【深度必读】一文理解1980年全球债务危机

In the developing world, there were severe financial crises in both the 1980s and 90s. But the nature of crises was quite different between the two decades.

在发展中国家，1980 年代和 90 年代都发生了严重的金融危机。但危机的性质在这两个十年间大不相同。

In the 1980s, the world experienced a debt crisis in which highly indebted Latin America and other developing regions were unable to repay the debt, asking for help. The problem exploded in August 1982 as Mexico declared inability to service its international debt, and the similar problem quickly spread to the rest of the world. To counter this, macroeconomic tightening and “structural adjustment” (liberalization and privatization) were administered, often through the conditionality of the IMF and the World Bank. This crisis involved long-term commercial bank debt which was accumulated in the public sector (including debt owed by SOEs and guaranteed by the government). The governments of developing countries were unable to repay the debt, so financial rescue operations became necessary.

1980年代，世界经历了债务危机，拉美等发展中地区负债累累，无力偿还债务，纷纷求助。这个问题在 1982 年 8 月爆发，因为墨西哥宣布无法偿还其国际债务，并且类似的问题迅速蔓延到世界其他地区。为了解决这个问题，通常通过国际货币基金组织和世界银行的条件来实施宏观经济紧缩和“结构调整”（自由化和私有化）。这场危机涉及在公共部门积累的长期商业银行债务（包括国有企业所欠和政府担保的债务）。发展中国家政府无力偿还债务，大规模的全面金融救助行动势在必行。

By contrast, the 1990s crises were more staggered and sequential (not happening at the same time). We had the Mexican crisis in 1994, the Asian crisis in 1997, the Russian crisis in 1998, the Brazilian crisis in 1999, the Argentine crisis in 2002, etc. [In addition, we had big EMS currency crises in Europe in 1992 and 1993 but their characteristics were different.] These crises were often caused by short-term commercial bank debt and/or securities market investment. Particularly in the case of the Asian crisis, the private sector (not the public sector) was the main culprit. Banks, nonbanks and corporations overborrowed, and foreign banks and private investors overlent. Huge capital outflows and severe currency speculation often accompany these crises.

相比之下，1990 年代的危机更加交错和连续（不是同时发生）。我们有 1994 年的墨西哥危机，1997 年的亚洲危机，1998 年的俄罗斯危机，1999 年的巴西危机，2002 年的阿根廷危机等等。[此外，我们在 1992 年和 1993 年在欧洲发生了大的 EMS 货币危机 但它们的特点是不同的。]

这些危机往往是由短期商业银行债务和/或证券市场投资引起的。特别是在亚洲危机的情况下，私营部门（而不是公共部门）是罪魁祸首。银行、非银行和公司过度借贷，外国银行和私人投资者过度借贷。这些危机往往伴随着大量的资本外流和严重的货币投机。

In both cases, Mexico had the honor of starting a new type of financial crisis.

Generally speaking, instruments of external development finance (other than FDI) can be classified as follows:

(1) Official grants and loans (often concessional — i.e., at low interest rates and with grace periods and long maturities)
(2a) Long-term commercial bank loans
(2b) Short-term commercial bank loans
(3) Securities markets (bonds, equity)

在这两种情况下，墨西哥都有幸开启了一场新型的金融危机。

一般来说，外部发展融资工具（FDI除外）可分为以下几类：

(1) 官方赠款和贷款（通常是优惠的 — — 即低利率、宽限期和长期限）

(2a) 长期商业银行贷款

(2b) 短期商业银行贷款

(3) 证券市场（债券、股票）

This list is in the ascending order of instability. ODA flows are more stable and predictable (unless you have a problem with big donors or international organizations) while securities markets can be very volatile. In the latter case, it is almost impossible even to identify who are the investors.

The 1980s crisis was caused by (1) and (2a), especially the latter. The 1990s crises were more often caused by (2b) and (3). The Asian crisis of 1997–98 was mainly caused by (2b). This however does not mean that all financial crises in the 1990s and 2000s are of the latter type. The old type crises (caused by fiscal deficits) still occur today.

Insolvency versus illiquidity

When we discuss debt problems, we often hear these terms. There are two types of inability to repay.

此列表按不稳定的升序排列。官方发展援助流量更加稳定和可预测（除非您与大捐助者或国际组织有问题），而证券市场可能非常不稳定。在后一种情况下，甚至几乎不可能确定谁是投资者。

1980 年代的危机是由 (1) 和 (2a) 引起的，尤其是后者。1990 年代的危机更常由 (2b) 和 (3) 引起。1997–98 年的亚洲危机主要是由（2b）引起的。然而，这并不意味着 1990 年代和 2000 年代的所有金融危机都属于后一种类型。旧式危机（由财政赤字引起）今天仍在发生。

破产与缺乏流动性

当我们讨论债务问题时，我们经常听到这些术语。 债务违约（无法偿还）有两种类型。

Insolvency means the borrower (or the borrowing country) is unable to pay back, both today and in the future. It has spent money beyond its inter-temporal budget constraint, so there is no way they can service the debt in full, even if they try. In this case, waiting does not improve the situation. The lenders must face the inevitable result that some (or even all) of the money will not be repaid. The only solution is forgiving debt — give up the hope of full repayment.

Illiquidity means the borrower (or the borrowing country) is unable to pay back now, but it can pay back later. It just does not have enough cash in the pocket (or not enough international reserves in the central bank), but it expects future income or export receipts so debt will be fully serviced (with added interest for late payment) in the future. In this case, the appropriate response is delaying the repayment, or “debt rescheduling.”

Thus, the policy response should be very different depending on whether the country is facing a solvency problem or a liquidity problem. The first is more serious than the second.

