的討論中，我們將探討需要什麼。

The US Now

如今的美國

The United States is now in Stage 5 and has not yet crossed the line into Stage 6 (the civil-war stage). Will populism and fighting between extremists go past the point of no return? Judging by the indicators the honest answer is that it is too close to call. Hardly anyone expects that the US will cross the line to have a civil war/revolution, though it could. Because the United States has a long tradition of working out disagreements within the system, precedent favors making changes within the system. In its 244-year history it has had only one civil war, several rather peaceful revolutions, and many serious conflicts, so it has shown great capacity to bend without breaking. Of course, it was our ancestors who bent and compromised enough to work things out without abandoning the system, and now it is the responsibility of existing decision makers to interact with the system that our founding fathers gave us.

美國現在處於第 5 階段，尚未越線進入第 6 階段（內戰階段）。民粹主義和極端分子之間的鬥爭是否會越過不歸路？從指標來看，誠實的答案是它太接近了。幾乎沒有人預料到美國會越過界限進行內戰/革命，儘管它可能。由於美國在體制內解決分歧的悠久傳統，先例傾向於在體制內進行變革。在它244年的歷史中，它只經歷過一次內戰，幾次比較和平的革命，和許多嚴重的衝突，所以它表現出屈從於不折不扣的強大能力。當然，是我們的祖先在不放棄系統的情況下做出了足夠的妥協和妥協，現在現有的決策者有責任與我們的開國元勳賦予我們的系統互動。

The recent elections showed how split the country is — almost 50/50 along seemingly irreconcilable lines. Figuratively speaking the population 50 years ago used to look like this — i.e., the majority of each party were moderates and the extremists were less extreme.

最近的選舉顯示了這個國家的分裂程度 — — 幾乎50/50的比例似乎不可調和。形像地說，50 年前的人口曾經是這樣的 — — 即，每個政黨的大多數都是溫和派，而極端分子則不那麼極端。

Now it looks like this — i.e., with a greater concentration and number of people at the extremes.

現在看起來是這樣 — — 也就是說，極端集中的人數和人數都更多。

Such changes are typical of progressing toward greater conflict as they reflect more people being at the extremes and the number of moderates shrinking. When moderates are in the minority and extremists are in the majority in each party there is a self-reinforcing pull to greater polarization and increased conflict. As previously described, after there are regime changes (such as Biden winning the presidency), those who were united in their desire to depose the incumbent common enemy fight each other for power after they defeat the incumbent and come to power. So, we should expect that the Democrats and the Republicans will fight among themselves for power as well as with those in the opposite parties. Since the extremists in each party appear to outnumber the moderates, the dynamic I am describing pulls the parties to greater extremes because if they don’t themselves lean in that direction they could be defeated in primary elections by greater extremists. A modern-day example of that dynamic is the possibility that Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer could be unseated by a Democrat who is more left than he is. That would be a straw in the wind.

這種變化是朝著更大衝突發展的典型特徵，因為它們反映了更多的人處於極端狀態，而溫和派的數量正在減少。當溫和派佔少數而極端分子佔多數時，就會有一種自我強化的牽引力，導致兩極分化和衝突加劇。如前所述，在政權更迭之後（例如拜登贏得總統職位），那些為了推翻現任共同敵人而團結起來的人在擊敗現任總統並上台後相互爭奪權力。因此，我們應該預料，民主黨和共和黨將在彼此之間以及與對立政黨之間爭奪權力。由於每個政黨中的極端分子似乎都多於溫和派，我所描述的動態將政黨拉向更大的極端，因為如果他們自己不朝那個方向傾斜，他們可能會在初選中被更大的極端分子擊敗。這種動態的現代例子是參議院少數黨領袖查克舒默可能被一位比他更左的民主黨人取代。那將是風中的一根稻草。

History has shown us that greater polarization equals either a) greater risk of political gridlock, which reduces the chances of revolutionary changes that rectify the problems, or b) some form of civil war.

歷史告訴我們，更大的兩極分化等於 a) 更大的政治僵局風險，這降低了糾正問題的革命性變革的機會，或者 b) 某種形式的內戰。

With a moderate/establishment president (Biden) and the Senate likely to be in Republican hands, it now appears most likely that neither side will be able to dominate the other and fighting for changes will most likely continue within the system. That is likely to force either gridlock or compromise. Greater gridlock could lead to more unethical fighting that the other side will find intolerable and reply to in kind, while compromise would require moderates to split from the extremists in their parties. For these reasons it would be unwise to be confident about whether the cycle will or will not progress to Stage 6. However, because that would be a very big deal, it will be important to watch the markers closely. In my opinion they will be best reflected in the 18 factors previously mentioned, though they can also be reflected by other markers.

由於溫和派/建制派總統（拜登）和參議院可能掌握在共和黨手中，現在看來，任何一方都無法主宰對方，爭取變革的鬥爭很可能會在系統內繼續進行。這可能會導致僵局或妥協。更大的僵局可能導致更不道德的戰鬥，對方會覺得無法忍受並以實物回應，而妥協則需要溫和派與黨內的極端分子分裂。由於這些原因，對周期是否會進入第6 階段充滿信心是不明智的。但是，因為這將是一個非常重要的問題，所以密切關注標記非常重要。在我看來，它們將最好地反映在前面提到的 18 個因素中，儘管它們也可以通過其他信號來反映。

To reiterate, some of the most important markers I am looking at are:

• The combination of financial circumstances, wealth gaps, and economic shock (“Classic Toxic Mix”)
• Decadent spending of money and time
• Bureaucracy
• Populism and extremism
• Polarization and loss of moderates
• Class warfare and demonization of people in different classes
• Polarized and distorted media
• Rule-following fading and power-grabbing increasing
• Legal and political systems increasingly used for personal political power
• Fighting with fatalities

重申一下，我正在查看的一些最重要的信號是：
1. 金融環境、貧富差距和經濟衝擊的結合（”經典有毒組合”）
2. 浪費金錢和時間
3. 官僚主義
4. 民粹主義和極端主義
5. 極化和中等強度損失
6. 階級鬥爭和妖魔化不同階級的人
7. 極化和扭曲的媒體
8. 遵循規則衰落和奪權增加
9. 法律和政治制度越來越多地用於個人政治權力

與死亡搏鬥

History shows us that when empires decline they decline in most of these ways because when each of these types of strengths and weaknesses improve or decline, they reinforce the others. It also shows us that past a certain point, the factors deteriorate very rapidly together.

歷史告訴我們，當帝國衰落時，它們會以大多數方式衰落，因為當這些類型的優勢和劣勢中的每一種改善或下降時，它們都會加強其他。它還向我們表明，過了某個時間點，這些因素會一起迅速惡化。

What Would Good Look Like?

國家好的狀態應該是什麼樣的？

It would be great to keep the peace and do the things necessary to have the 18 factors stop moving to the right (bad) part of the continuum and to start moving to the left (good) part of the continuum. To move in the right direction there will have to simultaneously be greater unity and big restructurings. For example, a) many debts and non-debt obligations (e.g., for pensions and healthcare) and balance sheets will probably have to be restructured or devalued, b) the ways of doing things will have to be restructured so productivity can be increased so that incomes will rise relative to expenses and balance sheets will improve for most people and governments (i.e., central, state, and local) while the benefits are broadly shared, so c) financial, educational, and health disparities will have to be reduced with those suffering the most being increasingly protected and d) the fundamentals that lead to these improvements in areas such as education, infrastructure, and supports for healthy bodies, minds, and environments will have to be improved. Conversely it would be very bad if Americans increased their fighting with each other at the expense of the order that is needed to bring about revolutionary improvements. Hopefully realizing what the next two stages — i.e., the civil-war and post-civil-war stages — will probably be like will help motivate people not to go there and instead to make the needed changes.

