【深度必讀】從美聯儲角度理解世紀大通脹| The Great Inflation 1965~82

The Great Inflation was the defining macroeconomic period of the second half of the twentieth century. Lasting from 1965 to 1982, it led economists to rethink the policies of the Fed and other central banks.

大通脹是 20 世紀下半葉具有決定性意義的宏觀經濟時期。從 1965 年持續到 1982 年，它促使經濟學家重新思考美聯儲和其他中央銀行的政策。
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by Michael Bryan, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
本文作者為Michael Bryan, 亞特蘭大聯儲銀行官員

目錄 Sections
1、Forensics of the Great Inflation
大通脹的底層運作機制
2、The Motive: The Phillips Curve and the Pursuit of Full Employment
通脹如何形成：菲利普斯曲線以及過度追求充分就業
3、The Means: The Collapse of Bretton Woods
通脹的導火索：布雷頓森立體系瓦解
4、The Opportunity: Fiscal Imbalances, Energy Shortages, and Bad Data
通脹下的機遇以及危機：財政失衡，能源短缺以及惡化的經濟數據
5、From High Inflation to Inflation Targeting — The Conquest of US Inflation
從高通脹到通脹錨定 — — 如何政府美國的通脹。

The Great Inflation was the defining macroeconomic event of the second half of the twentieth century. Over the nearly two decades it lasted, the global monetary system established during World War II was abandoned, there were four economic recessions, two severe energy shortages, and the unprecedented peacetime implementation of wage and price controls. It was, according to one prominent economist, “the greatest failure of American macroeconomic policy in the postwar period” (Siegel 1994).

大通脹是 20 世紀下半葉具有決定性意義的宏觀經濟事件。在它持續的近二十年裡，二戰期間建立的全球貨幣體係被拋棄，有四次經濟衰退，兩次嚴重的能源短缺，以及史無前例的和平時期工資和價格管制。
根據一位著名經濟學家的說法，這是”美國宏觀經濟政策在戰後時期最大的失敗”（Siegel 1994）。

But that failure also brought a transformative change in macroeconomic theory and, ultimately, the rules that today guide the monetary policies of the Federal Reserve and other central banks around the world. If the Great Inflation was a consequence of a great failure of American macroeconomic policy, its conquest should be counted as a triumph.

但這次對於經濟管理的失敗也帶來了宏觀經濟理論的變革，並最終帶來了當今指導美聯儲和世界其他中央銀行貨幣政策的規則。如果大通脹是美國宏觀經濟政策嚴重失敗的結果，那麼其對通脹的征服應該被視為勝利。

Forensics of the Great Inflation

大通脹的形成機制

In 1964, inflation measured a little more than 1 percent per year. It had been in this vicinity over the preceding six years. Inflation began ratcheting upward in the mid-1960s and reached more than 14 percent in 1980. It eventually declined to average only 3.5 percent in the latter half of the 1980s.

1964 年，通货膨胀率每年略高于 1%。在过去的六年里，它一直在这个数值附近。通货膨胀率在 20 世纪 60 年代中期开始上升，并在 1980 年达到 14% 以上。最终在 1980 年代后半期下降至平均仅为 3.5%。

While economists debate the relative importance of the factors that motivated and perpetuated inflation for more than a decade, there is little debate about its source. The origins of the Great Inflation were policies that allowed for an excessive growth in the supply of money — Federal Reserve policies.

雖然經濟學家爭論十多年來推動和持續通貨膨脹的因素的相對重要性，但對其來源幾乎沒有爭論。大通脹的起源是允許貨幣供應過度增長的政策 — — 美聯儲的政策。

Chart 1: Inflation as measured by the consumer price index. Data plotted as a curve. Units are percentage change from a year ago. The grey bar indicates a period of Great Inflation, which began in January 1965 and ended in December 1982. In January 1965, the percentage change from a year ago in the consumer price index began to rise until it peaked in March 1980 at close to 15 percent. In 1983, the percentage change from a year ago settled back to pre-Great Inflation levels of 0 to 5 percent. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics via FRED; graph created by Sam Marshall, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond)