破产意味着借款人（或借款国）现在和将来都无法偿还。它的支出超出了跨期预算约束，因此即使他们尝试，也无法全额偿还债务。在这种情况下，等待并不能改善情况。贷方必须面临部分（甚至全部）资金无法偿还的不可避免的结果。唯一的解决办法是免除债务 — — 放弃全额偿还的希望。

流动性不足意味着借款人（或借款国）现在无法偿还，但可以稍后偿还。它只是口袋里没有足够的现金（或者中央银行没有足够的国际储备），但它预计未来的收入或出口收入将在未来完全偿还债务（延迟付款会增加利息）。在这种情况下，适当的反应是延迟还款或“债务重新安排”。

因此，根据国家是面临偿付能力问题还是流动性问题，政策反应应该会有很大不同。第一个比第二个更严重。

But this is a theoretical distinction. The big problem is: it is very difficult to distinguish the two cases in reality. When a crisis happens, it is virtually impossible to tell precisely whether Russia, Argentina, Thailand, or any other country has a solvency problem or a liquidity problem, especially ex ante (before the event) but even ex post (after the event).

A similar situation can occur with the concept of sustainability of the balance of payments. When a developing country is accumulating foreign debt (whether ODA or commercial), how can we tell whether it will repay the debt in the future? It depends on many factors: (i) whether industrialization succeeds; (ii) whether political stability is maintained; (iii) whether the global business condition is favorable; (iv) whether export and import prices rise or fall; (v) whether world interest rates rise or fall; (vi) whether regional crisis, war, terrorism, etc. occurs, … We can calculate the balance-of-payments viability with a simple model with rigorous assumptions. But for practical purposes, sustainability is highly uncertain. For example, there is no easy way to predict whether or not a country succeeds in development in the long run.

There are more complications.

There are cases where the country wants to repay, but cannot (inability). There are also cases where the country can repay, but will not (unwillingness). Again, it is sometimes difficult to tell them apart.

Furthermore, insolvency or illiquidity may be the outcome of wrong policy. If the government implements wrong measures, the problem can worsen from illiquidity to insolvency. It is also possible that international organizations impose wrong policy conditionality so the situation deteriorates.

但这是理论上的区别。最大的问题是：现实中很难区分这两种情况。当危机发生时，几乎不可能准确判断俄罗斯、阿根廷、泰国或任何其他国家是否存在偿付能力问题或流动性问题，尤其是事前（事前），甚至事后（事后）。

国际收支可持续性的概念也可能发生类似的情况。当一个发展中国家在积累外债（无论是官方发展援助还是商业债务）时，我们如何判断它未来是否会偿还债务？

这取决于很多因素：（i）工业化是否成功；(ii) 是否维持政治稳定；(iii) 全球商业环境是否有利；(iv) 进出口价格是上涨还是下跌；(v) 世界利率是上升还是下降；(vi) 地区危机、战争、恐怖主义等是否发生，……我们可以用一个简单的模型和严格的假设来计算国际收支的可行性。但就实际目的而言，可持续性是高度不确定的。

例如，从长远来看，没有简单的方法可以预测一个国家的发展是否成功。

债务危机爆发还有更多的并发症。

也有国家想还，但不能（无力）的情况。也有国家可以偿还，但不会（不愿意）的情况。同样，有时很难区分它们。

此外，破产或流动性不足可能是错误政策的结果。如果政府采取错误的措施，问题可能会从流动性不足恶化为资不抵债。国际组织也有可能强加错误的政策条件，从而使局势恶化。

Latin America and East Asia

When we consider the debt crisis in the 1980s and the currency crises in the 1990s, an interesting comparison can be made between Latin America and East Asia. While both regions were affected by these crises, Latin America was more severely impacted by the 1980s crisis while East Asia was more directly hit by the 1990s crisis.

After the Asian crisis of 1997–98, some people argued that the high growth of East Asia was now over, the Asian development model was no longer useful, and Asia would have hard time growing in the early 21st century. It is true that some Asian economies (for example, Japan, the Philippines and Indonesia) struggled economically and/or politically in the aftermath of the crisis. But we also see strong growth dynamism too (for example, China, Vietnam and Thailand). It is a bit of exaggeration to say that the Asian crisis permanently and significantly reduced the growth prospects of the region. I think East Asia is still dynamic, even with many problems.

拉丁美洲和东亚

当我们考虑 80 年代的债务危机和 1990 年代的货币危机时，可以对拉丁美洲和东亚进行有趣的比较。虽然这两个地区都受到了这些危机的影响，但拉丁美洲受 1980 年代危机的影响更为严重，而东亚则更直接地受到 1990 年代危机的打击。

1997–98年亚洲金融危机后，有人认为东亚的高增长已经结束，亚洲发展模式不再有用，21世纪初亚洲将很难发展。的确，一些亚洲经济体（例如日本、菲律宾和印度尼西亚）在危机之后在经济和/或政治上陷入困境。但我们也看到了强劲的增长动力（例如，中国、越南和泰国）。说亚洲危机永久性地显着降低了该地区的增长前景，这有点夸大其词。我认为东亚仍然充满活力，尽管存在许多问题。

In the long-term perspective, it is undeniable that East Asia as a region has succeeded in sustaining growth and improving living standards. This is in sharp contrast to the Latin American experience where consistent growth has been highly elusive. In the 19th century, Argentina was one of the “developed” countries with relatively high income. But since then, its development path has been strewn with many instabilities. Even in the early 21st century, it remains a developing country saddled with gigantic economic problems.

But if we take a long-run view and compare East Asia and Latin America, it is hardly deniable that East Asia on the whole has succeeded more brilliantly in economic development. Many economies in East Asia (but not all of them — at least not yet) have raised income significantly and promoted industrialization after political independence, and especially during the last few decades. The question is WHY?

(Some say that Chile is really an East Asian country, with its authoritarian past, disciplined policies and successful export promotion; and the Philippines belongs to Latin America with its social conflicts, political instability and low growth.)