保持平靜並採取必要的措施讓 18 個因素停止向連續統的右側（壞）部分移動並開始向連續統的左側（好的）部分移動，這將是很棒的。為了朝著正確的方向前進，必須同時進行更大的團結和大規模的重組。例如，a) 許多債務和非債務義務（例如，養老金和醫療保健）和資產負債表可能需要重組或貶值，b) 必須重組做事方式，以便提高生產力，從而大多數人和政府（即中央、州和地方）的收入將相對於支出而增加，資產負債表將得到改善，而收益將廣泛共享，因此c) 必須通過以下方式縮小財務、教育和健康差距那些受害最深的人得到越來越多的保護，並且d) 在教育、基礎設施以及對健康身體、思想和環境的支持等領域，導致這些改善的基礎必須得到改善。相反，如果美國人以犧牲帶來革命性改進所需的秩序為代價來增加彼此之間的戰鬥，那將是非常糟糕的。希望了解接下來的兩個階段 — — 即內戰和內戰後階段 — — 可能會是什麼樣子，將有助於激勵人們不要去那裡，而是做出必要的改變。

How should we judge whether policy makers are making the right moves to improve these things? Very simply, what governments do economically is reflected in just two types of policy — fiscal and monetary — and each can be either easy or tight. Easy means a lot of debt and money is created, which will lead it to become worth less if the country doesn’t raise productivity by more than a commensurate amount, but it is stimulative for the economy and is an innocuous way of getting money into the hands of those who would not get it through the normal means. Tight means that a lot less debt and money is produced so it will be devalued less, all else being equal, but it is less stimulative to the economy and gets less money into the hands of those who most desperately need it. So, we can watch how those trade-offs are handled. In addition to paying attention to the tight or easy fiscal and monetary trade-offs, which tell us the amount of borrowing and spending, we need to pay attention to what that borrowing and spending is used for; most importantly, will it increase productivity and the well-being of most people, or will it not? History has shown that what matters most is what the system puts the credit and money into. We can watch that and judge whether or not it will raise productivity and real incomes for the whole and for most people. Of course, non-fiscal and non-monetary policies such as laws and regulations matter too, so they also should be assessed in terms of whether or not they will increase the country’s strengths.

我們應該如何判斷決策者是否正在採取正確的措施來改善這些事情？很簡單，政府在經濟上的所作所為僅反映在兩種類型的政策上 — — 財政和貨幣 — — 而且每一種都可以是寬鬆的，也可以是緊縮的。容易意味著創造了大量的債務和金錢，如果國家的生產力提高不超過相應數量，這將導致它變得更有價值，但它對經濟有刺激作用，是一種無害的賺錢方式那些不會通過正常手段得到它的人的手。緊縮意味著生產的債務和貨幣會減少很多，因此在其他條件相同的情況下貶值也會減少，但它對經濟的刺激性較小，並且流入最迫切需要它的人手中的資金也會減少。因此，我們可以觀察這些權衡是如何處理的。除了關注寬鬆的財政和貨幣權衡，它告訴我們藉貸和支出的數量，我們還需要關注借貸和支出的用途；最重要的是，它會提高大多數人的生產力和福祉，還是不會？歷史表明，最重要的是系統將信用和貨幣投入什麼。我們可以觀察並判斷它是否會提高整體和大多數人的生產力和實際收入。當然，法律法規等非財政、非貨幣政策也很重要，所以也要從能否增強國家實力來衡量。

The challenges of doing what is needed are that getting the necessary cooperation requires a) moderates to split from the extremists in their parties to try to pull the country together, which is very difficult to pull off, and b) big restructurings and revolutionary changes to be pushed through to yield revolutionary improvements, which is also very difficult to pull off. History has shown that moderates in environments like those that exist now (in Stage 5) have been more inclined to be pulled to the extremes than to work well with moderates of other parties to bring the country together behind sensible and mutually agreed-upon policies. While seemingly unlikely, history has shown that people can be inventive when faced with seemingly intractable problems and get around them. For example, though seemingly unlikely, perhaps a third party for moderates who are no longer comfortable in their existing parties will be created, which could quickly increase the power of moderates because it wouldn’t take many votes in the Senate or House to give moderates the swing votes that would give them great power.[20]

做需要做的事情的挑戰是，獲得必要的合作需要a) 溫和派從黨內的極端分子中分裂出來，試圖將國家團結起來，這很難實現，以及b) 大的重組和革命性的變革推動產生革命性的改進，這也很難實現。歷史表明，在目前（第5 階段）這樣的環境中，溫和派更傾向於被拉到極端，而不是與其他政黨的溫和派很好地合作，以將國家團結在明智的、共同商定的政策之下。雖然看似不太可能，但歷史表明，人們在面對看似棘手的問題時可以發揮創造力並繞過它們。例如，雖然看起來不太可能，但也許會為那些對現有政黨不再感到舒服的溫和派創建第三方，這可以迅速增加溫和派的權力，因為在參議院或眾議院投票不需要很多票就可以給溫和派搖擺選票會給他們很大的權力。 [20]

We will soon find out in what directions Democratic and Republican party members will be pulled and how well the representatives of the two parties deal with each other, as described above: either with gridlock or compromise. I just hope all parties recognize where they are in the cycle and what could come next — i.e., the costs of increased conflict and the benefits of reduced conflict.

我們很快就會發現民主黨和共和黨成員將被拉到什麼方向，以及兩黨代表之間的關係如何，如上所述：要么陷入僵局，要么妥協。我只是希望各方認識到他們在循環中的位置以及接下來會發生什麼 — — 即衝突增加的成本和衝突減少的好處。

Stage 6: When There Are Civil Wars

階段 6：發生內戰時

This section is about the part of the Big Cycle when there is a fight to get rid of the existing system/order — i.e., when there is a civil war.

本節是關於大循環的一部分，當有一場擺脫現有系統/秩序的鬥爭時 — — 即，當發生內戰時。

History shows us that civil wars inevitably happen, so rather than assuming that “it won’t happen here,” which most people in most of the countries assume after an extensive period of not having them, one should be wary of them and look for the markers to indicate how close to one one is. In this section we will look at those markers.

歷史告訴我們，內戰不可避免地發生，所以與其假設”它不會在這裡發生”，大多數國家的大多數人在經歷了很長一段時間沒有內戰之後才假設，而是應該警惕它們並尋找用於指示與一的接近程度的標記。在本節中，我們將查看這些標記。

While in the last section we looked at nonviolent revolutions that took place within the order, in this section we will be looking at the patterns of civil wars and revolutions that were almost always violent and toppled the old order and replaced it with a new one. Though there are an innumerable number that we could have examined to understand how they work, we chose what I believe are the 29 most significant ones, which are shown in the following table. We categorized this group into those that produced big changes to the system/regime and those that did not. For example, the US Civil War was a real bloody civil war that failed to overturn the system/order, so it is in the second group at the bottom of the table, while those that toppled the system/order are at the top. These categories are of course imprecise, but once again we won’t let imprecision stand in the way of seeing what we couldn’t see if we insisted on being precise. Most of them, though not all of them, transpired in the archetypical way described in this section.

在上一節中，我們研究了秩序內發生的非暴力革命，而在本節中，我們將研究內戰和革命的模式，這些模式幾乎總是暴力的並推翻舊秩序並用新秩序取而代之。雖然我們可以檢查無數的數字來了解它們的工作原理，但我們選擇了我認為最重要的29個，如下表所示。我們將這一群體分為對系統/制度產生重大變化的群體和沒有發生重大變化的群體。例如，美國內戰是一場真正的血腥內戰，未能推翻制度/秩序，因此排在表格底部的第二組，而推翻制度/秩序的則排在最前面。這些類別當然是不精確的，但如果我們堅持精確，我們不會再讓不精確阻礙看到我們看不到的東西。它們中的大多數（儘管不是全部）都以本節中描述的原型方式發生。

A classic example of a civil war breaking the system and having to build a new system is the Russian Civil War/Revolution of 1917, which put into place the communist internal order that entered Stage 5 in the late 1980s, which led it to attempt to make revolutionary changes within the system, which was called perestroika (i.e., restructuring), which failed and was followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union’s order in 1991 and that order being replaced by the new system/order that is now governing Russia, which, after the collapse of the old order, was built in the classic ways described later in this chapter in my explanation of Stages 1 and 2. In that case, the communist domestic order and its big cycle lasted 74 years (from 1917 until 1991). Another is the Meiji Restoration, which came about as a result of a three-year revolution (1866–69) in Japan that came about because the Japanese were closed off to the outside world and failed to advance so the Americans forced the Japanese to open, which prompted a revolutionary group to fight and defeat the rulers (led by the military shogun) in battle, which led to overturning the internal order run by four classes — 1) the conservative military, 2) farmers, 3) artisans, and 4) merchants — that had ruled Japan. The old Japanese order run by traditional people was ultra-conservative — e.g., social mobility was outlawed — and was replaced by revolutionaries who were extremely progressive and changed everything under the emperor to make great improvements. Early in this period there were lots of labor disputes, strikes, and riots that resulted from the classic wealth gaps and bad economic condition triggers. In the reform process the leadership provided universal elementary education for both boys and girls, adopted capitalism, and opened up the country to the outside world. Rather than using the old technologies they were able to use the new technologies, which led them to become very competitive and gain wealth. There are many such cases of countries that did the right things to produce revolutionarily beneficial improvements, just as there are many cases of revolutionaries doing the wrong things that inflicted terrible pain on their people for decades. By the way, as a result of its reformations Japan went on to move through the classic stages of the Big Cycle to become extremely successful and rich, but over time it became decadent, overextended, and fragmented; had an economic depression; had expensive wars; and that led to a classic demise. Its “Meiji order” and its classic Big Cycle lasted for 76 years from 1869 to 1945.