圖 1：以消費者價格指數衡量的通貨膨脹。數據繪製為曲線。單位是與一年前相比的百分比變化。灰色條表示從 1965 年 1 月開始到 1982 年 12 月結束的大通脹時期。 1965 年 1 月，消費者價格指數與一年前相比的百分比變化開始上升，直到 1980 年 3 月達到頂峰，接近 15 百分。 1983 年，與一年前相比的百分比變化回到了大通脹前的 0% 到 5% 的水平。資料來源：勞工統計局，來自 FRED；圖表由里士滿聯邦儲備銀行的 Sam Marshall 創建）

To understand this episode of especially bad policy, and monetary policy in particular, it will be useful to tell the story in three distinct but related parts. This is a forensic investigation of sorts, examining the motive, means, and opportunity for the Great Inflation to occur.

要理解這段特別糟糕的政策，尤其是貨幣政策，將這個故事分成三個不同但相關的部分會很有用。這是一種更為深入的法醫式的調查，以此我們來回顧大通脹發生的動機、手段和通脹下的危和機。

The Motive: The Phillips Curve and the Pursuit of Full Employment

通脹形成的原因：菲利普斯曲線與追求充分就業

The first part of the story, the motive underlying the Great Inflation, dates back to the immediate aftermath of the Great Depression, an earlier and equally transformative period for macroeconomic theory and policy. At the conclusion of World War II, Congress turned its attention to policies it hoped would promote greater economic stability. Most notable among the laws that emerged was the Employment Act of 1946. Among other things, the act declared it a responsibility of the federal government “to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power” and provided for greater coordination between fiscal and monetary policies.1 This act is the seminal basis for the Federal Reserve’s current dual mandate to “maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates…so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates” (Steelman 2011).

故事的第一部分，大通脹背後的動機，可以追溯到大蕭條的直接後果，這是宏觀經濟理論和政策的一個更早且同樣具有變革性的時期。第二次世界大戰結束時，國會將注意力轉向希望促進經濟穩定的政策。出現的法律中最引人注目的是 1946 年的《就業法》。除其他外，該法宣布聯邦政府有責任”促進最大限度的就業、生產和購買力”，並規定加強財政和貨幣政策之間的協調 .1 該法案是美聯儲當前雙重使命的開創性基礎，即”維持貨幣和信貸總量的長期增長……以有效促進最大就業、穩定價格和適度長期利率的目標”（ 斯蒂爾曼 2011）。

The orthodoxy guiding policy in the post-WWII era was Keynesian stabilization policy, motivated in large part by the painful memory of the unprecedented high unemployment in the United States and around the world during the 1930s. The focal point of these policies was the management of aggregate spending (demand) by way of the spending and taxation policies of the fiscal authority and the monetary policies of the central bank. The idea that monetary policy can and should be used to manage aggregate spending and stabilize economic activity is still a generally accepted tenet that guides the policies of the Federal Reserve and other central banks today. But one critical and erroneous assumption to the implementation of stabilization policy of the 1960s and 1970s was that there existed a stable, exploitable relationship between unemployment and inflation. Specifically, it was generally believed that permanently lower rates of unemployment could be “bought” with modestly higher rates of inflation.

二戰後的正統指導政策是凱恩斯穩定政策，這在很大程度上是受 1930 年代美國和世界各地前所未有的高失業率的痛苦記憶所推動。這些政策的重點是通過財政當局的支出和稅收政策以及中央銀行的貨幣政策來管理總支出（需求）。

貨幣政策可以而且應該用於管理總支出和穩定經濟活動的想法仍然是當今指導美聯儲和其他中央銀行政策的普遍接受的原則。但是，對 1960 年代和 70 年代穩定政策實施的一個關鍵和錯誤假設是，失業與通貨膨脹之間存在一種穩定的、可利用的關係。具體而言，人們普遍認為，可以用適度較高的通貨膨脹率”用來置換”永久較低的失業率。