从长远来看，不可否认，东亚作为一个地区，在保持增长和提高生活水平方面取得了成功。这与拉丁美洲的经历形成鲜明对比，拉丁美洲的经历难以实现持续增长。19世纪，阿根廷是收入较高的“发达国家”之一。但从那以后，它的发展道路就充满了许多不稳定因素。即使在 21 世纪初，它仍然是一个背负着巨大经济问题的发展中国家。

但如果放眼长远，比较东亚和拉美，不可否认，东亚整体经济发展更加辉煌。东亚的许多经济体（但不是全部 — — 至少目前还没有）在政治独立后显着提高了收入并促进了工业化，特别是在过去的几十年里。

问题是为什么？

（有人说智利确实是一个东亚国家，过去是专制的，政策有纪律，出口促进成功；而菲律宾属于拉丁美洲，社会冲突多，政治不稳定，增长缓慢。）

Each country in East Asia is different, and each country in Latin America is also unique. Therefore, generalization is not easy. But at the risk of oversimplification, we can list some of the typical characteristics of these regions which affect their long-term development performance.

First and perhaps most important, inequality (between rich and poor, cities and country side, white and non-white, etc) has remained and even intensified in Latin America over the centuries. There seems to be a socially ingrained mechanism to reinforce these social divisions in Latin America which continue even today. In contrast, in most of the successful East Asian countries, social divisions as initial conditions were less severe, governments have made effort to narrow income gaps and unite different social groups, and growth (accompanied by appropriate policies) generally reduced these gaps.

Second, generally speaking, Latin America is more resource-rich while East Asia is less so (they are people-rich). As we discussed in lecture 8, a large endowment of natural resources is often an impediment, rather than a help, to industrialization. One reason is economic: the “Dutch Disease,” or exchange rate overvaluation and crowding out of limited domestic factors of production by the extractive sector, suppresses the growth of other tradable industries. Another reason which is important in Latin America is political: natural resources tend to create strong vested interest groups around them (rich commercial farmers and landlords, mining interests, etc). They favor overvaluation and free trade, and oppose public investment for industrial growth. Because of their resistance, industrial promotion policy is more difficult to implement in such countries. This problem was largely nonexistent in East Asia.

Third, there was a difference in political regime. Latin America had “soft” states while East Asia had “hard” states. For a long time, politics in Latin America was characterized by instability and oscillation between militarism and populism (but now, almost all Latin American countries are democratized). Populism is a political system supported by many interest groups. The government must please these groups continuously and simultaneously. Stability is maintained through delicate political balancing acts. Wealth must be distributed among these supporters. This prevents taking decisive action and making quick response. On the contrary, East Asia typically had a top-down, non-democratic authoritarian state as it initiated industrialization. Such a government is very strong and does not have to appeal to various interest groups. If the leader is intelligent and farsighted (a big “if”), it can have very agile and dynamic policies. Some countries in East Asia still have such a regime.

东亚的每个国家都不一样，拉美的每个国家也都是独一无二的。因此，泛化并不容易。但冒着过于简单化的风险，我们可以列出这些地区影响其长期发展绩效的一些典型特征。

首先，也许是最重要的，几个世纪以来，拉丁美洲的不平等（贫富之间、城市与乡村之间、白人和非白人之间等）一直存在，甚至加剧。似乎有一种根深蒂固的社会机制来加强拉丁美洲的这些社会分歧，这种分歧一直持续到今天。相比之下，在大多数成功的东亚国家，作为初始条件的社会分裂不那么严重，政府努力缩小收入差距并团结不同的社会群体，增长（伴随着适当的政策）普遍缩小了这些差距。

其次，一般来说，拉丁美洲的资源更丰富，而东亚则不那么丰富（他们人口丰富）。正如我们在第 8 讲中所讨论的，大量自然资源往往是工业化的障碍，而不是帮助。原因之一是经济：“荷兰病”，即汇率高估和采掘业挤出有限的国内生产要素，抑制了其他贸易行业的增长。在拉丁美洲很重要的另一个原因是政治：自然资源往往会围绕它们创造强大的既得利益集团（富有的商业农民和地主、矿业利益集团等）。他们赞成高估和自由贸易，反对公共投资促进工业增长。由于他们的阻力，这些国家的产业促进政策更难实施。这个问题在东亚基本上不存在。

三是政治体制不同。拉丁美洲有“软”国家，而东亚有“硬”国家。长期以来，拉美政治的特点是军国主义和民粹主义之间的不稳定和摇摆不定（但现在，几乎所有拉美国家都实现了民主化）。民粹主义是一种受到许多利益集团支持的政治制度。政府必须持续并同时取悦这些群体。稳定是通过微妙的政治平衡行为来维持的。财富必须在这些支持者之间分配。这会阻止采取果断行动并做出快速反应。相反，东亚在启动工业化时通常有一个自上而下的、非民主的威权国家。这样的政府非常强大，不必向各种利益集团呼吁。如果领导者聪明且有远见（一个很大的“如果”），它就可以制定非常灵活和动态的政策。东亚一些国家还有这样的制度。

Other differences include the social continuity after colonization (original societies in Latin America were destroyed by the whites, while Asian societies survived colonization) and growth strategy (import substitution was continued longer and in a more counter-productive manner in Latin America).

其他差异包括殖民化后的社会连续性（拉丁美洲的原始社会被白人摧毁，而亚洲社会在殖民化中幸存下来）和增长战略（进口替代持续时间更长，而且在拉丁美洲以更适得其反的方式）。

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民粹主义的必然失败

Oil dollar recycling of the 1970s

The standard explanation of why the debt crisis occurred in the 1980s goes something like the following. We must first look at the 1970s for the background and then see what happened in the 1980s. Between these two decades, the financial flows surrounding developing countries changed dramatically.

The 1970s was an inflationary decade. In particular, there were two “oil shocks” in which the world oil price was greatly increased due to political and military reasons, in 1973–74 and 1979–80. As a result, huge oil export earnings flowed into the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries). At the same time, non-oil producing developing countries suffered from ballooning trade deficits. As the graph below shows, the real price of oil peaked around 1980. Although the nominal oil price is accelerating in recent years, its inflation-adjusted level is currently not as high as in 1980.