內戰打破體制並不得不建立新體制的一個典型例子是1917 年的俄羅斯內戰/革命，它確立了在1980 年代後期進入第五階段的共產主義內部秩序，這導致它試圖在系統內進行革命性的變革，這被稱為改革（即重組），失敗並隨之而來的是1991 年蘇聯秩序的崩潰，該秩序被現在統治俄羅斯的新系統/秩序所取代。舊秩序崩潰後，以本章後面我在第一階段和第二階段的解釋中描述的經典方式建立。在這種情況下，共產主義國內秩序及其大周期持續了74年（從1917年到1991年） .另一個是明治維新，它是日本三年革命（1866–69 年）的結果，因為日本人與外界隔絕，未能前進，所以美國人強迫日本人開放，這促使一個革命團體在戰鬥中與統治者（以軍事幕府為首的）戰鬥並擊敗了統治者，從而推翻了由四個階級管理的內部秩序 — — 1）保守的軍隊，2）農民，3）工匠，4 ) 商人 — — 曾經統治過日本。由傳統人管理的舊日本秩序是極端保守的 — — 例如，社會流動是非法的 — — 取而代之的是極其進步的革命者，他們在天皇統治下改變了一切，做出了很大的改進。在這一時期的早期，由於典型的貧富差距和糟糕的經濟狀況引發了許多勞資糾紛、罷工和騷亂。在改革過程中，領導層普及了男孩和女孩的基礎教育，採用了資本主義，對外開放了國家。他們沒有使用舊技術，而是能夠使用新技術，這使他們變得非常有競爭力並獲得財富。有很多這樣的例子，國家做了正確的事情以產生革命性的有益改進，正如有許多革命者做了錯誤的事情，幾十年來給他們的人民帶來了可怕的痛苦一樣。順便說一下，作為改革的結果，日本繼續通過大周期的經典階段，變得非常成功和富裕，但隨著時間的推移，它變得頹廢、過度擴張和支離破碎；經濟蕭條；有過昂貴的戰爭；這導致了經典的消亡。它的”明治令”和經典的大循環從1869年到1945年持續了76年。

Civil wars and revolutions inevitably take place to radically change the internal order (i.e., the system of distributing wealth and power). They include total restructurings of wealth and political power that include complete restructurings of debt and financial ownership and political decision making. These changes are the natural consequence of needing to make big changes that can’t be made within the existing system. Almost all systems encounter them. That is because almost all systems benefit some classes of people at the expense of other classes, which eventually becomes intolerable to the point that there is a fight to determine the path forward. When the gaps in wealth and values become very wide and economically bad conditions ensue so that the system is not working for a large percentage of the people, the people will fight to change the system. Those who are economically suffering the most will fight to get more wealth and power against those who have wealth and power and who benefit from the existing system. Naturally the revolutionaries want to radically change the system, so naturally they are willing to break the laws that those in power demand that they adhere to. These revolutionary changes typically happen violently through civil wars, though as previously described, they can come about peacefully without toppling the system.

內戰和革命不可避免地發生，以從根本上改變內部秩序（即分配財富和權力的製度）。它們包括財富和政治權力的全面重組，包括債務和金融所有權以及政治決策的全面重組。這些更改是需要進行現有系統無法進行的重大更改的自然結果。幾乎所有系統都會遇到它們。那是因為幾乎所有系統都以犧牲其他階級為代價使某些階級的人受益，這最終變得無法忍受，以至於需要為確定前進的道路而進行鬥爭。當財富和價值觀的差距變得非常大並且經濟狀況不佳時，系統無法為大部分人服務時，人們就會為改變系統而鬥爭。那些在經濟上受苦最深的人將與那些擁有財富和權力並從現有製度中受益的人爭奪更多的財富和權力。革命者自然想從根本上改變制度，所以他們自然願意打破當權者要求他們遵守的法律。這些革命性的變化通常會通過內戰猛烈地發生，儘管如前所述，它們可以和平地發生，而不會推翻系統。

The periods of civil war are typically very brutal. Typically early in them these wars are forceful and orderly struggles for power, and as the fighting and emotions intensify and the sides do anything to win, the levels of brutality accelerate unexpectedly so the actual levels of brutality that occur in the Stage 6 civil wars and revolutions will have been considered implausible in Stage 5. Reading the stories of the civil wars and revolutions that I studied, such as the Spanish Civil War, the Chinese Civil War, the Russian Revolution, and the French Revolution, made my hair curl. The elites and moderates flee, are imprisoned, or are killed.

內戰時期通常非常殘酷。通常在早期，這些戰爭是強有力的、有序的權力鬥爭，隨著戰鬥和情緒的加劇，雙方不惜一切代價贏得勝利，殘酷程度出乎意料地加速，因此第6 階段內戰中發生的實際殘酷程度和在第5 階段，革命將被認為是難以置信的。閱讀我研究的內戰和革命的故事，例如西班牙內戰、中國內戰、俄國革命和法國大革命,而這些流血的。精英和溫和派逃跑、被監禁或被殺。

How do they transpire? Earlier I described the dynamics of Stage 5 that led to crossing the line to Stage 6. During this stage all of those intensify greatly. I will explain.

它們是如何蒸發的？早些時候，我描述了導致跨越界限進入第 6 階段的第 5 階段的動態。在這個階段，所有這些都大大加強了。我會解釋。

How Civil Wars and Revolutions Transpire

內戰和革命如何發生

As previously described, the cycle of building wealth and wealth gaps that leads to a very small percentage of the population controlling an exceptionally large percentage of the wealth eventually results in the poor majority overthrowing the rich minority via civil wars and revolutions. This has happened more times than one can imagine.

如前所述，財富積累和貧富差距的循環導致極少數人控制著異常大比例的財富，最終導致大多數窮人通過內戰和革命推翻富人少數。這種情況發生的次數比人們想像的要多。

While most of the archetypical civil wars and revolutions shifted power from the right to the left, many shifted wealth and power to the right and away from those on the left. However, there were fewer of them and they were different. They typically happened when the existing orders slipped into dysfunctional anarchies and a large percentage of the population yearned for strong leadership, discipline, and productivity. Examples of revolutions from the left to the right include Germany, Spain, Japan, and Italy in the 1930s, the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1980s to the early 1990s, the 1976 coup in Argentina replacing Isabel Perón with a military junta, and the coup leading to the Second French Empire in 1851. Like the other examples, there are many, many cases to look at — more than I could examine carefully or explain here. However, all those that I examined worked or didn’t work for the same reason. Like those of the left, these new internal orders succeeded when they produced broad-based economic successes and failed when they did not. They were also more evolutionary than revolutionary as the periods of peace and prosperity in which wealth, and typically wealth gaps, increases are much longer. That is why we see that the long-term trends have been to greater total wealth and broader distribution of the wealth. That big picture can be easily lost when one is in and experiencing one part of the Big Cycle.

雖然大多數典型的內戰和革命將權力從右翼轉移到左翼，但許多典型的內戰和革命將財富和權力轉移到了右翼並遠離左翼。然而，他們的人數較少，而且有所不同。它們通常發生在現有秩序陷入功能失調的無政府狀態並且很大一部分人口渴望強大的領導力、紀律和生產力時。從左到右的革命例子包括1930 年代的德國、西班牙、日本和意大利，1980 年代至1990 年代初期的蘇聯解體，1976 年阿根廷政變以軍政府取代伊莎貝爾·庇隆，以及1851 年導致法蘭西第二帝國的政變。和其他例子一樣，有很多很多案例需要研究 — — 我在這裡無法仔細研究或解釋。然而，我檢查的所有那些工作或不工作的原因都是一樣的。與左派一樣，這些新的內部秩序在取得廣泛的經濟成功時取得成功，在沒有取得成功時失敗。它們也更具進化性而不是革命性，因為在和平與繁榮時期，財富（通常是貧富差距）擴大的時間要長得多。這就是為什麼我們看到長期趨勢是更大的總財富和更廣泛的財富分配。當一個人進入並體驗大周期的一部分時，這個大圖很容易丟失。

Typically the people who lead the civil war/revolution were (and still are) well-educated people from middle-class backgrounds. For example, three of the key revolutionary leaders of the French Revolution were Georges-Jacques Danton, a lawyer raised in a bourgeois family; Jean-Paul Marat, a physician, scientist, and journalist raised in a bourgeois family; and Maximilian Robespierre, a lawyer and statesman also from a bourgeois family. This revolution was initially supported by many liberal aristocrats, like Marquis de Lafayette, who were raised in moderately well-off families. Similarly, the leaders of the Russian Revolution were Lenin, who studied law, and Trotsky, who was raised in a bourgeois family of intellectuals. The Chinese Civil War was led by Mao, who was from a moderately well-off family and studied a variety of subjects such as law, economics, and political theory, and Zhou Enlai, who was from a middle-class scholarly family of civil servants. They also typically were (and still are) charismatic and able to work well with others to build big, well-run organizations that have the power to bring about the revolutions that they led. If you want to look for the revolutionaries of the future, you might keep an eye on those who have these qualities. Over time they typically evolve from being idealistic intellectuals wanting to change the system to be fairer to brutal revolutionaries willing to win at all costs.