The idea that the “Phillips curve” represented a longer-term trade-off between unemployment, which was very damaging to economic well-being, and inflation, which was sometimes thought of as more of an inconvenience, was an attractive assumption for policymakers who hoped to forcefully pursue the dictates of the Employment Act.2 But the stability of the Phillips curve was a fateful assumption, one that economists Edmund Phelps (1967) and Milton Friedman (1968) warned against. Said Phelps “[I]f the statical ‘optimum’ is chosen, it is reasonable to suppose that the participants in product and labour markets will learn to expect inflation…and that, as a consequence of their rational, anticipatory behaviour, the Phillips Curve will gradually shift upward…” (Phelps 1967; Friedman 1968). In other words, the trade-off between lower unemployment and more inflation that policymakers may have wanted to pursue would likely be a false bargain, requiring ever higher inflation to maintain.

“菲利普斯曲線”代表對經濟福祉非常有害的失業與有時被認為更不便的通貨膨脹之間的長期權衡，這一想法對政策制定者來說是一個有吸引力的假設 希望有力地遵循《就業法》的規定。 2 但菲利普斯曲線的穩定性是一個致命的假設，經濟學家埃德蒙菲爾普斯 (Edmund Phelps) (1967) 和米爾頓弗里德曼 (Milton Friedman) (1968) 對此提出警告。菲爾普斯說：”[I]如果選擇靜態’最優’，可以合理地假設產品和勞動力市場的參與者將學會預期通貨膨脹……而且，由於他們理性、預期的行為，菲利普斯曲線 將逐漸向上移動……”（Phelps 1967；Friedman 1968）。

換句話說，政策制定者可能想要追求的較低失業率和更高通脹之間的權衡可能是錯誤的交易，需要更高的通脹來維持。

The Means: The Collapse of Bretton Woods

通脹的導火索：布雷頓森林體系的崩潰

Chasing the Phillips curve in pursuit of lower unemployment could not have occurred if the policies of the Federal Reserve were well-anchored. And in the 1960s, the US dollar was anchored — albeit very tenuously — to gold through the Bretton Woods agreement. So the story of the Great Inflation is in part also about the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the separation of the US dollar from its last link to gold.

如果美聯儲的政策得到很好的錨定，就不可能為了降低失業率而追逐菲利普斯曲線。在 1960 年代，美元通過布雷頓森林協議與黃金掛鉤 — — 儘管非常脆弱。因此，大通脹的故事在一定程度上也與布雷頓森林體系的崩潰以及美元與其與黃金的最後聯繫的分離有關。

During World War II, the world’s industrial nations agreed to a global monetary system that they hoped would bring greater economic stability and peace by promoting global trade. That system, hashed out by forty-four nations in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, during July 1944, provided for a fixed rate of exchange between the currencies of the world and the US dollar, and the US dollar was linked to gold.3

第二次世界大戰期間，世界工業國家同意建立全球貨幣體系，他們希望通過促進全球貿易來實現更大的經濟穩定與和平。該體係於 1944 年 7 月在新罕布什爾州的布雷頓森林由 44 個國家共同製定，規定了世界貨幣與美元之間的固定匯率，並且美元與黃金掛鉤。 3

But the Bretton Woods system had a number of flaws in its implementation, chief among them the attempt to maintain fixed parity between global currencies that was incompatible with their domestic economic goals. Many nations, it turned out, were pursing monetary policies that promised to march up the Phillips curve for a more favorable unemployment-inflation nexus.

但布雷頓森林體系在其實施過程中存在一些缺陷，其中最主要的是試圖維持全球貨幣之間的固定平價，這與其國內經濟目標不相容。事實證明，許多國家都在推行貨幣政策，這些政策承諾會沿著菲利普斯曲線上行，以獲得更有利的失業-通脹關係。

As the world’s reserve currency, the US dollar had an additional problem. As global trade grew, so too did the demand for U.S. dollar reserves. For a time, the demand for US dollars was satisfied by an increasing balance of payments shortfall, and foreign central banks accumulated more and more dollar reserves. Eventually, the supply of dollar reserves held abroad exceeded the US stock of gold, implying that the United States could not maintain complete convertibility at the existing price of gold — a fact that would not go unnoticed by foreign governments and currency speculators.