1970年代的石油美元循环机制

1980 年代发生债务危机的标准解释如下。我们必须先看看 1970 年代的背景，然后再看看 1980 年代发生了什么。在这两个十年之间，围绕发展中国家的资金流动发生了巨大变化。

1970 年代是通货膨胀的十年。尤其是1973–74年和1979–80年两次因政治和军事原因导致世界油价大幅上涨的“石油冲击”。结果，巨额的石油出口收入流入了欧佩克（石油输出国组织）。与此同时，非产油发展中国家的贸易逆差不断扩大。

如下图所示，石油实际价格在 1980 年左右见顶。虽然近年来名义石油价格在加速上涨，但其通胀调整后的水平目前没有 1980 年那么高。

Real Oil Price

真实原油价格
(WTI in constant USD of July 2005)

Sources: National Post with data from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

The world’s purchasing power accumulated in OPEC but they had little absorptive capacity. This means that they could not immediately invest the money in domestic industrial projects. Their export earnings were deposited at banks for the moment. The OPEC countries typically deposited their oil receipts in dollar accounts located outside the US (remember, oil receipts are in US dollars). These were called “euro” dollar deposits. How to mobilize this huge euro-dollar deposits for global growth became a big financial problem of the 1970s. This was called the problem of “oil dollar recycling” (American English) or “petrodollar recycling” (British English).

Here, the adjective “euro” means outside the original issuing country. For example, US dollar deposits outside the US (say, in London) are called “euro-dollar deposits.” Japanese yen bonds issued in New York is called “euro-yen bonds,” and so on. This term has no direct relation to geographical Europe. The point is, in those days, “euro” transactions were freer because they were outside the country which wanted to regulate them. But as financial liberalization proceeded, even the original country dropped regulation and added convenience of euro-money was gradually lost. Today, this terminology has become obsolete and is used only in the historical context. Virtually everyone thinks the euro is the currency unit of Europe, not an adjective.

欧佩克（OPEC）积累了世界的购买力，但他们几乎没有吸收能力。这意味着他们无法立即将资金投入国内工业项目。他们的出口收入暂时存放在银行。欧佩克国家通常将其石油收入存入位于美国境外的美元账户（请记住，石油收入以美元为单位）。

这些被称为“欧元”美元（EURODOLLAR) 存款。如何调动这笔巨额欧元美元存款促进全球增长成为 1970 年代的一个重大金融问题。这被称为“石油美元回收”（美式英语）或“石油美元回收”（英式英语）的问题。

在这里，形容词“欧元”是指原始发行国以外的地方。例如，美国境外（例如伦敦）的美元存款被称为“欧元美元存款”。在纽约发行的日元债券被称为“欧元日元债券”等。这个词与地理上的欧洲没有直接关系。关键是，在那些日子里，“欧元”交易更加自由，因为它们在想要对其进行监管的国家之外。但随着金融自由化的推进，即使是原来的国家也放弃了监管，增加了欧元货币的便利性也逐渐丧失。今天，这个术语已经过时，只在历史背景下使用。几乎每个人都认为欧元是欧洲的货币单位，而不是一个形容词。

Large international commercial banks which received the OPEC money decided to reinvest it in developing countries with good growth prospects. Usually, a group of such banks got together and lent money to a developing country endowed with a lot of primary commodity resources or “good” industrial projects (Brazil, Mexico, Korea, Indonesia, etc). Such group lending by banks is called “syndicated loans.” These were long-term commercial bank loans to the governments of developing countries (or to SOEs with government guarantee). With ever-rising commodity prices, these investments looked very safe and profitable.

Some of the developing countries were also very aggressive in receiving such loans to promote national development projects. They were optimistic and borrowed happily. As a result, they became heavily dependent on foreign bank loans.

However, not all developing countries enjoyed foreign loans and investment booms. Some non-oil producing developing countries as well as industrial countries in North America, Europe and Japan were experiencing “stagflation” — a situation of high inflation and stagnant output.

How the crisis occurred in the 1980s

收到欧佩克资金的大型国际商业银行决定将其再投资于具有良好增长前景的发展中国家。通常，一群这样的银行聚集在一起，向一个拥有大量初级商品资源或“好”工业项目的发展中国家（巴西、墨西哥、韩国、印度尼西亚等）放贷。银行的这种集体贷款被称为“银团贷款”。这些是向发展中国家政府（或向有政府担保的国有企业）提供的长期商业银行贷款。随着商品价格不断上涨，这些投资看起来非常安全且有利可图。

一些发展中国家在接受此类贷款以促进国家发展项目方面也非常积极。他们乐观，愉快地借钱。结果，他们变得严重依赖外国银行贷款。

然而，并非所有发展中国家都享有外国贷款和投资热潮。一些非产油发展中国家以及北美、欧洲和日本的工业国家正在经历“滞胀” — — 高通胀和产出停滞的局面。

1980 年代的危机是如何发生的

But good times do not last forever. As the new decade of the 1980s began, the global economy shifted dramatically from inflation to recession.

In late 1979, Mr. Paul Volcker was appointed as a new chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board (i.e., American central bank). Immediately, he initiated an anti-inflation campaign. From 1979 to 1980, the Fed tightened money supply. As a result, dollar interest rates shot up sharply, even to 20% per year or above. Although this caused serious economic slowdown in the US and the rest of the world, in the long run Mr. Volcker succeeded in stopping the global inflation of the 1970s. But this process caused enormous strain for highly indebted developing countries.