通常，領導內戰/革命的人是（現在仍然是）來自中產階級背景的受過良好教育的人。例如，法國大革命的三位主要革命領袖是喬治-雅克丹東，他是一位在資產階級家庭長大的律師；讓-保羅·馬拉特(Jean-Paul Marat)，一位在資產階級家庭長大的醫生、科學家和記者；還有同樣來自資產階級家庭的律師兼政治家馬克西米利安·羅伯斯庇爾。這場革命最初得到了許多自由派貴族的支持，比如拉斐特侯爵，他們在中等富裕的家庭中長大。同樣，俄國革命的領導人是學習法律的列寧和在資產階級知識分子家庭長大的托洛茨基。中國內戰是由出身小康家庭、學過法律、經濟、政治理論等多種學科的毛澤東和出身於中產階級文官家庭的周恩來領導的。他們通常也（現在仍然）有魅力，能夠與他人很好地合作，建立大型、運行良好的組織，有能力帶來他們領導的革命。如果你想尋找未來的革命者，你可能會關注那些具有這些品質的人。隨著時間的推移，他們通常會從希望改變體制以使其更加公平的理想主義知識分子演變為願意不惜一切代價贏得勝利的野蠻革命者。

While having large wealth gaps during economically difficult times was typically the biggest source of conflict, there were always also other reasons for conflict that added up to a lot of opposition to the leadership and the system. Typically in revolutions the revolutionaries with these different grievances joined together to make revolutionary changes; so while they looked united during the revolution, after winning the revolution, the leaders of it typically fight with each other over issues and for power.

雖然在經濟困難時期出現巨大的貧富差距通常是衝突的最大根源，但也總有其他原因導致對領導層和製度的反對。通常在革命中，具有這些不同不滿情緒的革命者聯合起來進行革命性的改變；因此，雖然他們在革命期間看起來很團結，但在贏得革命之後，革命領導人通常會因為問題和權力而相互爭鬥。

As previously mentioned, during the civil war/revolution stage of the cycle the governments in power almost always had an acute shortage of money, credit, and buying power. That shortage created the desire to grab money from those who had it, which led those that had wealth to move them into places and assets that were safe, which led the governments to stop these movements by imposing capital controls — i.e., controls on movements to other jurisdictions (e.g., other countries), to other currencies, or to assets that are more difficult to tax and/or are less productive (e.g., gold).

如前所述，在周期的內戰/革命階段，當權政府幾乎總是嚴重缺乏貨幣、信貸和購買力。這種短缺產生了從擁有財富的人手中搶錢的願望，這導致那些擁有財富的人將他們轉移到安全的地方和資產，這導致政府通過實施資本管制來阻止這些流動 — — 即控制流動其他司法管轄區（例如其他國家/地區）、其他貨幣或更難徵稅和/或生產力較低的資產（例如黃金）。

To make matters even worse, typically when there was internal disorder, such as civil wars and revolutions, foreign enemies were more likely to challenge the country. This happens because domestic conflict causes vulnerabilities that make external wars more likely. For example, internal conflict splits the people within a country, is financially taxing on them, and demands attention that leaves less time for the leaders to tend to other issues — all things that create vulnerabilities for foreign powers to take advantage of. That is the main reason why internal wars and external wars tend to come close together. Other reasons include: emotions and tempers are heightened; strong populist leaders who tend to come to power at such times are fighters by nature; when there are internal conflicts leaders find that a perceived threat from an external enemy can bring the country together in support of the leader so they tend to encourage the conflict; and being deprived leads people/countries to be more willing to fight for what they need, including resources that other countries have. Almost all civil wars have had some foreign powers participating in attempts to influence the outcome to their benefit.

更糟糕的是，通常在發生內戰和革命等內部混亂時，外敵更有可能挑戰國家。發生這種情況是因為國內衝突導致脆弱性，使外部戰爭更有可能發生。例如，內部衝突使一個國家的人民分裂，在財政上對他們造成負擔，並需要引起領導人的關注，而沒有時間讓領導人處理其他問題 — — 所有這些都為外國勢力創造了漏洞利用。這就是內戰和外戰趨於接近的主要原因。其他原因包括：情緒和脾氣變高；在這種時候往往上台的強大的民粹主義領導人天生就是戰士；當發生內部衝突時，領導人發現外部敵人的威脅可以使國家團結起來支持領導人，因此他們傾向於鼓勵衝突；被剝奪導致人們/國家更願意為他們需要的東西而戰，包括其他國家擁有的資源。幾乎所有的內戰都有一些外國勢力參與，試圖影響結果以使其受益。

Entering and leaving civil wars and revolutions aren’t clear when they are happening, though it is clear that one is happening when deeply in the middle of it. While historians assign dates to the beginnings and ends of civil wars, they are arbitrary. The truth is that almost no one at the time knows that a civil war has begun or that it has ended although they know when they are in them. For example, many historians have designated July 14, 1789, as the day the French Revolution began because an armory and prison called the Bastille was stormed by a mob, but nobody at the time thought it was the beginning of the French Revolution or had any idea how terribly brutal that civil war and revolution would become. While one might not know what’s to come, one can have imprecise markers that help one place where one is, to see the direction that one is moving, and to know something about what the next stage will be like.

進入和離開內戰和革命何時發生尚不清楚，但很明顯，當處於中間狀態時正在發生。雖然歷史學家為內戰的開始和結束指定日期，但它們是任意的。事實是，當時幾乎沒有人知道內戰已經開始或已經結束，儘管他們知道他們何時參與其中。例如，許多歷史學家將1789 年7 月14 日指定為法國大革命開始的日子，因為一個叫做巴士底獄的軍械庫和監獄遭到暴徒的襲擊，但當時沒有人認為這是法國大革命的開始，也沒有任何人知道這一天。內戰和革命將變得多麼殘酷。雖然人們可能不知道將要發生什麼，但人們可以使用不精確的標記來幫助一個人所在的地方，看到一個人正在移動的方向，並了解下一階段會是什麼樣子。

Civil wars are incredibly brutal because they are fights to the death. Everyone is an extremist because everyone is forced to pick a side and fight. Also moderates lose out in knife fights.

內戰非常殘酷，因為它們是生死搏鬥。每個人都是極端分子，因為每個人都被迫選擇一邊戰鬥。溫和派也將在如此激烈的衝突中失敗。

As for what types of leaders are best for civil wars and revolutions, they are the “inspirational generals” — people who are strong enough to marshal support and win the various types of battles they have to win. Because the fight is brutal they have to be brutal enough to do whatever is necessary to win.

至於什麼類型的領導人最適合內戰和革命，他們是”鼓舞人心的將軍” — — 強大到可以集結支持並贏得他們必須贏得的各種戰鬥的人。因為戰鬥是殘酷的，他們必須足夠殘酷才能做任何必要的事情來贏得勝利。

Fortunately these civil war/revolutionary periods eventually come to an end, though the ends like the beginnings are not as clearly defined as historians convey.

幸運的是，這些內戰/革命時期最終會結束，儘管開始時的結束並不像歷史學家所傳達的那樣明確。

The time that historians stamp as the civil-war period typically lasts a few years and determines the official winners and losers, which is conveyed by who gets to occupy the government buildings in the capital. But the fighting to consolidate power can go on for a long time after the official civil war has ended. That brings us to the next stage in this big cycle, Stage 1.

歷史學家標記為內戰時期的時間通常會持續幾年，並決定了官方的贏家和輸家，這由誰可以佔據首都的政府大樓來傳達。但是，在正式內戰結束後，鞏固權力的鬥爭可以持續很長時間。這將我們帶到了這個大周期的下一個階段，即第一階段。

While civil wars and revolutions are typically extremely painful, they often lead to restructurings that, if done well, can establish the foundation for improved future results. What the future after the civil war/revolutions looks like depends on how the next steps are handled. Let’s take a peek.