作為世界儲備貨幣，美元還有一個問題。隨著全球貿易的增長，對美元儲備的需求也在增長。一時間，國際收支逆差越來越大，美元需求得到滿足，外國央行積累的美元儲備越來越多。最終，在國外持有的美元儲備供應超過了美國的黃金存量，這意味著美國無法在現有黃金價格下保持完全的可兌換性 — — 外國政府和貨幣投機者不會忽視這一事實。

As inflation drifted higher during the latter half of the 1960s, US dollars were increasingly converted to gold, and in the summer of 1971, President Nixon halted the exchange of dollars for gold by foreign central banks. Over the next two years, there was an attempt to salvage the global monetary system through the short-lived Smithsonian Agreement, but the new arrangement fared no better than Bretton Woods and it quickly broke down. The postwar global monetary system was finished.

隨著 1960 年代後半期通貨膨脹走高，美元越來越多地兌換成黃金，1971 年夏天，尼克松總統停止了外國中央銀行將美元兌換成黃金。在接下來的兩年裡，有人試圖通過短暫的史密森尼協議來挽救全球貨幣體系，但新安排的表現並不比布雷頓森林體係好，而且很快就崩潰了。戰後全球貨幣體系已經完成。

With the last link to gold severed, most of the world’s currencies, including the US dollar, were now completely unanchored. Except during periods of global crisis, this was the first time in history that most of the monies of the industrialized world were on an irredeemable paper money standard.

隨著與黃金的最後聯繫被切斷，世界上大多數貨幣，包括美元，現在完全失去了錨定。除全球危機時期外，這是歷史上第一次工業化世界的大部分貨幣都採用不可兌換的紙幣本位。

The Opportunity: Fiscal Imbalances, Energy Shortages, and Bad Data
大通脹下的危和機：財政失衡、能源短缺和不良數據

The late 1960s and the early 1970s were a turbulent time for the US economy. President Johnson’s Great Society legislation brought about major spending programs across a broad array of social initiatives at a time when the US fiscal situation was already being strained by the Vietnam War. These growing fiscal imbalances complicated monetary policy.

60 年代末和 70 年代初是美國經濟的動盪時期。在美國財政狀況已經因越南戰爭而緊張之際，約翰遜總統的偉大社會立法帶來了涉及廣泛社會倡議的重大支出計劃。這些日益嚴重的財政失衡使貨幣政策複雜化。

In order to avoid monetary policy actions that might interfere with the funding plans of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve followed a practice of conducting “even-keel” policies. In practical terms, this meant the central bank would not implement a change in policy and would hold interest rates steady during the period between the announcement of a Treasury issue and its sale to the market. Under ordinary conditions, Treasury issues were infrequent and the Fed’s even-keel policies didn’t significantly interfere with the implementation of monetary policy. But as debt issues became more prevalent, the Federal Reserve’s adherence to the even-keel principle increasingly constrained the conduct of monetary policy (Meltzer 2005).

為了避免可能干擾財政部融資計劃的貨幣政策行動，美聯儲采取了實施”平穩”政策的做法。實際上，這意味著中央銀行不會實施政策變化，並且會在宣布發行國債和向市場出售國債之間的這段時間內保持利率不變。在正常情況下，美國國債問題並不頻繁，美聯儲的平穩政策並沒有顯著干擾貨幣政策的實施。但隨著債務問題變得更加普遍，美聯儲對平穩原則的堅持越來越多地限制了貨幣政策的實施（Meltzer 2005）。

A more disruptive force was the repeated energy crises that increased oil costs and sapped U.S. growth. The first crisis was an Arab oil embargo that began in October 1973 and lasted about five months. During this period, crude oil prices quadrupled to a plateau that held until the Iranian revolution brought a second energy crisis in 1979. The second crisis tripled the cost of oil.