但好时光不会永远持续下去。随着 1980 年代新十年的开始,全球经济从通货膨胀急剧转向衰退。1979年底，保罗沃尔克先生被任命为美国联邦储备委员会（即美国中央银行）的新主席。他立即发起了反通货膨胀运动。从 1979 年到 1980 年，美联储收紧了货币供应量。

结果，美元利率急剧上升，甚至达到每年 20% 或更高。

尽管这导致美国和世界其他地区的经济严重放缓，但从长远来看，沃尔克先生成功阻止了1970 年代的全球通货膨胀。但这一过程给负债累累的发展中国家带来了巨大的压力。

The tightening of American monetary policy impacted indebted countries in three ways:

— As dollar interest rates rose, debt service payments also rose sharply.
— Due to global recession, the quantitative demand for their exports fell.
— As commodity prices declined, they faced lower “terms of trade” (= export price/import price)

Thus, highly indebted countries suddenly faced payment difficulties. Finally, in August 1982, Mexico said, “Sorry, we can’t service our debt any more.” This ignited a global crisis. It was not just Mexico that had the balance of payments problem. One by one, debtor countries declared similar inability to repay.

I was a summer intern at the IMF’s Western Hemisphere Department in 1982. As the Mexican problem erupted, the Mexican division of IMF became empty. I was assigned to East Caribbean Division where it was less exciting but more peaceful. I was asked to calculate real effective exchange rates for East Caribbean islands. In those days, computers looked much like vacuum cleaners.

美国货币政策的收紧从三个方面影响了负债国：

— — 随着美元利率上升，偿债支付也急剧上升。

— — 受全球经济衰退影响，出口数量需求下降。

— 随着大宗商品价格下跌，他们面临更低的“贸易条件”（=出口价格/进口价格）

因此，高负债国家突然面临支付困难。最后，在 1982 年 8 月，墨西哥说：“对不起，我们不能再偿还我们的债务了。”这引发了一场全球危机。不仅仅是墨西哥有国际收支问题。债务国一一宣布类似无力偿还。

1982年，我在国际货币基金组织西半球部做暑期实习生。随着墨西哥问题的爆发，国际货币基金组织的墨西哥分部变得空旷。我被分配到东加勒比海赛区，那里不那么令人兴奋，但更平静。我被要求计算东加勒比岛屿的实际有效汇率。在那个年代，计算机看起来很像吸尘器。

As soon as the debt crisis broke out, foreign commercial banks stopped lending to them, and began to think only of getting the money back. The oil dollar recycling and syndicated loans were completely terminated. After this, the financial rescue was extended to them by the IMF and the World Bank in close collaboration with the US government. They extended loans to fill the “financing gap,” provided that the government of the affected country took the “correct” adjustment policies. Ultimately, these official loans were financed by developed countries through capital contributions and loans.

Sometimes the amount of financial help needed was so huge that IMF and World Bank loans were not enough. The international community provided larger loans through the Paris Club, a group of official lenders to a particular developing country, which rescheduled existing debt or provided new money in exchange for full servicing of the existing debt. (Technically, rescheduling means delaying the payment of old debt and new money means extending new loans if old debt is repaid as scheduled. But economically, they have the same balance-of-payments impact). The Paris Club rescheduling (or new money) was conditional on the existence of an IMF agreement. Bilateral official lenders extended rescue loans only when the IMF itself had successfully negotiated a new adjustment program (IMF loan with conditionality) with the country in question. Hence the enormous power of the IMF vis-à-vis countries in balance-of-payments trouble.

欧债危机一爆发，外资商业银行就停止放贷，一心只想着把钱还回来。石油美元回收和银团贷款完全终止。

此后，国际货币基金组织和世界银行与美国政府密切合作，向他们提供了金融救助。他们提供贷款以填补“融资缺口”，前提是受灾国政府采取“正确”的调整政策。最终，这些官方贷款是由发达国家通过出资和贷款提供的。

有时需要的财政援助数额巨大，以至于国际货币基金组织和世界银行的贷款都不够。国际社会通过巴黎俱乐部提供了更大的贷款，巴黎俱乐部是一个向特定发展中国家提供官方贷款的团体，它们重新安排现有债务或提供新资金以换取全面偿还现有债务。（从技术上讲，重新安排意味着延迟偿还旧债，新货币意味着如果旧债如期偿还，则延长新贷款。

但在经济上，它们具有相同的国际收支影响）。巴黎俱乐部重新安排（或新资金）的条件是 IMF 协议的存在。只有当IMF本身与有关国家成功谈判新的调整计划（有条件的 IMF 贷款）时，双边官方贷方才会提供救助贷款。

因此，国际货币基金组织对处于国际收支困境的国家具有巨大的权力。

In addition, commercial bank lenders also negotiated debt rescheduling through the London Club. While the Paris Club was always held in Paris (French MOF), the London Club was not necessarily convened in London.

Recovery strategy: adjustment plus debt relief

When providing a balance-of-payments rescue package, the IMF and the World Bank always require that appropriate corrective policies be undertaken (called conditionality). They provided the carrot and the stick.

In order to cope with the 1980s debt crisis, these international organizations created new lending facilities such as:

— World Bank’s structural adjustment lending including “structural adjustment loan (SAL),” at commercial interest rate, and “structural adjustment credit (SAC),” at concessional interest rate

— IMF’s structural adjustment facility (SAF) and enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF)

此外，商业银行贷方还通过伦敦俱乐部协商债务重组。虽然巴黎俱乐部总是在巴黎举行（法国财政部），但伦敦俱乐部不一定在伦敦召开。

经济复苏策略：调整加债务减免

在提供国际收支救助方案时，国际货币基金组织和世界银行总是要求采取适当的纠正政策（称为条件性）。他们提供了胡萝卜和大棒。

为了应对 1980 年代的债务危机，这些国际组织创建了新的贷款工具，例如：

— 世界银行的结构调整贷款，包括商业利率的“结构调整贷款（SAL）”和优惠利率的“结构调整信贷（SAC）”

— 基金组织的结构调整机制（SAF）和增强型结构调整机制（ESAF）

Conditionality typically consisted of macroeconomic tightening (budget cuts and low credit growth to reduce domestic expenditure, i.e., “absorption”) and “structural adjustment” (deregulation, privatization, trade liberalization, etc. to stimulate private supply response). The theoretical background of this strategy was called neoclassical development economics. Simply put, it assumes that the private sector will grow strongly, once macroeconomic instability and government intervention are removed.