雖然內戰和革命通常是極其痛苦的，但它們通常會導致重組，如果做得好，可以為改善未來結果奠定基礎。內戰/革命後的未來是什麼樣子取決於下一步的處理方式。讓我們看一看。

Stage 1: When the New Order Begins and the New Leadership Consolidates Power

第一階段：當新秩序開始，新領導鞏固權力時

After the official civil war is over there is typically post-civil-war/revolution fighting to consolidate power. In this stage new leaders typically mop up the remaining opposition and fight among themselves for power. In fact one might say that revolutions typically come in two parts — the first part is the fight to bring down the established leaders and systems, and the second part is the fight to mop up those who were loyal to the former leaders and the fight for power among those who won. I will call the second part “purges” and touch on them in this section.

官方內戰結束後，通常會進行內戰/革命後的鬥爭以鞏固權力。在這個階段，新領導人通常會掃除剩餘的反對派，並相互爭奪權力。事實上，人們可能會說，革命通常分為兩部分 — — 第一部分是打倒既定領導人和製度的鬥爭，第二部分是掃除忠於前領導人的人的鬥爭，以及爭取權力的鬥爭。獲勝者之間的權力。我將第二部分稱為”清除”並在本節中介紹它們。

These consolidation of power/purge periods range widely in form and severity, depending on the degrees of conflict between the new leaders and their opposition, the amount of conflict between the new leaders themselves, and the levels of development of the various government departments and bureaucracies that they are inheriting. At their worst, these periods can be even more brutal than the official civil-war periods.

這些權力鞏固/清洗時期的形式和嚴重程度各不相同，這取決於新領導人與其反對派之間的衝突程度、新領導人之間的衝突程度以及各個政府部門和官僚機構之間的內耗。在最糟糕的情況下，這些時期可能比官方內戰時期更加殘酷。

This is the stage when, in some cases, the remaining opposition is killed or imprisoned so that the new leaders are assured that they won’t come back fighting. It is also when those revolutionaries who were on the same side and won the revolution fight against each other for power.

在某些情況下，在這個階段，剩餘的反對派被殺死或監禁，以便新領導人確信他們不會回來戰鬥。也正是站在革命一方並贏得革命的革命者相互爭奪權力的時候。This stage has happened after virtually all revolutions, though in roughly the same degree as the degree of revolutionary changes. At its worst this post-revolution fighting to consolidate power produced some of the most brutal periods in the country’s history — e.g., the post-1789 French Revolution period called the Reign of Terror, the post-1917 Russian Revolution period called the Red Terror, the post-1949 Chinese Civil War period called the Anti-Rightist Campaign, etc. In some cases these purges happened a single time right after the revolution (e.g., the Reign of Terror), while in other cases they came and went episodically over decades (e.g., China’s Cultural Revolution happened 17 years after the Chinese Communist Party came to power). These “purges” are done to consolidate power and persecute perceived ideological enemies or enemies of the state, and they are sometimes more brutal than the revolution itself. At their best, and if conditions allow because the basic system and respect for it is maintained, they’re like the period after the US Civil War of 1861 to 1865 or during the peaceful Roosevelt revolution of the 1930s. In the table below, we show seven archetypical cases of “purges.”

這個階段幾乎發生在所有革命之後，儘管程度與革命變化的程度大致相同。在最糟糕的情況下，這場革命後鞏固權力的鬥爭產生了該國歷史上一些最殘酷的時期 — — 例如，1789 年法國大革命後被稱為恐怖統治的時期，1917 年俄羅斯革命後時期被稱為紅色恐怖，1949年後的中國內戰時期被稱為反右運動等。在某些情況下，這些清洗在革命之後發生了一次（例如，恐怖統治），而在其他情況下，它們在幾十年間斷斷續續地來來去去（例如，中國的文化大革命發生在中國共產黨上台17 年後）。這些”清洗”是為了鞏固權力和迫害意識形態上的敵人或國家的敵人，有時比革命本身更殘酷。在最好的情況下，如果條件允許，因為基本製度和對其的尊重得到維持，它們就像 1861 年至 1865 年美國內戰之後或 1930 年代和平羅斯福革命期間的時期。在下表中，我們展示了七個典型的”清除”案例。

During this stage the leaders who do best are “consolidators of power.”They typically have qualities similar to those who did best in the revolution in the prior stage, as they are strong, smart fighters who are willing and able to win at all costs, though they have to be much more politically astute because in the earlier stages the enemies were much more apparent. As discussed further below, great dynastic founders like the Tang Dynasty’s Emperor Taizong and Rome’s Caesar Augustus, among others, excelled at this stage. More recently, leaders such as the US founding fathers (e.g., Alexander Hamilton) and Germany’s Otto von Bismarck also exemplify taking periods of conflict and within them establishing institutions that set up the country for future success.

在這個階段，表現最好的領導者是”權力的鞏固者”。他們通常具有與前一階段革命中表現最好的人相似的品質，因為他們是堅強、聰明的戰士，願意並且能夠不惜一切代價取得勝利。儘管他們必須在政治上更加精明，因為在早期階段，敵人更加明顯。
如下文所述，唐朝太宗皇帝和羅馬皇帝奧古斯都等偉大的王朝締造者在這個階段表現出色。最近，美國開國元勳（例如亞歷山大·漢密爾頓）和德國的奧托·馮·俾斯麥等領導人也舉例說明了衝突時期，並在他們內部建立了為國家未來成功奠定基礎的機構。

This stage is over when the new power authorities are clear, and everyone is sick of the fighting and the rebuilding process begins.

當新的權力機構明確時，這個階段就結束了，每個人都厭倦了戰鬥，重建過程開始了。

Stage2: When Resource-Allocation Systems and Government Bureaucracies Are Built and Refined

階段 2：當資源分配系統和政府官僚機構建立和完善時

I also call this phase “early prosperity” because it is typically the beginning of a peaceful and prosperous period.

我也稱這個階段為”早期繁榮”，因為它通常是和平繁榮時期的開始。

After the new leaders have torn down the old order and consolidated power, or overlapping with that time, the new leaders have to start building a new system to better allocate resources. This is the stage when system and institution building are of paramount importance. What is required is designing and creating a system (order) that is effective in allocating resources requires people to row in the same direction in pursuit of similar goals, with respect for rules and laws, putting together an effective resource-allocation system that leads to rapidly improving productivity that benefits most people. This redesigning and rebuilding period has to be done even after lost wars because rebuilding still must occur. Examples of countries being in this stage include the United States in the 15 years after it declared independence in 1776, the early Napoleonic era immediately after Napoleon grabbed power in a coup at the end of the French Revolution in 1799, the early Japanese Meiji Restoration period immediately after the political revolution in 1868, the post-civil war and postwar periods in China, Japan, Germany, and most countries in the late 1940s through most of the 1950s, and Russia after the breakup of the Soviet Union.

在新領導人推翻舊秩序鞏固權力之後，或與那個時代重疊後，新領導人必須開始建立新的製度以更好地分配資源。這是製度建設和製度建設重中之重的階段。需要的是設計和創造一個有效配置資源的系統（秩序），要求人們為追求相似的目標而朝著同一個方向行進，尊重規則和法律，構建一個有效的資源配置系統，導致快速提高生產力，使大多數人受益。即使在失敗的戰爭之後，這個重新設計和重建時期也必須完成，因為重建仍然必鬚髮生。處於這一階段的國家包括1776年宣布獨立後15年的美國、1799年法國大革命末期拿破崙政變奪取政權後的拿破崙時代初期、日本明治維新初期1868 年政治革命之後，中國、日本、德國和1940 年代後期到1950 年代大部分時間的大部分國家的內戰和戰後時期，以及蘇聯解體後的俄羅斯。

A timeless and universal principle to keep in mind during this stage is that to be successful the system has to produce prosperity for the middle class. As Aristotle conveyed in Politics: “Those states are likely to be well-administered in which the middle class is large, and stronger if possible than both the other classes…where the middle class is large, there are least likely to be factions and dissensions…For when there is no middle class, and the poor are excessive in number, troubles arise, and the state soon comes to an end.”[21]

在這個階段要記住的一個永恆和普遍的原則是，要取得成功，該體系必須為中產階級帶來繁榮。正如亞里士多德在《政治學》中所表達的：”那些中產階級人數眾多的國家可能管理得很好，並且如果可能的話，比其他兩個階級都要強大……在中產階級人數眾多的情況下，派系和分歧的可能性最小 ……因為沒有中產階級，窮人過多，就會有麻煩，國家很快就會結束。”[21]

The leaders who are best during this stage are typically very different from those who succeeded in Stages 6 and 1. I call them “civil engineers.” While they need to be smart, and ideally they are still strong and inspirational, above all else they need to be great civil engineers or have great civil engineers working for them to design and build the system that is productive for most people. The different qualities of leaders that are required to succeed in the revolutionary Stages 6 and 1 and those that are required in this rebuilding administrative Stage 2 are exemplified by Churchill and Mao being great “inspirational generals” and lousy “civil engineers.” Examples of great leaders at this stage include Konrad Adenauer in Germany, Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, and Deng Xiaoping in China, who came to power after wars and built systems that produced prosperity well beyond them.