一個更具破壞性的力量是反復出現的能源危機，它增加了石油成本並削弱了美國的增長。第一次危機是阿拉伯石油禁運，始於 1973 年 10 月，持續了大約五個月。在此期間，原油價格翻了兩番，一直保持穩定，直到 1979 年伊朗革命帶來了第二次能源危機。第二次危機使石油成本增加了兩倍。

In the 1970s, economists and policymakers began to commonly categorize the rise in aggregate prices as different inflation types. “Demand-pull” inflation was the direct influence of macroeconomic policy, and monetary policy in particular. It resulted from policies that produced a level of spending in excess of what the economy could produce without pushing the economy beyond its ordinary productive capacity and pulling more expensive resources into play. But inflation could also be pushed higher from supply disruptions, notably originating in food and energy markets (Gordon 1975).4 This “cost-push” inflation also got passed through the chain of production into higher retail prices.

在 20 世紀 70 年代，經濟學家和政策制定者開始普遍將總價格的上漲歸類為不同的通貨膨脹類型。 “需求拉動型”通脹是宏觀經濟政策，尤其是貨幣政策的直接影響。這是由於政策產生的支出水平超過了經濟所能產生的水平，而沒有將經濟推向其普通生產能力之外，也沒有吸引更昂貴的資源發揮作用。但通貨膨脹也可能因供應中斷而推高，特別是源於食品和能源市場（戈登 1975 年）。 4 這種”成本推動”通貨膨脹也通過生產鏈傳遞到更高的零售價格。

From the perspective of the central bank, the inflation being caused by the rising price of oil was largely beyond the control of monetary policy. But the rise in unemployment that was occurring in response to the jump in oil prices was not.

從央行的角度來看，油價上漲引發的通貨膨脹在很大程度上超出了貨幣政策的控制範圍。但是，因油價上漲而出現的失業率上升卻並非如此。

Motivated by a mandate to create full employment with little or no anchor for the management of reserves, the Federal Reserve accommodated large and rising fiscal imbalances and leaned against the headwinds produced by energy costs. These policies accelerated the expansion of the money supply and raised overall prices without reducing unemployment.

出於創造充分就業而很少或根本沒有儲備管理基礎的使命的推動，美聯儲適應了巨大且不斷加劇的財政失衡，並依靠能源成本帶來的逆風。這些政策加速了貨幣供應量的擴張，並在沒有減少失業的情況下提高了總體價格。

Bad data (or at least a bad understanding of the data) also handicapped policymakers. Looking back at the information policymakers had in hand during the period leading up to and during the Great Inflation, economist Athanasios Orphanides has shown that the real-time estimate of potential output was significantly overstated, and the estimate of the rate of unemployment consistent with full employment was significantly understated. In other words, policymakers were also likely underestimating the inflationary effects of their policies. In fact, the policy path they were on simply wasn’t feasible without accelerating inflation (Orphanides 1997; Orphanides 2002).

糟糕的經濟數據（或者至少是對數據的錯誤理解）也阻礙了政策制定者。回顧政策制定者在大通脹之前和期間掌握的信息，經濟學家 Athanasios Orphanides 表明，對潛在產出的實時估計被大大高估了，而對失業率的估計與完全一致 就業被大大低估了。換句話說，政策制定者也可能低估了其政策的通脹效應。事實上，如果不加速通貨膨脹，他們所採用的政策路徑根本不可行（Orphanides 1997；Orphanides 2002）。

And to make matters worse yet, the Phillips curve, the stability of which was an important guide to the policy decisions of the Federal Reserve, began to move.

更糟糕的是，菲利普斯曲線開始移動，其穩定性是美聯儲政策決定的重要指南。

From High Inflation to Inflation Targeting — The Conquest of US Inflation

從高通脹到通脹目標 — — 如何征服美國通脹問題

Phelps and Friedman were right. The stable trade-off between inflation and unemployment proved unstable. The ability of policymakers to control any “real” variable was ephemeral. This truth included the rate of unemployment, which oscillated around its “natural” rate. The trade-off that policymakers hoped to exploit did not exist.