In 1985, US Treasury Secretary James Baker initiated the Baker Plan in which adjustment was combined with debt rescheduling and new money. Fifteen highly indebted countries were designated as candidates. This plan was based on the assumption that the problem was illiquidity so delaying the repayment will solve the problem. The debt stock was not reduced but the repayment schedule was simply pushed back into the future.

But when the delayed repayment approached, it was clear that the indebted countries could not pay back and the balance-of-payments situation was even worse than before. The problem was not illiquidity but insolvency. It was gradually recognized that the real solution must come from cutting the debt stock itself, not just from delaying the repayment.

Therefore, in 1989 another US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady launched the Brady Plan, in which market-based debt reduction was implemented. This meant that the indebted countries engaged in buying up their own debt at discount in the secondary market using various techniques (debt buyback, debt-equity swap, etc). These amounted to exchanging a large amount of your own bad debt for a smaller amount of good debt (debt you must repay in full). IMF and World Bank loans could be used for these operations. Mexico was again the first country to take advantage of this scheme [the US is always very kind to Mexico].

条件通常包括宏观经济紧缩（预算削减和低信贷增长以减少国内支出，即“吸收”）和“结构调整”（放松管制、私有化、贸易自由化等以刺激私人供应反应）。这一战略的理论背景被称为新古典发展经济学。简而言之，它假设一旦宏观经济不稳定和政府干预消除，私营部门将强劲增长。

1985年，美国财政部长詹姆斯·贝克发起了贝克计划，将调整与债务重组和新货币相结合。15 个重债国家被指定为候选国。该计划基于这样一个假设，即问题是流动性不足，因此延迟还款将解决问题。债务存量没有减少，但还款时间表只是推迟到未来。

但当延迟还款临近时，债务国显然无力偿还，国际收支状况甚至比以前更糟。问题不是流动性不足，而是资不抵债。人们逐渐认识到，真正的解决方案必须来自削减债务存量本身，而不仅仅是推迟还款。

因此，1989年，另一位美国财政部长尼古拉斯·布雷迪（Nicholas Brady）推出了布雷迪计划，实施了市场化的减债计划。这意味着负债国使用各种技术（债务回购、债转股等）在二级市场上以折扣价购买自己的债务。这些相当于将您自己的大量坏账换成少量的好债（您必须全额偿还的债务）。国际货币基金组织和世界银行的贷款可用于这些业务。墨西哥再次成为第一个利用这个计划的国家[美国对墨西哥总是很好]。

In addition, some countries of geopolitical importance (particularly for the US) were accorded with very generous treatment. Poland (in transition from socialism to market) and Egypt (US ally in the Gulf War against Iraq) were given debt forgiveness in which loans amounting to tens of billions of dollars were written off. They did not have to repay later or buy back their own debt — their debt was simply canceled.

One justification of such debt reduction was furnished by the Debt Laffer Curve. Originally, the Laffer Curve intended to show that as the tax rate rises, the total tax revenue of the government actually goes down beyond a certain point because people work less or try to evade taxes. This means that there is a certain tax rate that maximizes the tax revenue, and that lowering the tax rate may sometimes increase revenue (Arthur Laffer is a business professor at MIT).

Similarly, the Debt Laffer Curve shows that as the external debt stock rises, the indebted country will try to produce less (discouragement effect) or intentionally default on the existing debt (sabotage) so the foreign lenders will receive less than full repayment. Again, there is a critical debt stock beyond which both the lenders and borrowers lose. If the debt stock is already above this level, it is in the self-interest of the lenders to forgive some of the debt. But in reality, it is very difficult to tell whether a particular country has already reached this point or not.

此外，一些具有地缘政治重要性的国家（特别是美国）得到了非常慷慨的待遇。波兰（从社会主义向市场过渡）和埃及（美国在海湾战争中对伊拉克的盟友）获得了债务减免，其中数百亿美元的贷款被注销。他们不必稍后偿还或回购自己的债务 — — 他们的债务只是被取消了。

债务拉弗曲线提供了这种减债的一个理由。本来，拉弗曲线是想表明，随着税率的上升，政府的税收总额实际上会下降到某个点以上，因为人们工作减少或试图逃税。这意味着存在一定的税率使税收收入最大化，而降低税率有时可能会增加收入（亚瑟·拉弗（Arthur Laffer）是麻省理工学院的商业教授）。

同样，债务拉弗曲线表明，随着外债存量的增加，负债国将尝试减少（劝阻效应）或故意违约（破坏）现有债务，因此外国贷方将获得少于全额的还款。同样，有一个关键的债务存量，超过了贷方和借方的损失。如果债务存量已经高于这个水平，那么免除部分债务符合贷方的自身利益。但实际上，一个国家是否已经到了这个地步，很难说。

s

The 1990s: optimism and new crises 1990年代的乐观主义以及新危机

With debt rescheduling and reduction, which were combined with neoclassical policy conditionality, the debt crisis in many countries, including those in Latin America and East Asia, were successfully contained. It took about ten years, but by the early 1990s, Latin America declared graduation from the “Lost Decade” and hoped for renewed growth. Inflation was still a bit too high in Latin America, but their economies had been liberalized and opened up externally thanks to the IMF and World Bank conditionalities, and foreign investment began to return.

The developing and transition economies which open up their financial sectors to invite foreigners to lend and invest in them are called emerging market economies. In the early to mid 1990s, this mode of attracting foreign funds became very fashionable. Many countries rushed to liberalize capital accounts (for capital mobility) as well as current accounts (for free trade) to absorb as much foreign savings as possible.