在這個階段表現最好的領導者通常與在第6階段和第1階段取得成功的領導者大不相同。我稱他們為”土木工程師”。雖然他們需要聰明，而且理想情況下他們仍然強大且鼓舞人心，但最重要的是，他們需要成為出色的土木工程師，或者讓出色的土木工程師為他們設計和構建對大多數人來說高效的系統。丘吉爾和毛澤東是偉大的”鼓舞人心的將軍”和糟糕的”土木工程師”，這體現了在革命第6 階段和第1 階段取得成功所需的領導者的不同素質，以及在重建行政階段所需的領導者素質。這一階段的偉大領袖的例子包括德國的康拉德·阿登納、新加坡的李光耀和中國的鄧小平，他們在戰後上台並建立了產生遠超他們的繁榮的製度。

The most extraordinary leaders are those who took their countries through Stages 6, 1, and 2 — i.e., through the civil war/revolution, through the consolidation of power, and through the building of the institutions and systems that worked fabulously for a long time after them — and did it at scale. The best ever probably were Tang Taizong (one of the revolutionary founders of the Tang Dynasty in China in the 600s, which was followed by about a century and a half of peace and prosperity that led China to become the world’s largest and strongest country); Caesar Augustus (the first emperor of Rome in 27 BC who began roughly 200 years of frequent peace and prosperity, in which Rome became the world’s largest empire); and Genghis Khan (who founded and led the Mongol Empire starting in 1206, which was followed by over a century of prosperity when it became the world’s largest and strongest empire, though there were civil wars shortly after his death).

最傑出的領導人是那些帶領他們的國家經歷了第6、1 和2 階段的人 — — 即通過內戰/革命，通過鞏固權力，通過建立長期運作良好的機構和製度在他們之後 — — 並且大規模地做到了。

有史以來最好的可能是唐太宗（600年代中國唐朝的革命創始人之一，隨後大約一個半世紀的和平與繁榮使中國成為世界上最大和最強大的國家）；凱撒奧古斯都（公元前27 年羅馬的第一位皇帝，開始了大約200 年頻繁的和平與繁榮，羅馬成為世界上最大的帝國）；和成吉思汗（他於1206 年建立並領導了蒙古帝國，隨後經過一個多世紀的繁榮，成為世界上最大和最強大的帝國，儘管在他死後不久發生了內戰）。

This sequence of rebuilding happens all the time in varying degrees depending on the amount of change that is warranted. In some cases it comes after brutal revolutions when there needs to be a rebuilding of nearly everything, and in other cases it comes when the instructions and systems that are there just need to be modified to suit the new leader. For example, there will be some changes in the United States after the presidential election that will lead to some amount of purging of those in government who were sympathetic to the old administration and fighting for power between moderate Democrats and very left Democrats.

根據保證的更改量，這種重建序列始終以不同的程度發生。在某些情況下，它發生在殘酷的革命之後，幾乎所有東西都需要重建，而在其他情況下，它發生在那裡的指令和系統只需要修改以適應新領導者的時候。
例如，總統大選後美國將出現一些變化，這將導致政府中同情舊政府並在溫和民主黨和極左民主黨之間爭奪權力的人進行一定程度的清洗。

Stage 3: When There Is Peace and Prosperity

I also call this phase “mid-prosperity.” It is the sweet spot of the Big Cycle. It is when people have an abundance of opportunity to be productive, are excited about it, work well together, produce a lot, get rich, and are admired for being successful. It is more opposite than similar to Stages 5 and 6 — so pretty much whatever I said about Stages 5 and 6, the opposite can be said about this one. In this stage conditions are improving for almost everyone so most of the next generation are better off than most of the prior generation, so there is broad optimism and excitement about the future. History shows us through time that, when done well, there is wide and almost equal access to education and merit-based placements in jobs, which draws on the widest possible range of the population to access talents and yields a system that most people believe is fair. Successful entrepreneurs, inventors, and adventurers produce new ideas and take their societies to new places and become the heroes that others aspire to be like because of how they come up with revolutionary new ideas, make people’s lives better, and are rewarded for it. Debt growth fuels productivity and in turn real income growth, which makes debts easy to service and provides excellent excess returns that make equity returns excellent. Incomes exceed expenses and savings exceed liabilities with the savings financing investment in the future. Stage 3 is an exciting period that has a lot of creativity (e.g., the arts flourish), productivity, and energy.

第三階段：和平與繁榮

我也稱這個階段為”中期繁榮”。這是大周期的甜蜜點。當人們有大量的機會來提高生產力時，他們對此感到興奮，一起工作，生產很多，變得富有，並因成功而受到欽佩。它與第5階段和第6階段的相似程度相反，因此幾乎無論我對第5階段和第6階段說了什麼，都可以對這個階段說相反的說法。在這個階段，幾乎每個人的條件都在改善，因此下一代的大多數人比上一代的大多數人過得更好，因此對未來充滿了樂觀和興奮。隨著時間的推移，歷史向我們展示了，如果做得好，就會有廣泛且幾乎平等的教育機會和基於績效的就業機會，這會吸引盡可能廣泛的人口來獲取​​人才，並產生一個大多數人認為是公平的。成功的企業家、發明家和冒險家會產生新的想法，並將他們的社會帶到新的地方，並成為其他人渴望成為的英雄，因為他們提出了革命性的新想法，讓人們的生活更美好，並因此獲得了回報。債務增長推動了生產力，進而推動了實際收入增長，這使得債務易於償還，並提供了極好的超額回報，使股票回報極好。收入大於支出，儲蓄大於負債，未來儲蓄融資投資。第3階段是一個激動人心的時期，具有很多創造力（例如，藝術蓬勃發展）、生產力和活力。

Examples of this period include most of the Victorian Era in Britain (covering much of the 19th century, marked by Industrial Revolution inventions producing a rapid increase in prosperity); the German Empire in the late 1800s (with rapid industrialization, technological innovation, and a quickly strengthening military); and the 1960s in the United States. For example, in the United States the 1960s moon shot project to put a man on the moon exemplified the shared mission. The whole country cheered and was brought closer together when the moon landing happened.

這一時期的例子包括英國維多利亞時代的大部分時間（涵蓋19 世紀的大部分時間，以工業革命發明為標誌，使繁榮迅速增加）；1800 年代後期的德意志帝國（快速工業化、技術創新和迅速加強的軍事力量）；以及1960 年代的美國。
例如，在美國，1960 年代載人登月的登月計劃就是共同使命的例證。當登月發生時，整個國家都歡呼雀躍，團結在一起。

This is the time for the “inspirational visionary” who can a) imagine and convey an exciting picture of a future that never existed before, b) actually build that future out, and then c) use the prosperity earned to broaden the inclusiveness of it and to invest in the future. They do this while d) maintaining sound finances and e) producing excellent international relations, so that they protect or expand their empires without any financially or socially debilitating wars. Examples include:

現在是”鼓舞人心的遠見者”的時候了，他們可以a) 想像並傳達一個前所未有的令人興奮的未來圖景，b) 實際構建那個未來，然後c) 利用所獲得的財富以及繁榮來擴大它的包容性並投資於未來。他們這樣做的同時 d) 保持穩健的財政和 e) 建立良好的國際關係，以便他們保護或擴張自己的帝國，而不會發生任何經濟或社會上的戰爭。