菲爾普斯和弗里德曼是對的。通貨膨脹和失業之間的穩定平衡被證明是不穩定的。政策制定者控制任何”真實”變量的能力是短暫的。這個事實包括失業率，失業率圍繞其”自然”失業率波動。政策制定者希望利用的權衡並不存在。

As businesses and households came to appreciate, indeed anticipate, rising prices, any trade-off between inflation and unemployment became a less favorable exchange until, in time, both inflation and unemployment became unacceptably high. This, then, became the era of “stagflation.” In 1964, when this story began, inflation was 1 percent and unemployment was 5 percent. Ten years later, inflation would be over 12 percent and unemployment was above 7 percent. By the summer of 1980, inflation was near 14.5 percent, and unemployment was over 7.5 percent.

隨著企業和家庭開始升值，實際上是預期價格上漲，通貨膨脹和失業之間的任何權衡都變得不太有利，直到通貨膨脹和失業率都高得令人無法接受。然後，這成為”滯脹”時代。 1964 年，當這個故事開始時，通貨膨脹率為 1%，失業率為 5%。十年後，通貨膨脹率將超過 12%，失業率將超過 7%。到 1980 年夏天，通貨膨脹率接近 14.5%，失業率超過 7.5%。

Federal Reserve officials were not blind to the inflation that was occurring and were well aware of the dual mandate that required monetary policy to be calibrated so that it delivered full employment and price stability. Indeed, the Employment Act of 1946 was re-codified in 1978 by the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act, more commonly known as the Humphrey-Hawkins Act after the bill’s authors. Humphrey-Hawkins explicitly charged the Federal Reserve to pursue full employment and price stability, required that the central bank establish targets for the growth of various monetary aggregates, and provide a semiannual Monetary Policy Report to Congress.5 Nevertheless, the employment half of the mandate appears to have had the upper hand when full employment and inflation came into conflict. As Fed Chairman Arthur Burns would later claim, full employment was the first priority in the minds of the public and the government, if not also at the Federal Reserve (Meltzer 2005). But there was also a clear sense that addressing the inflation problem head-on would have been too costly to the economy and jobs.

美聯儲官員並非對正在發生的通貨膨脹視而不見，並且非常清楚需要調整貨幣政策以實現充分就業和價格穩定的雙重使命。事實上，1946 年的《就業法》在 1978 年被《充分就業和平衡增長法》重新編纂，該法在該法案的作者之後通常被稱為《漢弗萊-霍金斯法》。漢弗萊-霍金斯明確要求美聯儲追求充分就業和物價穩定，要求央行製定各種貨幣總量的增長目標，並向國會提交半年一次的貨幣政策報告。 5 儘管如此，就業任務的一半 當充分就業和通貨膨脹發生衝突時，似乎佔了上風。正如美聯儲主席亞瑟伯恩斯後來聲稱的那樣，充分就業是公眾和政府的首要任務，如果不是美聯儲的話（Meltzer 2005）。但也有一種明顯的感覺，即直接解決通貨膨脹問題對經濟和就業來說代價太大。

There had been a few earlier attempts to control inflation without the costly side effect of higher unemployment. The Nixon administration introduced wage and price controls over three phases between 1971 and 1974. Those controls only temporarily slowed the rise in prices while exacerbating shortages, particularly for food and energy. The Ford administration fared no better in its efforts. After declaring inflation “enemy number one,” the president in 1974 introduced the Whip Inflation Now (WIN) program, which consisted of voluntary measures to encourage more thrift. It was a failure.

早些時候曾有過幾次控制通貨膨脹的嘗試，而沒有高失業率的代價高昂的副作用。尼克松政府在 1971 年至 1974 年的三個階段實施了工資和價格控制。這些控制只是暫時減緩了價格上漲，同時加劇了短缺，尤其是食品和能源短缺。福特政府的努力也好不到哪裡去。在宣布通貨膨脹為”頭號敵人”後，總統於 1974 年推出了鞭策通貨膨脹 (WIN) 計劃，該計劃包括鼓勵更多節儉的自願措施。這是一個失敗。

By the late 1970s, the public had come to expect an inflationary bias to monetary policy. And they were increasingly unhappy with inflation. Survey after survey showed a deteriorating public confidence over the economy and government policy in the latter half of the 1970s. And often, inflation was identified as a special evil. Interest rates appeared to be on a secular rise since 1965 and spiked sharply higher still as the 1970s came to a close. During this time, business investment slowed, productivity faltered, and the nation’s trade balance with the rest of the world worsened. And inflation was widely viewed as either a significant contributing factor to the economic malaise or its primary basis.