But this led to another great risk. Emerging market economies simply borrowed too much, and foreigners lent and invested too much, without much thinking and beyond sound limits. The financial sectors of these countries were still primitive. Moreover, their governments were not monitoring private-sector behavior properly. The domestic economy first enjoyed a strong investment boom and an asset market bubble, especially in land, property and stock markets. Then, the crash came. Suddenly, foreign investors and lenders pulled out in droves and the macroeconomy and the domestic currency collapsed, with the banking sector paralyzed. Enterprises were faced with bankruptcies and people suffered unemployment. Multilateral and bilateral donors had to come to the rescue after private investors left. This was the basic nature of the Asian crisis 1997–98. [Analysis of the Asian crisis will continue in the following lectures. This is only a preview.]

通过债务重组和减债，结合新古典政策条件，包括拉丁美洲和东亚在内的许多国家的债务危机得到成功遏制。花了大约十年的时间，但到 1990 年代初，拉丁美洲宣布从“失去的十年”中毕业，并希望重新增长。拉美的通胀仍然偏高，但由于国际货币基金组织和世界银行的附加条件，他们的经济已经自由化和对外开放，外国投资开始回流。

开放金融部门以邀请外国人贷款和投资的发展中和转型经济体被称为新兴市场经济体。90年代初期到中期，这种吸引外资的模式非常流行。许多国家急于开放资本账户（为了资本流动）和经常账户（为了自由贸易），以尽可能多地吸收外国储蓄。

但这导致了另一个巨大的风险。新兴市场经济体只是借了太多钱，外国人放贷和投资太多，没有太多思考，超出了合理的限度。这些国家的金融部门还很原始。此外，他们的政府没有适当地监督私营部门的行为。国内经济首先出现了强劲的投资热潮和资产市场泡沫，尤其是土地、房地产和股票市场。然后，车祸来了。突然间，外国投资者和贷方蜂拥而至，宏观经济和本币崩溃，银行业瘫痪。企业破产，人民失业。私人投资者离开后，多边和双边捐助者不得不出手相救。这是 1997–98 年亚洲危机的基本性质。

​

The other debt problem: PRSPs and HIPCs

However, there is another part of the debt crisis story that continued beyond the 1980s. Some heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) — many of them in Sub Saharan Africa — could not escape from the debt trap even with repeated structural adjustment programs and debt rescheduling. Some of them went to the Paris Club for debt relief several times, or more. They continued to suffer from economic stagnation and heavy debt burden well into the 1990s. It was clear that their problem was insolvency, that their economic prospects were bleak with a huge debt overhang, and that a new approach had to be taken to stimulate development.

In 1999 at the Koln (Cologne) Summit, the HIPCs Initiative was launched. It was proposed that official debt of heavily indebted poor countries should be forgiven (including both multilateral and bilateral official loans), and the money thus saved should be used for poverty reduction.

At around the same time, World Bank President James Wolfensohn initiated the new development approach called CDF (1998) and PRSP (1999) for poor countries.

另一个债务问题：PRSP和HIPC

然而，债务危机故事的另一部分一直延续到1980年代之后。一些重债穷国（HIPC） — — 其中许多在撒哈拉以南非洲 — — 即使反复进行结构调整计划和债务重新安排，也无法摆脱债务陷阱。他们中的一些人多次或多次前往巴黎俱乐部寻求债务减免。直到 1990 年代，他们继续遭受经济停滞和沉重的债务负担。很明显，他们的问题是资不抵债，他们的经济前景黯淡，负债累累，必须采取新的方法来刺激发展。

1999 年在科隆（科隆）峰会上，发起了重债穷国倡议。建议免除重债穷国的官方债务（包括多边和双边官方贷款），将节省的资金用于减贫。

大约在同一时间，世界银行行长詹姆斯·沃尔芬森为贫困国家发起了名为 CDF（1998）和 PRSP（1999）的新发展方法。

Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) is a general philosophy and procedure under which development should take place. It emphasizes comprehensiveness, namely both economic and non-economic (i.e., social and institutional) aspects must be considered. Development must proceed with ownership (autonomy) of the developing country and partnership among all stakeholders in development. We may safely say that CDF, as a general principle, is not very operational and its political importance has already ended.

Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is a document that spells out concrete measures and timetable (usually three years) for poverty reduction for each poor country. The allocation of tasks among various donors is also mapped out in a matrix form. Originally, only HIPC countries were required to draft this document. But now. all poor countries (i.e., all countries that receive IMF and World Bank loans on concessional terms) must produce PRSP. [In East Asia, Vietnam was the first country to draft a PRSP document, which was renamed the “Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (CPRGS).” However, the Vietnamese government decided not to do the second round of CPRGS; instead, its ideas were included in the traditional Five-Year Plan for Socio-economic Development 2006–2010.]

As of April 2006, 18 countries have reached the completion point (i.e., finished the three years of PRSP successfully). The July 2005 G8 Summit pledged full cancellation of debt owed to the International Development Association (World Bank), the IMF and the African Development Fund to countries that have reached the completion point of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. This proposal is called the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI).

综合开发框架 (CDF) 是开发应该遵循的一般理念和程序。它强调综合性，即必须考虑经济和非经济（即社会和制度）方面。发展必须以发展中国家的所有权（自主权）和所有利益相关者之间的伙伴关系进行。

我们可以肯定地说，作为一般原则，CDF 的操作性不强，其政治重要性已经结束。

减贫战略文件（PRSP）是一份文件，阐明了每个贫困国家减贫的具体措施和时间表（通常为三年）。不同捐助者之间的任务分配也以矩阵形式绘制出来。最初，只有重债穷国国家需要起草这份文件。但现在。所有穷国（即所有以优惠条件接受国际货币基金组织和世界银行贷款的国家）都必须生产减贫战略文件。[在东亚，越南是第一个起草PRSP文件的国家，该文件更名为“全面减贫和增长战略（CPRGS）”。但是，越南政府决定不做第二轮CPRGS；相反，它的想法被包含在传统的 2006–2010 年社会经济发展五年计划中。]

截至 2006年4月，已有18个国家达到完成点（即成功完成了三年的减贫战略计划）。2005年7月的八国集团峰会承诺完全取消欠国际开发协会（世界银行）、国际货币基金组织和非洲发展基金对已达到强化重债穷国倡议完成点的国家的债务。该提案被称为多边债务减免倡议 (MDRI)。

MDGs — key goals for poor countries?