具體的例子包括：

• In the British Empire’s Victorian Age in the mid-to-late 1800s, Prime Minister William Gladstone simultaneously a) maintained high levels of productivity, b) imposed strict budget controls that led to strong finances, and c) supported the common man so much that he was known as “The People’s William.” He also ran a peaceful and prosperous foreign policy.
• 在1800 年代中後期大英帝國的維多利亞時代，威廉·格萊斯頓首相同時a) 保持高水平的生產力，b) 實行嚴格的預算控制，導致財政強勁，以及c) 對普通人的支持如此之多以至於他被稱為”人民的威廉”。他還推行和平繁榮的外交政策。
• In the German Empire in the late 1800s, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck united the disparate populations of 39 different states and people of different religions to build Germany as a country and an economic powerhouse. Under him Germany had an economic boom with sound finances while brilliantly navigating international relations to have it benefit internationally and avoid debilitating major wars.
• 在 1800 年代後期的德意志帝國，總理奧托·馮·俾斯麥將 39 個不同國家的不同人口和不同宗教的人民聯合起來，將德國建設為一個國家和經濟強國。在他的領導下，德國經濟繁榮，財政狀況良好，同時出色地駕馭國際關係，使其在國際上受益，避免破壞重大戰爭。
• Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew successfully took the country through these stages by running the country as prime minister from 1959 to 1990 and mentoring until his death in 2015. He created the principles and shaped the culture to be successful way beyond him and avoided wars without losing power.
• 新加坡總理李光耀從 1959 年到 1990 年擔任總理，並在 2015 年去世前一直擔任總理，成功地帶領新加坡度過了這些階段。他創造了原則並塑造了超越他的成功方式，使得國家避免戰爭而沒有失去其軍事力量。
• In the postwar US, John F. Kennedy in his 34 short months as president from January 20, 1961, to November 22, 1963, simultaneously inspired the country to go to the moon, advanced the civil rights movement, undertook the war on poverty with Vice President Lyndon Johnson, and kept the United States out of major wars while simultaneously strongly containing opposition to the American Empire.
• 在戰後的美國，約翰·肯尼迪在他從1961 年1 月20 日到1963 年11 月22 日擔任總統的短短34 個月裡，同時鼓舞了國家登上月球，推進了民權運動，以副總統林登·約翰遜，使美國遠離重大戰爭，同時強烈遏制對美利堅帝國的反對。
• In China, Deng Xiaoping transitioned a weak and inefficient communist system to a highly productive state capitalist system, quickly changing the nation’s psychology to make these changes with sayings, such as “it is glorious to be rich” and “it doesn’t matter whether the cat is black or white as long as it catches mice”; built China’s economy and finances to be very strong; enormously improved the education and quality of life of most people; dramatically lengthened life expectancies and reduced poverty rates; successfully led China through internal political conflicts; and strictly maintained China’s sovereignty while avoiding major external conflicts.
• 中國轉變為一個高生產力的國家並迅速改變了民族的心理，用”有錢就是光榮”、”有錢不重要”等名言來做出改變。只要能抓到老鼠，貓就是黑貓或白貓”；把中國的經濟和財政建設得非常強大；極大地改善了大多數人的教育和生活質量； 顯著延長預期壽命並降低貧困率； 成功帶領中國渡過內部政治衝突； 嚴格維護中國主權，避免重大外部衝突。

The longer countries stay in this stage, the longer their good times last.

國家停留在這個階段的時間越長，它們的美好時光持續的時間就越長。

During this stage the developments to pay attention to that reflect the big risks that naturally develop and undermine the self-sustaining good results are the widenings of the opportunity, income, wealth, and values gaps accompanied by bad and unfair conditions for the majority, luxurious and unfairly privileged positions for the elites, declining productivity, and bad finances in which excess debts are created.

在這個階段需要注意的發展反映了自然發展和破壞自我維持良好結果的大風險是機會，收入，財富和價值觀差距的擴大，伴隨著大多數人的不良和不公平條件，奢侈精英階層享有不公平的特權地位，生產力下降，以及產生過多債務的不良財務狀況。

History shows us that the great empires and great dynasties that were able to sustain themselves stayed in Stage 3 by avoiding these risks. The failure to avoid these risks leads to the next stage, which is a period of excesses. This is the stage in which the temptation to do everything and borrow money to do everything can lead to the movement to the next stage.

歷史告訴我們，能夠維持自己的偉大帝國和偉大王朝通過避免這些內部金融風險而停留在第三階段。未能避免這些風險會導致下一階段，即過度時期。在這個階段，凡事的誘惑和過度增加金融槓桿做的事都會導致運動進入下一個階段。

Stage 4: A Period of Excesses

I also call this “the bubble prosperity phase.” I will describe it briefly because we touched on these elements before. Classically:

• There is the rapidly increasing debt-financed purchases of goods, services, and investment assets, so debt growth outpaces the capacity of future cash flows to service the debts. So, bubbles are created. These debt-financed purchases emerge because investors, business leaders, financial intermediaries, individuals, and policy makers tend to assume that the future will be like the past so they bet heavily on the trends continuing. They mistakenly believe that investments that have gone up a lot are good rather than expensive so they borrow money to buy them, which drives up their prices, which reinforces this bubble process. That is because as their assets go up in value their net worth and spending-to-income level rise, which increases their borrowing capacities, which supports the leveraging-up process, and so the spiral goes until the bubbles burst.[22]
• There is a shift in spending of money and time to more on consumption and luxury goods and less on profitable investments. The reduced level of investments in infrastructure, capital goods, and R&D slows their productivity gains and leads their cities and infrastructures to become older and less efficient.
• There is a lot of spending on the military at this stage to expand and protect global interests, especially if the country is a leading global power.
• The country’s balance of payments positions deteriorate, reflecting its increased borrowing and reduced competitiveness. If the country is a reserve currency country, this borrowing is made easy and the result of non-reserve currency savers having a preference to save/lend to their currency.
• Wealth and opportunity gaps are large and resentments between classes emerge.

第 4 階段：過度時期
我也稱之為”泡沫繁榮階段”。我將簡要描述它，因為我們之前已經接觸過這些元素。

經典：
債務融資購買的商品、服務和投資資產迅速增加，因此債務增長超過了未來現金流償還債務的能力。於是，氣泡就產生了。這些債務融資購買的出現是因為投資者、商業領袖、金融中介、個人和政策制定者傾向於假設未來會像過去一樣，因此他們對趨勢持續進行了大量押注。他們錯誤地認為，漲幅很大的投資是好的而不是昂貴的，所以他們藉錢購買，從而推高了價格，從而加劇了這種泡沫過程。這是因為隨著他們的資產價值上升，他們的淨資產和支出與收入水平上升，這增加了他們的借貸能力，支持了槓桿化過程，因此螺旋上升直到泡沫破滅。 [22]

金錢和時間的支出轉向更多的消費和奢侈品，而不是有利可圖的投資。基礎設施、資本貨物和研發投資水平的下降減緩了他們的生產力增長，並導致他們的城市和基礎設施變得陳舊和效率低下。

現階段有大量軍費開支來擴大和保護全球利益，特別是如果該國是全球領先的國家。

該國的國際收支狀況惡化，反映出其借貸增加和競爭力下降。如果該國是儲備貨幣國家，則這種借貸變得容易，並且非儲備貨幣儲戶傾向於將其貨幣存入/貸出。

財富和機會差距很大，階級之間的怨恨出現了。

During this phase, the archetypical best leader is the “well-grounded, disciplined leader” who understands and conveys sound fundamental behaviors that yield productivity and sound finances and creates restraints when the crowd wants to overdo things. These leaders are the ones who lead the country to continue to reinvest a significant amount of their earnings and their time to being productive when they become richer. As mentioned, Lee Kuan Yew, the former Prime Minister of Singapore, assured that his country and fellow citizens had the culture to become well-educated, disciplined, and of strong character even after becoming successful and rich. However, these leaders are few and far between because their fighting the ebullience of the masses is very unpopular. In almost all cases, after becoming rich, the country (and its leaders) become decadent, borrow to finance excess consumption, and lose competitiveness. This period of decline is exemplified by decadent leaders such as the notorious Roman emperor Nero (who used a city-wide fire in Rome to confiscate land to build an expansive palace)[2] as well as Louis XIV (who similarly expanded the Palace of Versailles while productivity fell and people endured hardships at the height of his power)[3] and the Ming Dynasty’s Wanli Emperor[4] (who withdrew from actively governing and focused on the construction of his own immense tomb).

在這個階段，典型的最佳領導者是”基礎良好、紀律嚴明的領導者”，他理解並傳達良好的基本行為，從而產生生產力和穩健的財務狀況，並在人群想要過度做事時產生約束。這些領導人是帶領國家繼續將大量收入和時間再投資於變得富有的人。如前所述，新加坡前總理李光耀保證，他的國家和同胞擁有文化，即使在成功和富有之後，也能受過良好教育，紀律嚴明，性格堅強。然而，這些領導人很少，因為他們與群眾的熱情作鬥爭是非常不受歡迎的。幾乎在所有情況下，國家（及其領導人）在致富後都會變得頹廢，借錢為過度消費提供資金，並失去競爭力。這一時期的衰落體現在頹廢的領導人，如臭名昭著的羅馬皇帝尼祿（他在羅馬利用全城大火沒收土地，建造了一座廣闊的宮殿）[2] 以及路易十四（他同樣擴建了羅馬帝國的宮殿）。凡爾賽宮在他的鼎盛時期生產力下降，人民吃苦耐勞）[3]和明朝萬曆皇帝[4]（他退出積極的統治，專注於建造自己的巨大墳墓）。

Conclusion

My study of history has taught me that nothing is forever other than evolution, and within evolution there are cycles that are like tides that come in and go out and that are hard to change or fight against. To handle these changes well it is essential to know what part of the cycle one is in and to know timeless and universal principles for dealing with them. As conditions change the best approaches change — i.e., what is best depends on the circumstances and the circumstances are always changing in the ways we just looked at. History shows us that the best internal systems/orders depend on the circumstances at the time. For that reason it is a mistake to rigidly believe that any economic or political system is always best because there will certainly come times that that system is not best for the circumstances at hand, and if a society doesn’t adapt it will die. That is why constantly reforming systems to adapt well is best. The test of any system is simply how well it works in delivering what most of the people want. The effectiveness of any system can be objectively measured, which we will continue to do. Having said that, the lesson from history that comes through most loudly and most clearly is that skilled collaborations to produce productive win-win relationships to both grow and divide the pie well, so that most people are happy, is much more rewarding and much less painful than fighting civil wars over wealth and power that lead to one side subjugating the other side.