到 20 世紀 70 年代後期，公眾已經開始預期貨幣政策會出現通貨膨脹傾向。他們對通貨膨脹越來越不滿。一項又一項調查顯示，在 1970 年代後半期，公眾對經濟和政府政策的信心不斷惡化。

通常，通貨膨脹被認為是一種特殊的罪惡。自 1965 年以來，利率似乎處於長期上升狀態，並且隨著 1970 年代接近尾聲而大幅飆升。在此期間，商業投資放緩，生產力下降，國家與世界其他地區的貿易平衡惡化。通貨膨脹被廣泛認為是導致經濟萎靡不振的重要因素或其主要基礎。

But once in the position of having unacceptably high inflation and high unemployment, policymakers faced an unhappy dilemma. Fighting high unemployment would almost certainly drive inflation higher still, while fighting inflation would just as certainly cause unemployment to spike even higher.

但一旦處於無法接受的高通脹和高失業率的境地，政策制定者就面臨著令人不快的兩難選擇。與高失業率作鬥爭幾乎肯定會進一步推高通脹，而與通脹作鬥爭同樣肯定會導致失業率飆升得更高。

In 1979, Paul Volcker, formerly the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, became chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. When he took office in August, year-over-year inflation was running above 11 percent, and national joblessness was just a shade under 6 percent. By this time, it was generally accepted that reducing inflation required greater control over the growth rate of reserves specifically, and broad money more generally. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) had already begun establishing targets for the monetary aggregates as required by the Humphrey-Hawkins Act. But it was clear that sentiment was shifting with the new chairman and that stronger measures to control the growth of the money supply were required. In October 1979, the FOMC announced its intention to target reserve growth rather than the fed funds rate as its policy instrument.

1979年，前紐約聯邦儲備銀行行長保羅沃爾克成為美聯儲主席。當他 8 月上任時，同比通脹率超過 11%，全國失業率略低於 6%。到這個時候，人們普遍認為，降低通貨膨脹需要更好地控制儲備增長率，尤其是廣義貨幣。聯邦公開市場委員會 (FOMC) 已經開始按照漢弗萊-霍金斯法案的要求制定貨幣總量目標。但很明顯，市場情緒正在隨著新主席的上任而轉變，需要採取更強有力的措施來控制貨幣供應量的增長。 1979 年 10 月，聯邦公開市場委員會宣布打算將儲備增長而非聯邦基金利率作為其政策工具。

Fighting inflation was now seen as necessary to achieve both objectives of the dual mandate, even if it temporarily caused a disruption to economic activity and, for a time, a higher rate of joblessness. In early 1980, Volcker said, “[M]y basic philosophy is over time we have no choice but to deal with the inflationary situation because over time inflation and the unemployment rate go together.… Isn’t that the lesson of the 1970s?” (Meltzer 2009, 1034).

抗擊通貨膨脹現在被視為實現雙重任務的兩個目標所必需的，即使它暫時導致經濟活動中斷，並在一段時間內導致更高的失業率。 1980 年初，沃爾克說，”[我] 的基本理念是，隨著時間的推移，我們別無選擇，只能應對通貨膨脹情況，因為隨著時間的推移，通貨膨脹率和失業率會結合在一起……這不是 1970 年代的教訓嗎？” （梅爾策 2009 年，1034）。

Over time, greater control of reserve and money growth, while less than perfect, produced a desired slowing in inflation. This tighter reserve management was augmented by the introduction of credit controls in early 1980 and with the Monetary Control Act. Over the course of 1980, interest rates spiked, fell briefly, and then spiked again. Lending activity fell, unemployment rose, and the economy entered a brief recession between January and July. Inflation fell but was still high even as the economy recovered in the second half of 1980.