Separately, the UN Millennium Summit (2000) adopted ambitious social targets to be achieved by 2015, called the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs, WB page, UNDP page), including halving the ratio of people in absolute poverty between 1990 and 2015. To attain these goals, the World Bank’s PRSP is going to be used (hence the linkage between World Bank and UN policies). The World Bank economists estimated that achieving MDGs would require an additional $40–60 billion dollars of ODA per year (i.e., doubling the current level of global ODA). The EU has promised to increase its ODA to 0.39% of GNP (amounting to about $7 billion) while the US has declared to add $5 billion annually in the next three years for the benefit of poor countries with “good practice.” But Japan has cut its ODA budget drastically due to fiscal crisis in recent years, and there is so far no sign that this trend will end.

千年发展目标 — — 贫困国有哪些重要目标？

另外，联合国千年首脑会议（2000 年）通过了到 2015 年要实现的雄心勃勃的社会目标，称为千年发展目标（MDGs，WB 页，UNDP 页），包括在 1990 年至 2015 年期间将绝对贫困人口的比例减半。为了实现这些目标，将使用世界银行的 PRSP（因此世界银行和联合国政策之间的联系）。

世界银行经济学家估计，要实现千年发展目标，每年需要额外提供 40–600 亿美元的官方发展援助（即当前全球官方发展援助水平的两倍）。欧盟已承诺将其官方发展援助增加到GNP的0.39%（约 70 亿美元），而美国则宣布在未来三年内每年增加 50 亿美元，以造福具有“良好做法”的穷国。

但近年来，由于财政危机，日本大幅削减了官方发展援助预算，目前还没有迹象表明这种趋势会结束。

Other arguments in the current global development strategy include the following:

— Some people (including NGOs and social activists) say that ODA should be given in grants, not in loans which worsens the debt burden problem.

— ODA should be given to poor countries only. Middle-income countries should not receive official aid since they can attract private funds.

— ODA should be given only to poor countries with “good governance” (this is called the selectivity argument). If money is given to countries with bad policies and institutions, it will be wasted. For these countries, advice, not money, should be given.

— Aid coordination and harmonization: To reduce the transaction cost (too many missions, reports, meetings, etc), aid programs must be coordinated among all donors. A common fund should be created to which all donors contribute. Sector strategies must be created and shared by all. We must avoid overlaps and duplication, since money is fungible (any contribution by any donor has the same effect [is it true?]).

However, the Japanese government has been uncomfortable with these trends, which are mostly led by Europeans. It fears too much unification of development ideas and implementation. Japan adheres to the best-mix approach which says: since the needs of each country are different and each donor has its comparative advantage, it is neither necessary nor desirable to unify all aid programs and implementation. Unnecessary procedures must be avoided, but a broad menu of alternative ideas and tools should be available to developing countries. It is up to them, not donors, to decide which goals and methods are to be adopted. Moreover, it is very risky to shift the financial management of ODA money from donors to governments (especially local governments) which are not very clean or transparent.

In summary, in the last several years, the international donor community began to respond to the debt crisis of the poorest countries by a combination of debt forgiveness and strengthened poverty reduction drive. In fact, some donors now want to use ODA for poverty reduction only (not for diplomacy, industrialization, infrastructure or competitiveness). However, whether this strategy will really work in the long run remains to be seen. Since 2002, the international organizations (especially the World Bank) has started to re-emphasize the role of economic growth and infrastructure in the process of poverty reduction. Some developing countries are tired of too much emphasis on poverty reduction and too little effort in the direction of competitiveness, industrialization and agricultural development. Clearly, this is an evolving story the end of which is still unknown to us.

当前全球发展战略中的其他论点包括：

— — 一些人（包括非政府组织和社会活动家）说官方发展援助应该以赠款的形式提供，而不是贷款，这会加剧债务负担问题。

— — 官方发展援助应该只提供给贫穷国家。

中等收入国家不应该接受官方援助，因为它们可以吸引私人资金。 — 官方发展援助应该只提供给具有“良好治理”的贫穷国家（这称为选择性论证）。如果把钱交给政策和制度不健全的国家，那将是浪费。对于这些国家，应该提供建议而不是金钱。

— 援助协调和协调：为了降低交易成本（过多的任务、报告、会议等），援助计划必须在所有捐助者之间进行协调。应设立一个共同基金，所有捐助者都向其捐款。部门战略必须由所有人制定和共享。我们必须避免重叠和重复，因为钱是可以互换的（任何捐助者的任何捐款都具有相同的效果[是真的吗？]）。

然而，日本政府对这些主要由欧洲人领导的趋势感到不安。它害怕发展思路和实施过于统一。日本坚持最佳组合方法，即：由于每个国家的需求不同，每个捐助者都有其比较优势，因此统一所有援助计划和实施既不必要也不可取。必须避免不必要的程序，但应向发展中国家提供广泛的替代想法和工具。由他们而非捐助者来决定采用哪些目标和方法。此外，将官方发展援助资金的财务管理从捐助者转移到不是很干净或透明的政府（特别是地方政府）是非常危险的。

综上所述，近几年来，国际捐助界开始通过减免债务和加大减贫力度相结合的方式来应对最贫困国家的债务危机。事实上，一些捐助者现在只想将官方发展援助用于减贫（而不是用于外交、工业化、基础设施或竞争力）。但是，从长远来看，这种策略是否真的有效还有待观察。2002年以来，国际组织（特别是世界银行）开始重新强调经济增长和基础设施在减贫过程中的作用。一些发展中国家厌倦了过多强调减贫，而在竞争力、工业化和农业发展方向上的努力过少。显然，这是一个不断发展的故事，我们仍然不知道它的结局。