結論：
我對歷史的研究告訴我，除了進化之外，沒有什麼是永恆的，在進化中，有一些週期就像潮汐一樣來來去去，很難改變或對抗。為了很好地處理這些變化，必須知道一個人處於週期的哪個部分，並了解處理它們的永恆和普遍的原則。隨著條件的變化，最好的方法也會發生變化 — — 也就是說，最好的方法取決於環境，而環境總是以我們剛剛看待的方式發生變化。歷史告訴我們，最好的內部系統/訂單取決於當時的情況。

出於這個原因，死板地相信任何經濟或政治制度總是最好的，這是錯誤的，因為肯定會出現這種制度不適合當前情況的時候，如果一個社會不適應它就會消亡。這就是為什麼不斷改革系統以適應良好是最好的。任何系統的測試只是它在提供大多數人想要的東西方面的工作情況。任何系統的有效性都可以客觀衡量，我們將繼續這樣做。話雖如此，歷史上最響亮和最清楚的教訓是，通過熟練的合作來產生富有成效的雙贏關係，既可以成長又可以很好地分割餡餅，讓大多數人感到高興，回報更高，但收益更少。比爭奪財富和權力的內戰導致一方征服另一方更痛苦。

For important disclosure please see the end of Chapter 8, linked here.

Appendix: US State and City Indebtedness, Inequality, and Income Picture

對於重要的披露，請參閱第 8 章的結尾，鏈接在這裡。
附錄：美國州和城市的債務、不平等和收入情況

Here’s the same cut, looking at the 30 largest cities.[26]

讓我們來看看30 個最大的城市。 [26]

Appendix: Major Empires

附錄：主要帝國年曆

[1] To get a rich picture of what makes great leaders great in different types of circumstances I recommend Henry Kissinger’s upcoming book on leadership.

[2] There are a lot of developments and changes in psychology behind these cycles, which range from good developments and corresponding emotions that lead to harmony and effectiveness in Stages 2 and 3 to bad developments and emotions that lead to fighting and ineffectiveness in Stages 5, 6, and 1. Because each stage is distinctive — e.g., Stage 5 looks almost opposite to Stage 3 — it is easy to see which stage any country is in, though the exact points of transition can be challenging to identify since the transitions tend to blend into each other.

[3] See Appendix for more detail on the duration of major empires through time.

[4] Based on historical analysis of nine great powers (covering about 2,200 years of history in total). The likelihood of conflict is based on major cases of civil war, rebellion, and revolution but excludes peaceful revolutions that did not change the existing system. The analysis does not count the probability of conflict arising in a period when a country is already in the midst of internal conflict (and the five years following) to avoid counting periods in which economic conditions were bad because of the conflict itself.

[5] To be clear, when a government’s finances are in bad shape that does not necessarily mean it will run out of buying power. But it does mean that there is a much higher risk of that happening than if the government were in a financially strong position.

[6] Of course, these two kinds of struggles aren’t equivalent. Still, in both cases, I have found that people are focused on their own issues and communities and don’t understand the circumstances of those they don’t have direct contact with. In many communities, people, and most heart-breakingly the children, are desperately poor and neglected. There is an acute shortage of money for basics such as adequate school supplies, nutrition, and basic healthcare and an environment of violence and trauma that perpetuates a cycle in which children are brought up intellectually and physically malnourished and traumatized; this leaves them disadvantaged as they grow into adulthood, which makes it hard for them to earn a living, which perpetuates the cycle. Consider this fact: a recent study that our foundation funded showed that 22% of the high school students in Connecticut — the richest state in the country by income per capita — are either “disengaged” or “disconnected.” A disengaged student is one who has an absentee rate of greater than 25% and is failing classes. A disconnected student is one who the system can’t track because they dropped out. Imagine the consequences in 10 years and the human and social costs of this cycle. Our society has not established limits to how terrible it will allow conditions to get.

Reference:

[7] https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/10/10/how-partisans-view-each-other/

[8] https://www.prri.org/research/fractured-nation-widening-partisan-polarization-and-key-issues-in-2020-presidential-elections/

[9] https://www.vox.com/xpress/2014/9/23/6828715/heres-how-many-republicans-dont-want-their-kids-to-marry-democrats

[10] From Nathan Kalmoe and Lilliana Mason, “Lethal Mass Partisanship: Prevalence, Correlates, & Electoral Contingencies,” NCAPSA American Politics Meeting, 2019.

[11] Viscount Northcliffe, who controlled just under half of daily newspaper circulation in the UK around World War I, was known for anti-German coverage and was made “Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries” by the government in 1918.

[12] https://news.gallup.com/poll/267047/americans-trust-mass-media-edges-down.aspx

[13] https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/07/business/media/medias-next-challenge-overcoming-the-threat-of-fake-news.html

[14] What can be done? The news media is unique in being the only industry that operates without quality controls or checks on its power. I and most others believe that it would be terrible for our government to regulate it and, at the same time, believe that something has to be done to fix the problem. Perhaps if people protest enough the media could be motivated to create a self-regulatory organization to regulate and create ratings the way the Motion Picture Association did. I don’t have a clue about what should be done because this problem isn’t in my areas of expertise, and it’s not my place to offer suggestions to try to fix the problem; however, it is my responsibility to point out that we are in an era in which sensationalism, commercialism, and political desires to manipulate people’s views have superseded accuracy and journalistic integrity as the primary objectives of most of those in the media and that this is like a cancer that threatens our well-being. If you believe that fake and distorted media is a problem and you are interested in watching the media/propaganda for clues about whether and how this is transpiring, here are a few commonly recommended things to look out for. Ask yourself:

1) Does the story consist of emotionally triggering, unsubstantiated accusations or are the facts substantiated and the sources provided? When the facts are put aside to create an exciting story and the sources are undisclosed, don’t believe the story.

2) Does the writer welcome or not welcome replies or arguments that refute what they are asserting, and are they willing or not willing to publish them along with what they published?

3) Are the accusations in the story consistent with what has been identified and proven in the legal system? If people or groups are accused in the media of doing bad things but they haven’t been accused and judged to have done bad things in the legal system (which follows a process that tries to weigh the evidence to get at what is true), at least ask yourself why that is and probably don’t believe the story.

4) If the writer or outlet has shown themselves to be biased, assume that they and their stories are biased.

[15] Historians require more than 1,000 deaths a year to call such internal conflict a civil war.

[16] Notably after the Napoleonic Wars (when the then-new world order was established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815), Western Europe and particularly the UK by and large experienced 100 years of peace and prosperity and great wealth creation until World War I developed in 1914, which was followed by a very painful and turbulent 30 years.

[17] In some nondemocratic countries, capitalists were also killed.

[18] The Roman Republic and Athens both had democratic elements, but not everyone was able to participate or vote equally. Although democracies have existed for thousands of years, it is only recently that most people were allowed to vote. For example, in the US African American men were not universally allowed to vote until 1870, and women of all races until 1920.

[19] Note: shade of coloring indicates degree of polarization.

[20] Though it is unlikely that a third party of moderates could elect a president or large numbers of senators or representatives soon, it wouldn’t take much to elect the few whose votes would be needed by the opposing parties to get what they want passed, which would give these moderates great power. It also, with time, would give moderate voters and moderate politicians a party to go to that could better reflect their desired positions, which could negate some of the pull to the extremes.

[21] Aristotle, Politics, IV.11 (translated by Stephen Everson)

[22] Japan in 1988–90, the US in 1929, the US in 2006–07, Brazil and most other Latin American commodity producers in 1977–79 are classic examples.

[23] https://www.britannica.com/topic/Golden-House-of-Nero

[24] https://www.britannica.com/biography/Louis-XIV-king-of-France

[25] https://www.britannica.com/biography/Wanli

[26] Note: a couple cities have a positive net worth (liquid assets in excess of liabilities), appearing as negative on the charts. Analysis based on data from a variety of US government organizations and Truth in Accounting’s January 2020 report: Financial State of the Cities.