隨著時間的推移，對儲備和貨幣增長的更大控制雖然不夠完美，但卻產生了預期的通脹放緩。 1980 年初引入的信貸控制和《貨幣控制法》加強了這種更嚴格的儲備管理。在 1980 年期間，利率飆升，短暫下降，然後再次飆升。貸款活動下降，失業率上升，經濟在 1 月至 7 月間進入短暫衰退。通貨膨脹有所下降，但即使在 1980 年下半年經濟復甦時仍居高不下。

But the Volcker Fed continued to press the fight against high inflation with a combination of higher interest rates and even slower reserve growth. The economy entered recession again in July 1981, and this proved to be more severe and protracted, lasting until November 1982. Unemployment peaked at nearly 11 percent, but inflation continued to move lower and by recession’s end, year-over-year inflation was back under 5 percent. In time, as the Fed’s commitment to low inflation gained credibility, unemployment retreated and the economy entered a period of sustained growth and stability. The Great Inflation was over.

但沃爾克聯儲繼續通過提高利率和更慢的準備金增長來對抗高通脹。經濟在 1981 年 7 月再次進入衰退，事實證明衰退更為嚴重且持續時間更長，一直持續到 1982 年 11 月。失業率達到近 11% 的峰值，但通貨膨脹率繼續走低，到衰退結束時，同比通貨膨脹率又回來了 不到百分之五。隨著時間的推移，隨著美聯儲對低通脹的承諾獲得可信度，失業率下降，經濟進入持續增長和穩定的時期。大通脹結束了。

By this time, macroeconomic theory had undergone a transformation, in large part informed by the economic lessons of the era. The important role public expectations play in the interplay between economic policy and economic performance became de rigueur in macroeconomic models. The importance of time-consistent policy choices — policies that do not sacrifice longer-term prosperity for short-term gains — and policy credibility became widely appreciated as necessary for good macroeconomic results.

到這個時候，宏觀經濟理論已經發生了轉變，這在很大程度上是受到了那個時代的經濟教訓的啟發。在宏觀經濟模型中，公眾預期在經濟政策和經濟績效之間的相互作用中發揮著重要作用。時間一致的政策選擇 — — 不為短期利益犧牲長期繁榮的政策 — — 的重要性和政策可信度被廣泛認為是良好宏觀經濟結果所必需的。

Today central banks understand that a commitment to price stability is essential for good monetary policy and most, including the Federal Reserve, have adopted specific numerical objectives for inflation. To the extent they are credible, these numerical inflation targets have reintroduced an anchor to monetary policy. And in so doing, they have enhanced the transparency of monetary policy decisions and reduced uncertainty, now also understood to be necessary antecedents to the achievement of long-term growth and maximum employment.

如今，中央銀行明白，對價格穩定的承諾對於良好的貨幣政策至關重要，而且包括美聯儲在內的大多數中央銀行都採用了具體的通脹數字目標。在可信的範圍內，這些數字通脹目標重新引入了貨幣政策的錨點。通過這樣做，它們提高了貨幣政策決策的透明度並減少了不確定性，現在也被認為是實現長期增長和就業最大化的必要先決條件。

Endnotes

• 1 The act also created the president’s Council of Economic Advisers.
• 2 The Phillips curve is a negative, statistical relationship between inflation (or nominal wage growth) and the rate of unemployment. It is named after British economist A.W. Phillips, who is often credited with the revelation of the relations. Phillips, A.W. “The Relationship between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wages in the United Kingdom 1861–1957.” Economica 25, no. 100 (1958): 283–99. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2550759.
• 3 Dollars were convertible for gold by foreign governments and central banks. For domestic purposes, the US dollar was separated from gold in 1934 and has remained unconvertible since.
• 4 The concept of core inflation — the measurement of aggregate prices excluding food and energy goods — has its origin about this time.
• 5 The Humphrey-Hawkins Act expired in 2000; the Federal Reserve continues to provide its Monetary Policy Report to Congress on a semiannual basis.